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IZREDNE RAZMERE
IN OBLAST / STATE
OF EMERGENCY
AND POWER

Uredniški uvodnik

Tokratna posebna številka Monitor ISH je nastala v sklopu projekta *Svoboda mnenja in izražanja skozi naracije izrednega stanja: antropološka študija slovenske (anti)demokratske zavesti v času epidemije covid-19*, ki se izvaja na Znanstveno-raziskovalnem središču Koper in raziskuje učinek izrednih razmer na prakse mirnega zbiranja in izražanja mnenja v Sloveniji. Zbrani prispevki širše pristopajo k tematiki in presegajo Slovenski kontekst – poleg Slovenije obravnavajo primere družbene mobilizacije v Burmi, desni populizem na Finskem, nevladni sektor Rusije v izrednih razmerah covida-19 in tudi teoretske koncepte, kot sta kritična teorija Frankfurtske šole in teorija iger, ki se dotikata vprašanja izrednih razmer v času covida-19.

Pričujoči članki potrjujejo, da raziskovanje izrednih razmer ostaja aktualno in pomembno, zlasti zaradi dejstva, da se družba nenehno srečuje z izrednimi razmerami, ki nastanejo kot posledica različnih situacij, kot so naravne katastrofe, vojne, teroristični napadi, gospodarske in finančne krize ter podobno. Številni znanstveniki in strokovnjaki, med njimi denimo Michael E. Mann (2012), James Hansen (2010), Lucy H. McHugh in drugi (2021), trdijo, da bodo izredne razmere v prihodnosti še pogostejše in intenzivnejše, kar še dodatno potrjuje pomen pravnih, antropoloških, socioloških in politoloških raziskav na tem področju.

Dejstvo je, da izredne razmere – kot odstopanje od sicer veljavnih pravil delovanja – spreminjajo meje možnega in sprejemljivega. Izredne razmere so pogosto dojete v kontekstu groženj preživetja nekega naroda, javnem redu in varnosti. Da bi se zoperstavile takšnim grožnjam, se državni voditelji zatekajo k ukrepom (namenoma in nenamenoma), ki v imenu »varovanja reda« vključujejo

začasno prekinitvev pravnih jamstev in demokratičnih norm. Ena izmed prvih izpričanih pravnih praks, podobna današnjim izrednim razmeram, je rimska *Senatus consultum ultimum*; gre za ukrep senata, ki je dajal konzulom izredna pooblastila za ohranjanje reda in varnosti, običajno v času političnih nemirov ali groženj notranje varnosti (Mitchell 1971, 47). Danes so določila o izrednih razmerah zapisana v ustavah ali različnih nacionalnih zakonih in se razlikujejo glede na nacionalno specifičnost in kontekst posamezne države.

Tovrstni zakoni imajo lahko v primeru aktivacije dolgoročne posledice za demokracijo in družbo – v času krize so tisti, ki imajo oblast, navadno soočeni z nalogo centralizacije oblasti in opuščanja demokratičnih mehanizmov odločanja, ob dejstvu, da kriza zahteva hitre odločitve in prevzemanje odgovornosti (Arendt 1979, 243–244). Ko je enkrat vzpostavljena nova struktura centralizirane moči, oblasti, odločanja in nadzora, obstaja tendenca, da se ta struktura ohrani in utrdi ter postane stalna in trajna (Fromm 1941, 167–188). V takih okoliščinah ni mogoče prezreti, da so politične institucije, ki vzdržujejo obstoječe sisteme demokracije, oslABLJENE »od zgoraj navzdol«, kar se kaže tudi v tem, da so temeljne demokratične vrednote, kot so delitev oblasti, načela pravne države, svoboda izražanja mnenja in pluralnosti ogrožene. Izredne razmere pogosto sprožijo nestrinjanje prebivalcev z nekaterimi vladnimi odločitvami, kot so omejitveni ukrepi, ki lahko vplivajo na vsakdanje življenje prebivalcev, omejitve pravic zaradi zaščite zdravja ali varnosti in tako naprej. Svoja nestrinjanja prebivalstvo izraža na različne načine, tako prek objavljanja komentarjev in mnenj na družbenih omrežjih, podpisovanja peticij, pisanja javnih pisem, kot tudi z udejetvovanjem znotraj protestniških gibanj na ulicah. Javno izražanje mnenja je še toliko bolj pomembno, saj omogoča pluralnost stališč, ki s strani državnih voditeljev v procesih odločanja v času krize

velikokrat ni dopuščena. Družbeni aktivizem na ta način deluje kot protiutež in korektiv omejevanju demokracije in naraščajoče avtoritarnosti, ki se poraja v kontekstu izrednih razmer. Številko začenjamo s prispevkom *Osberna Huanga*, v katerem proučuje dejavnike, ki so pripeljali do obsežne družbene mobilizacije v Burmi po državnem udaru februarja 2021. Analiza se osredotoča na miroljubne proteste in državljansko nepokorščino, ki sta bila odgovor burmanskega prebivalstva na poskus vzpostavitve demokracije. S pomočjo teorije mobilizacije Charlesa Tillyja obravnava koncept WUNC (Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, and Commitment) in njegov pomen pri organizaciji mirovnih demonstracij. Raziskava izpostavlja povezavo med zavezanostjo pred državnim udarom ter poznejšimi miroljubnimi protesti na ulicah. Sledi prispevek *Tanelija Viitahuhtaja*, ki uporablja teorijo Theodorja Adorna za analizo desnega populističnega gibanja v Evropi. V svojem delu poudarja, kako ta gibanja, delujoča v okvirih formalnih demokracij, uporabljajo jezikovne strategije, ki so bile že proučene v Adornovi analizi povojnega obdobja. V prispevku se osredotoča na stranko *Finns Party* kot primer stranke skrajne desnice z dvosmernim komunikacijskim modelom za radikalne in konservativne privržence. *Lewis Luartz* ugotavlja, kako lahko krize vplivajo na politično krajino in kako je pandemija spodbudila zavračanje vladnih politik, ki so bolj naklonjene populističnemu pristopu kot pluralističnemu. Predstavljena je obsežna analiza igranja vlog dveh ključnih akterjev v modeliranju situacije: vlade in državljana. Osredotoča se na njuno vlogo kot racionalnih igralcev, ki se spopadata z negotovostjo glede resnosti pandemije in nejasnostjo informacij. Avtorjev model nakazuje premik v mnenju splošne javnosti proti bolj restriktivnim stališčem do vladnih politik, kar pa hkrati spodbuja potencialno populistične tendence v vodstvu. Skozi ta model avtor nakazuje, kako krizne razmere, kot je pandemija covid-19, lahko ogrozijo načelo plural-

izma v sodobnih demokratičnih sistemih. *Matej Zupanc* analizira medijske vsebine o protestih v času pandemije covid-19. V analizi ugotavlja, kako so časnik Delo, tednik Demokracija in revija Mladina uokvirjali proteste. V prispevku predstavi pojavnost splošnih in vsebinsko-specifičnih okvirov v izbranih medijih ter kvalitativno analizira vsebino okvirov. V nadaljevanju okvire vsebinsko primerja med mediji ter pojasni, zakaj prihaja do raznolikega oziroma podobnega poročanja o protestih v analiziranih medijih. *Aleksandr Kuklin* se v svojem članku osredotoča na vlogo ruskega neprofitnega sektorja med pandemijo covid-19. Poudarja, kako so se nevladne organizacije prilagodile virtualnim oblikam dela, kljubovalne finančnim pritiskom ter svojo vlogo pri zagotavljanju pomoči ranljivim skupinam, dostavi osnovnih dobrin in medicinskih pripomočkov ter nudenju psihološke in pravne podpore. Poleg tega opisuje, kako so nevladne organizacije vplivale na politične spremembe in zagovarjale podporne ukrepe za ranljive skupine.

V število smo vključili tudi tri prispevke, ki vsebinsko niso povezani s tematiko posebne številke. *Luka Trebežnik* v prispevku poda kritiko tradicionalnemu konceptu skupnosti, ki so temeljili na idejah polnosti in prisotnosti, ne glede na povezavo z narodom, jezikom ali drugimi dejavniki. Sodobni razmisleki kažejo, da ta definicija postaja nevzdržna, saj se je izkazalo, da sta polnost in prisotnost iluzorni. Članek raziskuje nove smeri razumevanja skupnosti onkraj teh metafizičnih konstruktov. Osredotoča se na filozofska prizadevanja za konceptualizacijo postmoderne, postmetafizične skupnosti, kot je »nedelujoča skupnost« Jean-Luca Nancyja, »neomenljiva skupnost« Mauricea Blanchota, »negativna skupnost« Georgeseta Batailla in »skupnost vprašanja ali skupnost alegoreze« Jacquesa Derride. *Igor Ivašković* obravnava vprašanje narodne problematike znotraj Komunistične partije Jugoslavije (KPJ) do leta 1945 ter njene posledice na načrte za ureditev povojne države.

Osredotoča se na konflikte med vodstvom KPJ in njenimi podružnicami na slovenskem in hrvaškem ozemlju znotraj antifašističnih koalicij. Avtor poudarja, da so se posamezniki, zlasti na Hrvaškem, kljub podpori združevanju južnoslovanskih narodov, zavzemali za dejansko federalno državo z decentralizirano oblastjo. Vodstvo KPJ pa je zgolj zaradi vojaških taktik toleriralo avtonomne gibe, a je dejansko želelo centralizirano oblast z le nominalno federalizacijo. Konflikt je torej temeljil na boju med željo po nacionalni osvoboditvi na eni strani ter željo po oblasti na drugi. *Erika Ašič*, ki raziskuje dožemanje vonja med osnovnošolskimi učitelji. V analizi prikazuje, kako 54 osnovnošolskih učiteljev dojema vonj učencev, vpliv tega vonja na njihovo počutje ter kako se odzovejo ob zaznavi neprijetnega vonja. Pokaže, kako večina učiteljev opazi vonj učencev, se ob neprijetnem vonju počuti nelagodno, vendar redko posežejo po rešitvah, ki lahko vplivajo na učenčevo družinsko okolje.

Matej Zupanc

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OSBERN HUANG¹

From Willingness to Participate in Street Demonstrations: Unpacking the Role of WUNC Elements in Myanmar's Anti-Coup Mobilization

Abstract: This article investigates the catalysts behind the significant social mobilization against Myanmar's military regime following the February 2021 coup. In response to the coup, the Burmese populace organized widespread peaceful protests and civil disobedience campaigns, united by their collective pursuit of restoring democracy. Leveraging data from the 2019 Asian Barometer Survey and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), we examine previous instances of social mobilization against the military regime.

Applying Charles Tilly's mobilization theory, we explore how the WUNC (Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, and Commitment) theory sheds light on the social mobilization of the Burmese people, with a particular focus on the pattern of peace demonstrations. Our findings reveal a crucial link between pre-coup commitment and subsequent peaceful street demonstrations.

Utilizing quantitative methods, we analyze the relationship between WUNC elements and the likelihood of individuals participating in social mobilization and actual street demonstrations following Myanmar's military coup. Our findings underscore the importance of social capital and liberal democratic values in moti-

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vating individuals to support democratic governance, even under Myanmar's challenging conditions.

In conclusion, we argue that by strengthening social capital and promoting liberal democratic values, the people of Myanmar may be more inclined to engage in peaceful street demonstrations to resist authoritarian rule. Our research contributes to understanding factors that fuel social movements against oppressive regimes, enriching the literature on social mobilization in Myanmar.

Keywords: Social Mobilization, Myanmar Military Coup, Mobilization Theory, Social Capital, Democratic Values, Quantitative Analysis, Barometer Survey

Pripravljenost za sodelovanje v uličnih demonstracijah: razumevanje vloge WUNC elementov pri mjanmarski protidržavni mobilizaciji oziroma pri mobilizaciji protidržavnih demonstracij v Mjanmaru

Izvleček: Članek raziskuje katalizatorje za pomembno družbeno mobilizacijo proti vojaškemu režimu v Mjanmaru po državnem udaru februarja 2021. Kot odgovor na državni udar je burmansko prebivalstvo organiziralo obsežne miroljubne proteste in kampanje državljanske nepokorščine, ki jih je združilo skupno prizadevanje za ponovno vzpostavitev demokracije. S pomočjo podatkov iz raziskave Asian Barometer Survey iz leta 2019 in Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) preučujemo prejšnje primere družbene mobilizacije proti vojaškemu režimu.

Z uporabo mobilizacijske teorije Charlesa Tillyja smo raziskovali, kako teorija WUNC (Worthiness - Vrednota, Unity - Enotnost, Numbers - Število, in Commitment - Predanost) osvetljuje družbeno mobilizacijo mjanmarskega ljudstva, s posebnim poudarkom na vzorcu mirovnih demonstracij. Naše ugotovitve

razkrivajo ključno povezavo med predanostjo pred državnim udarom in poznejšimi miroljubnimi uličnimi demonstracijami.

Z uporabo kvantitativnih metod smo analizirali razmerje med elementi WUNC in verjetnostjo posameznikov, ki sodelujejo v družbeni mobilizaciji in dejanskih uličnih demonstracijah po vojaškem udaru v Mjanmaru. Naše ugotovitve poudarjajo pomen socialnega kapitala in liberalnih demokratičnih vrednot pri motiviranju posameznikov, da podprejo demokratično upravljanje, tudi v mjanmarskih zahtevnih razmerah.

Na koncu trdimo, da bodo ljudje v Mjanmaru morda bolj nagnjeni k miroljubnim uličnim demonstracijam, da bi se uprli avtoritarni vladavini, s krepitvijo socialnega kapitala in spodbujanjem liberalnih demokratičnih vrednot. Naše raziskave prispevajo k razumevanju dejavnikov, ki spodbujajo družbena gibanja proti zatiralskim režimom, s čimer obogatijo literaturo o družbeni mobilizaciji v Mjanmaru.

Ključne besede: družbena mobilizacija, vojaški udar v Mjanmaru, mobilizacijska teorija, socialni kapital, demokratične vrednote, kvantitativna analiza, raziskava barometra

Introduction

In the early hours of February 1, 2021, a significant political shift occurred in Myanmar, reconfiguring the country's complex socio-political landscape. The Myanmar military, known as the *Tatmadaw*, seized power, marking a decisive end to a decade-long quasi-democratic transition (Pedersen 2023; David and Holliday 2018, 179–198). This abrupt interruption came in the form of a *coup d'état* that resulted in the detainment of Myanmar's civilian leaders, including world-famous Nobel laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The military then declared a state of emergency, citing alleged fraud in the 2020 general election as a justification for their actions.

However, the Tatmadaw's return to complete authoritarian rule faced a swift and extensive backlash from the public. Across Myanmar, civilians took to the streets, enduring military crackdowns to protest the coup. This social upheaval involved widespread protests, civil disobedience campaigns, and general strikes. All these movements had one shared goal: to restore democratic governance. From doctors and teachers to students and civil servants, society showed unprecedented unity against the military regime (Farrelly 2021).

Despite the dangers and uncertainties, these collective actions continue, fuelled by profound resentment against the military regime and a shared desire for democracy. Understanding the catalysts behind this significant social mobilization is the main aim of this study.

Political sociologists have long analyzed social movements as complex phenomena from myriad social, political, and economic circumstances. Among the many theories developed to explain such actions, Charles Tilly's mobilization theory and the WUNC attributes (Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, and Commitment) have been instrumental in advancing our understanding of social movements' emergence and their potential impact on political change (Tilly 1993, 1-5; 2004, 1-15). However, applying these theories to the unique context of Myanmar's anti-coup mobilization presents an uncharted research realm, the resolution of which has significant practical implications for Myanmar people.

The Burmese populace's resistance to the military coup has attracted global attention. Nevertheless, a comprehensive analysis of this social movement needs to be improved in current academic literature, especially in examining individual attitudes and behaviors and their collective expression. Moreover, this study addresses a critical gap in the literature on Myanmar's political develop-

ment, which has traditionally focused on elite politics and ignored bottom-up dynamics of political change (Prasse-Freeman 2012, 372-373; Farrelly 2023).

By applying Tilly's WUNC framework to the pre-coup and post-coup Myanmar context, this research hopes to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the roots of anti-coup mobilization, especially the early street demonstrations across the country. Furthermore, we aim to underscore the influence of democratic values and social capital on the persistence of such movements.

This research may offer insights that benefit practitioners and policymakers by enhancing their understanding of the underlying motivations for social resistance. Such knowledge could contribute to the developing more effective strategies to support pro-democratic movements in Myanmar and other countries with comparable contexts.

In summary, this study explores the factors associated with the significant social mobilization against Myanmar's military regime following the February 2021 coup. Through an analysis centered on the WUNC elements, we aim to illuminate the correlations between an individual or aggregated attitudes and behaviors in the context of social movements. While we acknowledge the limitations in establishing direct causal mechanisms, our approach seeks to deepen the understanding of social movements' emergence and resilience in the face of autocratic backlash.

The article is organized in the following manner: Section two provides a background description of Myanmar's political situation and movements, and section three reviews pertinent literature on social mobilization and WUNC theory. Section four details our data sources and research methods. In section five, we share our findings and delve into their significance. Finally, the last section offers conclusions, highlights study limitations, suggests direc-

tions for subsequent investigations, and explores the potential impacts on future anti-authoritarian movements.

Political Context and Social Movement in Myanmar

The political situation in Myanmar has been characterized by an enduring tension between democratic aspirations and the military's relentless pursuit of control, often leading to moments of robust social mobilization. The 2021 coup is an apt illustration of this pattern more than seven decades after the independence of Myanmar. After the National League for Democracy (NLD) won by a landslide in the November 2020 general elections, the Tatmadaw overthrew the elected government before convening the new parliament, declaring a state of emergency under the justification of election fraud (Huang 2022, 319; Lidauer 2023, 1).

Public discontent surged in the coup's aftermath, triggering unprecedented social mobilization against the military regime (Wah 2021; Williams, 2021). The ensuing demonstrations were characterized by diverse participation. This widespread resistance to the coup was organized under the banner of the *Civil Disobedience Movement* (CDM), which employed various strategies such as strikes, protests, and social media campaigns to voice their demands for a restoration of democracy (Ryan and Tran 2022, 2).

This social mobilization was not an isolated or spontaneous phenomenon but the culmination of years of deep-seated grievances against military rule in Myanmar. It was reminiscent of the *8888 Uprising*² in 1988, where millions of Burmese citizens took to the streets to demand an end to military dictatorship, and the

² The 8888 Uprising was a major protest movement in Myanmar that began on August 8, 1988. It was driven by widespread discontent with military rule and economic hardships. The protests culminated in a violent crackdown by the military junta in September in the same year.

Saffron Revolution in 2007, led by Buddhist monks against the economic and political conditions under the junta (Lintner 1990, 1-12; Steinberg 2013, 2).

The *8888 Uprising* marked a significant shift in Myanmar's political landscape, culminating in the end of Ne Win's 26-year rule but leading to another military government – the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). This event saw the emergence of key figures such as Aung San Suu Kyi, who would later become the international symbol in the fight for democracy. On the other hand, despite being initially about economic conditions, the Saffron Revolution came to embody a broader struggle for political freedom and is indicative of the evolving strategies of social mobilization (Steinberg 2008, 220).

In both cases, the military regime responded with violence, resulting in a significant number of casualties and widespread international condemnation. Nevertheless, these movements demonstrated the potential for mass mobilization against the military regime and marked crucial moments in the country's enduring struggle for democracy. They also created a resilient underground civil society, provided a repertoire of contention, and nurtured democratic values that have persisted and informed subsequent resistances in various ways (Larkin 2005, 119-174).

The post-coup mobilization is distinguished by its ability to galvanize a broader cross-section of society, which is reflected by its 'cross-ethnic, cross-religion' feature to hold pressure against the military regime, which is never seen in previous anti-military movements (Dunford 2023, 159-160). We believe that this mass-scale 'cross-ethnic, cross-religion' unity can be understood within the framework of Tilly's WUNC attributes in our perspective, which provides a lens to examine the mechanisms driving this social mobilization (Tilly 1993, 1-5; 2004, 1-15; 2006, 298-306).

The WUNC theory suggests that social movements that display *worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment* have higher chances of success (Tilly, 1993, 21) and are more likely to gain public sympathy for recruiting more participants (Bennett and Segerberg 2012; Bailey et al., 2023, 1210). Understanding Myanmar's political context and previous social mobilizations against the military regime guides us to examine the role of WUNC elements in the anti-coup protests. The experience and memories of past resistances have shaped the people's willingness to mobilize, their commitment to democratic values, and their capacity to remain united in the face of brutal repression.

In the following sections, we will delve deeper into this exploration, examining the application of Tilly's theory to the post-coup mobilization in Myanmar and probing how the WUNC elements may have spurred the citizens' willingness to action when the junta had once again ruined the democratic transition.

Unraveling the Dynamics of Anti-Coup Mobilization in Myanmar with the WUNC Concept

Drawing on seminal works, social movements can be seen as a network of casual exchanges between a various individuals, groups, and organizations involved in political or cultural disputes bound together by a shared collective identity (Diani 1992, 3). Resource mobilization theory is a comprehensive framework that has been pivotal in understanding social movements. This theory suggests that the willingness of individuals to participate in social movements is influenced by the perceived costs and benefits of participation, shaped by both collective and selective incentives (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1214; Klandermans 1984, 583).

Charles Tilly is one of the most influential advocates of mobilization theory, which focuses on the political aspects of resource mobilization (Tilly 1993, 1-5). He distinguished between 'mobili-

zation potential,' referring to a group's capacity to engage in collective action, and 'actual mobilization,' which denotes translating that potential into concrete action. The theory emphasizes the importance of human and material resources, organizational capacities, and opportunities for successful collective action (Tilly 1978, 1-11). According to Tilly, social movements are more likely to develop when three critical conditions coincide: a conducive political environment for collective action, sufficient resources and organizations to mobilize people, and shared interests and identities among participants. While these conditions create a favorable landscape for the development of social movements, it is essential to note that their presence does not guarantee the automatic formation of such movements. The realization of social movements depends on a complex interplay of these factors and additional situational and contextual elements.

As such, Tilly's contribution to mobilization theory provides a valuable lens to understand the dynamics behind social mobilizations. Further, Tilly proposed the WUNC attributes as crucial for effective social mobilizations. WUNC stands for *Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, and Commitment*. According to Tilly (2004, 1-15; 2006, 298-306), a successful social movement is perceived as *worthy* when it demonstrates a righteous or virtuous cause. *Unity* indicates a shared identity and solidarity among the group members, compelling the cause. *Numbers* refer to the power in mass mobilization, reflecting broad support and participation. Lastly, *commitment* involves the willingness of participants to sustain the movement despite potential costs or risks.

Applying Tilly's WUNC concept, social movements aim to convince power holders and the public that they merit recognition and concession, possess the capability to challenge the status quo or defend their interests, and are resilient in the face of repression

or opposition. The emphasis on different WUNC attributes can vary based on the movement's goals, strategies, contexts, and audiences.

In analyzing the WUNC attributes within Myanmar's anti-coup mobilization, we find that while all elements are significant, the commitment of the movement's supporters emerges as particularly influential. Drawing from Bailey et al. (2023, 1213), we argue that this commitment represents a vital indicator of a movement's efficacy, as it exemplifies the supporters' readiness to take necessary actions to realize the movement's objectives. Though Tilly's framework does not prioritize any specific WUNC element, commitment plays a central role in Myanmar's unique political and historical context, functioning within a complex interplay of multiple factors influencing collective actions.

The term 'commitment' denotes the dedication of the movement and its participants. Social movements seek to showcase their commitment and willingness to endure hardships and risks for their cause. Thus, people's readiness to engage in political activities and confront potential risks reflects their commitment.

Nevertheless, such commitment is not without its risks. As mentioned, participants must be prepared to make sacrifices, particularly under an authoritarian regime such as Myanmar. Drawing on lessons from previous democratic movements in pre-Thein Sein era Myanmar, participants often faced brutal oppression and lengthy prison sentences (Smith 1991, 1-26).

Given the notoriously harsh conditions of political prisons in Myanmar, coupled with widespread societal suffering under an oppressive political regime and a distrustful civil society, individuals must weigh the risks before participating in street protests (Fink 2001, 46-69; Larkin 2005, 119-174). Lessons from decades of democratic struggles inform this deliberation. The decision to participate in such protests signifies personal risk-taking and reveals an understanding of the potential ramifications for their families and

communities. Given these implications, the importance of commitment in social movements is further emphasized. Thus, we posit that people's commitment to social protest and their disregard for the associated risks will positively correlate with the frequency of street protests following the coup (*Hypothesis 1*).

While worthiness, unity, and numbers are crucial to starting a robust social movement, the choice to act – the commitment – brings people's energy to the streets. Nevertheless, without the other three pillars – worthiness, unity, and numbers – citizens might not be determined to take to the streets. We believe that while worthiness, unity, and numbers may not directly predict the future scale of social movements, they undeniably reinforce people's commitment and determination to act when the time arises. First, we start with the worthiness of this movement.

In an anti-military dictatorship and pro-democracy movement, worthiness encapsulates participants' aspiration for democratic governance and their resistance to military rule (O'Donnell et al. 1986, 18–21). It represents not just citizens' assessment of a democratic government's legitimacy but also their alignment with liberal democratic values, thereby amplifying the rationale for anti-coup protests. Therefore, we posit that the perceived worthiness of democratic ways of life and a democratic regime will positively correlate with people's commitment to social protest (*Hypothesis 2*).

Unity can be assessed by the level of social capital within a society, reflecting the connections and trust among its citizens, which lead to more effectively reaching collective goals and help sustain a democratic society (Newton 2001, 202–206). Unity also promotes internal harmony over discord within the community. Furthermore, a cohesive society with aligned mindsets can act cohesively without diversions. Such unity reduces the barriers to initiating collective action and diminishes the risks of isolated resistance, offering

a more secure basis for mobilizing collective action. Therefore, we posit that unity, as displayed by group cohesion and consensus (Bailey et al. 2023, 1210-1220), will positively correlate with people's commitment to social protest. (*Hypothesis 3*).

The 'numbers' aspect refers to the anticipated size of participation before individuals join public demonstrations. Typically, people estimate the potential magnitude of these events based on past experiences and their sense of how many others hold similar views. Consequently, the attendance at previous demonstrations and the proportion of neighbors with congruent political positions can be key reference points. Thus, our final hypothesis regarding the 'numbers' dimension suggests that the number of previous protests in surrounding regions will positively correlate with the number of street protests following the military coup in Myanmar (*Hypothesis 4*).

In summary, Tilly's mobilization theory and the WUNC framework offer the essential theoretical foundation for our study. By connecting these theories with our empirical data, we seek to decipher the intricate dynamics of social mobilization against Myanmar's military regime. Our goal is to elucidate the correlations between democratic values, social capital, past experiences, and the determination of Myanmar people and their influence on participation in street demonstrations.

In the following section, we outline our data sources and methods. We detail how we operationalized the WUNC concept and measured how the Burmese populace exhibited these traits in their social mobilization against the military regime, utilizing nationwide survey and event-count data.

Data and Methodology

To shed light on the complex processes driving social mobilization against Myanmar's military regime, we utilized various data

sources, including the 2019 Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED). By integrating these datasets, we examined the relationship between the WUNC elements and the likelihood of social mobilization from both micro and macro perspectives.

ACLED is a comprehensive project dedicated to conflict data collection, analysis, and crisis mapping (Raleigh et al. 2010, 651–652). Founded by Professor Clionadh Raleigh of the University of Sussex in 2005 and initially part of her PhD work, ACLED has evolved into a non-profit, non-governmental organization incorporated in Wisconsin, USA, since 2014. In 2022, it broadened its scope globally, now collecting and disseminating real-time data and weekly updates on events worldwide. It has documented over one million individual global events.

Project ACLED offers current information on various political violence and protest events in developing countries, including Myanmar. This provides a detailed view of event locations, involved actors, fatalities, and event types. Data is sourced from diverse channels such as media reports, humanitarian agencies, and local partners, capturing specifics on event dates, locations, actors, fatalities, and types. Our analysis mainly focuses on the ‘demonstrations’ and sub-events labeled as ‘protests’ within the ACLED dataset.³ These are defined as public gatherings where participants

³ ACLED collects data on political disorder, capturing six primary event types: Battles, Explosions/Remote violence, Violence against civilians, Protests, Riots, and Strategic developments, and three types of disorder: political violence, demonstrations, or strategic developments. Each main category is divided into 25 sub-event types for a more granular analysis. Specifically for our study, we are utilizing the data about ‘demonstrations’ within the ‘disorder type’ category and ‘protests’ from the main event categories to underpin our analysis. Further details and classifications can be found in the ACLED Codebook and the Event Definitions Primer (ACLED 2023).

are unarmed and abstain from violence, even if violence might be directed towards them.

We filter events occurring in Myanmar from February 1, 2021, to April 30, 2023, encompassing the first two years of the coup and subsequent social mobilization. Additionally, we assess events from 2010 to February 1, 2021, dividing them into three distinct periods: Pre-reform era, Thein-Shein administration, and NLD administration, to test our hypothesis regarding ‘numbers.’ To fully leverage the dataset, we aggregate the events by the abovementioned periods⁴ and state/region, yielding a panel dataset capturing street demonstrations’ temporal and spatial variations.

Besides event count data, we also rely on survey data for our quantitative analysis. ABS is a valuable cross-national tool that gauges public sentiment concerning democracy, governance, and political culture across 15 East and Southeast Asian countries (Chu et al. 2020). The ABS was established in 2000 to assess public confidence in democracy across Asia and highlight the importance of public belief in democratic legitimacy for the success of democratization processes. From 2000 until 2023, the ABS has been co-hosted by the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica and the Institute for the Advanced Studies of Humanities and Social Sciences at the National Taiwan University in Taipei.

The fourth and fifth iterations of the ABS, conducted in 2015 and 2019, included Myanmar, with each survey encompassing approximately 1,600 respondents nationwide.⁵ This survey provides

4 Pre-reform era (before 2011), Thein-Shein administration (2011-2015). NLD administration (2015-2021), Post-coup (December 1, 2021 to now).

5 Notably, while each ABS survey typically targets approximately 1,600 nationwide respondents, sample sizes can vary due to fieldwork conditions. Specifically, the 2019 survey in Myanmar resulted in a final sample size of 1,627 respondents.

an insightful snapshot of the Burmese populace's perspectives before the coup.

Using the ABS data, we construct distinct indices representing the elements of WUC (worthiness, unity, and commitment). These indices are derived from responses about support for democracy,⁶ trust in others, and inclinations toward political engagement, including potential sacrifices for political movements. As the crucial individual-level variables in our research, these indices help elucidate the societal mobilization against Myanmar's military regime. The items and operationalizations used to measure each element of WUNC are detailed in Table 1 below:

6 Traditionally, the most commonly used set of questions for cross-national surveys to measure the level of public democratic support in a country is the 'three choices' format (Claassen 2020, 121). This format involves inquiring whether individuals believe democracy is always the best system, whether authoritarian regimes are sometimes preferable, or if they cannot discern the superiority of either system. However, due to variations in people's understanding of the 'democracy' concept, significant differences exist between authoritarian and democratic nations, casting doubt on the validity of this approach in authoritarian states. Hence, compared to direct measurement, we argue that indirect measurements, such as assessing whether people endorse a value system of freedom (Nathan 2020, 158-161), their understanding of democratic operational models (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007, 642-644), and the extent of opposition to specific authoritarian regimes (Foa and Mounk 2016, 11-14), can more accurately gauge citizens' democratic support within the context of authoritarian systems. Given the multifaceted nature of democratic systems, different democratic political bodies may operate differently, but political freedom remains the foundation of all democratic political processes. Therefore, we believe that individuals' identification with political freedom will better indicate their preference for a democratic system than direct questions about democratic support. In this paper, we employ a set of ten questions to measure individuals' support for core principles of liberal democracy, such as political equality, freedom of association and speech, checks and balances, and judicial independence.

Table 1: Questionnaire items and operationalization used for variables

WUNC element	Measurement Item in ABS	Operationalization
<i>Worthiness:</i> Liberal Democratic Values	<p>Q146: Women should not be involved in politics as much as men.</p> <p>Q147: The government should consult religious authorities when interpreting the laws.</p> <p>Q148. People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people.</p> <p>Q149. Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.</p> <p>Q150. The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society.</p> <p>Q151. Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups.</p> <p>Q152. When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch.</p> <p>Q153. If the government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.</p> <p>Q154. If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.</p> <p>Q155. If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.</p>	Summing up the frequencies of 'agree/strongly agree' responses for each question and form a composite score that ranges from zero to ten.
<i>Worthiness:</i> Diffuse Regime Support	<p>Q86. Over the long run, our system of government is capable of solving the problems our country faces.</p> <p>Q87. Thinking in general, I am proud of our system of government.</p> <p>Q88. A system like ours, even if it runs into problems, deserves the people's support.</p> <p>Q89. I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of.</p>	Summing up the frequencies of 'agree/strongly agree' responses for each question and form a composite score that ranges from zero to five.
<i>Worthiness:</i> NLD Supporters	If you vote today, which party would you vote for?	Respondents who answered NLD are encoded as 1, while the rest are encoded as 0.
<i>Unity:</i> Social Group Participant	Q18. We have listed various types of organizations that many people belong to. Could you identify the three most important organizations or formal groups you belong to?	Respondents who have participated in any group are encoded as 1, while the rest are encoded as 0.

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<i>Unity:</i> Trust Most People	Q22. General speaking, would you say that “Most people can be trusted” or “that you must be very careful in dealing with people”?	Respondents who chose ‘Most people can be trusted’ are encoded as 1, while the rest are encoded as 0.
<i>Commitment:</i> Will go or have already attended a demonstration or protest march	Q79. Attended a demonstration or protest march.	Respondents who selected ‘Have done it before’ and ‘I have not done this, but I might do it if something important happens in the future’ are encoded as 1, while the rest are encoded as 0.”
<i>Commitment:</i> Will take or have already taken risky action for a political cause	Q80. Taken an action or done something for a political cause that put you in a risk of getting injure.	

Regarding the aspect of ‘Worthiness,’ we employ ‘Liberal Democracy Values,’ ‘Diffuse Regime Support,’ and whether one supports the NLD as the primary variables of use. The reason is that even before the coup, Myanmar’s political system was not entirely democratic, yet a majority of the population could accept such a political arrangement (David and Holliday 2018, 46-74). Therefore, apart from supporters of the ruling party and individuals with higher liberal-democratic values, we also refer to the variable construction methods from existing research (Huang et al. 2013, 158-160). We use ‘diffuse support’ for the regime as an operational definition of endorsing the existing system (Lu and Dickson 2020, 678-681), considering it as one aspect of ‘Worthiness.’

Regarding the ‘Unity’ aspect, we expand the discussion to encompass social capital. We operationalize this by examining whether individuals participate in any social groups and whether they trust the majority of people in their society. For the ‘Commitment’ measure, we consider whether individuals are willing to, or have already, participated in demonstrations or protest marches. We also assess if they would disregard their safety for political reasons.

Furthermore, we incorporate sociodemographic variables, such as generation, gender, ethnicity, and affiliation with Buddhism, as control variables. In Myanmar, religion and ethnicity significantly influence the political landscape, citizenship, and nation-building processes. Buddhism, the dominant religion, along with the idea of ‘national races’ dramatically impacts the nation’s political norms and ideologies (Cheesman 2017, 461–462). Moreover, the ethnic diversity, which includes 135 officially recognized ethnic groups, adds to the intricacy of Myanmar’s politics and society (South 2008, 27–46).

Furthermore, we recognize that foreign researchers cannot access real-time public opinion in Myanmar following the coup and the decline in social liberties. However, the fifth wave of the Asian Barometer Myanmar survey was conducted in 2019, just before the onset of the global pandemic and the 2020 election. This gives us a unique chance to assess the attitudes of the Myanmar populace during the final moments of democratic reform. Moreover, we contend that the ACLED data offers a reliable proxy for measuring actual post-coup street demonstrations, as it draws from multiple sources and undergoes expert verification.

Our analysis employed quantitative methods to identify patterns and correlations within our selected datasets. Firstly, we connected the aggregated micro-level survey data from ABS with the macro-level ACLED data at the state and region levels. Through correlational analyses, we aimed to explore the relationship between WUNC indicators from the 2019 survey data and the actual instances of political violence and protest events in 2021. This approach enabled us to test our first and fourth hypotheses and to obtain a holistic view of the social mobilization in Myanmar, transitioning from pre-coup individual sentiments to post-coup tangible actions.

Next, to test hypotheses two and three, we utilized multilevel linear and logit regression models with a fixed-effect approach, given the vast regional disparities across Myanmar. This allowed us to account for the variability at the regional level, which would be lost in a simple pooled regression analysis (Gelman and Hill 2006, 1-12). Our dependent variables included measurements of citizens' propensity to engage in social mobilization, such as attending demonstrations or taking action for a political cause that will put them at risk (the *commitment*).

In the multilevel models, the individual and area-level elements of worthiness and unity – served as independent variables – were kept in their original form for the linear regression models. At the same time, the individual-level responses for the commitment to social movements were transformed into binary variables for the logit model.

By adopting this dual-level approach, we aim to surpass the constraints of strictly macro or micro perspectives, offering a more comprehensive and nuanced insight into the social mobilization against Myanmar's military regime. In the following section, we share our findings and discuss their implications.

Findings

This study examines the relationship between people's pre-coup commitment to demonstrations or taking action despite risks and the number of post-coup street demonstrations across various periods. Pre-coup commitments are aggregated by state/region to align with the similarly aggregated ACLED indicators. Subsequently, Pearson correlation coefficients are computed between each pair of variables, spanning all states/regions in Myanmar.

Table 2 displays the correlation matrix between the level of pre-coup commitments and the counts of demonstrations across dif-

ferent periods. While the two types of commitment vary in degree, they are strongly correlated. Furthermore, our findings suggest that citizens' commitment to demonstrations in 2019 did not correlate with the number of demonstrations during the previous Thein Sein Era or the subsequent NLD administration period. However, there is a significant correlation with the number of protests in each state/region after the coup.⁷ In contrast, the commitment to more aggressive actions shows no correlation with the number of demonstrations. Scatter plots with fitted lines are presented in Figures 1 and 2; the letter markings denote anonymized codes for different states/regions. Given a small sample estimate with only 15 observations, such a significance level is relatively uncommon. As a result, our macro-level findings partially validate the assumptions of our first hypothesis.

Table 2: Correlation analysis of macro variables: The effects of Commitment and Numbers

	Commitment to demonstration or protest march	Commitment to risky action for a political cause	# Thein Sein Era	# NLD Era	# Coup to coup anniversary	# Coup anniversary to 2022/5	# Coup to 2022/5
Commitment to demonstration or protest march	1						
Commitment to risky action for a political cause	0.7814***	1					


⁷ The correlation analysis using another event count, 'protests,' from ACLED, is entirely consistent with the results of Table 1 in terms of significance. This reflects the relationship in ACLED, where 'protests' is a subset of 'demonstration.' Therefore, the results of this correlation analysis are not shown here.

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# Thein Sein Era	0.3394	0.143	1				
# NLD Era	0.3898	0.1569	0.9655***	1			
# Coup to coup anniversary	0.4833*	0.2118	0.7691***	0.7248**	1		
# Coup anniversary to 2022/5	0.488*	0.247	0.3478	0.2307	0.699***	1	
# Coup to 2022/5	0.5261**	0.2467	0.629**	0.5456**	0.9377***	0.9039***	1


Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 1: Correlation between percentage of people willing to attend a demonstration and actual demonstration count (1 Feb 2021 - 1 Feb 2022)



Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); www.acleddata.com. & Asian Barometer Waves V dataset (Myanmar), www.asianbarometer.org.

Figure 2: Correlation between percentage of people willing to attend a demonstration and actual demonstration count (1 Feb 2021 - 1 Apr 2023)



Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); www.acleddata.com. & Asian Barometer Waves V dataset (Myanmar), www.asianbarometer.org.

Beyond our first main hypotheses, at a macro level, we also find that the more demonstrations there were in a region *before* the coup, the higher the number of demonstrations in that region in the year *after* the coup. This observation aligns with our fourth hypothesis. While this effect lost its significance a year after the coup, it still underscores the influence of the ‘numbers’ element in the WUNC theory in Myanmar.

We subsequently investigate how the WUNC elements influence respondents’ willingness to participate in political demonstrations and their readiness to undertake risky actions individually. Table 3 displays the outcomes from three multilevel regression

models. Model 1 employs a fixed-effect logit regression to gauge willingness to attend a demonstration. In contrast, Model 2 assesses the inclination to take action for a political cause, even if it poses personal risks. The coefficients for each variable are also graphically represented in Figure 3.


Table 3: Regression model: The impact of Worthiness and Unity on the two types of Commitment to political movement

	(1)	(2)
	Attended a demonstration or protest march	Taken an action or done something for a political cause that put you in a risk of getting injured
LDV	0.106*** (3.53)	0.134*** (4.19)
Diffuse regime support	0.107* (2.26)	-0.00892 (-0.18)
NLD supporter	0.512*** (3.75)	0.471** (3.25)
Social group participant	0.700*** (5.47)	0.522*** (3.80)
Trust most people	0.510** (3.12)	0.679*** (4.04)
Education level	0.216** (2.62)	0.155 (1.76)
35-49 years old	0.0798 (0.51)	-0.0635 (-0.38)
50 and above	-0.223 (-1.38)	-0.153 (-0.89)
Female	-0.261* (-2.05)	-0.185 (-1.35)
Ethnic: Bamar	0.227 (1.09)	0.286 (1.31)

Religion: Buddhism	0.506	0.671 [*]
	(1.90)	(2.33)
State-level Constant	-0.0229	-0.300
	(-0.11)	(-1.29)
Observations	1627	1627

t statistics in parentheses
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Figure 3: Logit model coefficients for 1) willingness to attend a demonstration or protest march and 2) taking action for a political cause that put you in a risk



Source: Asian Barometer Waves V dataset (Myanmar), www.asianbarometer.org.

In the first model, we discovered that the variables capturing elements of ‘Worthiness’ – specifically ‘LDV,’ ‘Diffuse regime support,’ and ‘NLD supporter’ – are all significant. These variables, representing people’s attitudes toward democratic governance and the

legitimacy of the incumbent NLD administration, act as positive predictors for attending a demonstration or protest march.

In the second model, which concerns the willingness to take action for a political cause regardless of the associated risks, both 'LDV' and 'NLD supporter' remain significant. However, 'Diffuse regime support' does not significantly predict the dependent variable in this model. This suggests that public support for Myanmar's semi-democratic political system is not robust enough to drive their willingness to take political actions despite potential risks.

The variables 'Social group participant' and 'Trust most people' represent the 'Unity' element of the WUNC concept in both models. Both are significant predictors for attending demonstrations and taking risky actions for a political cause. This suggests that individuals who are more socially involved and have a greater trust in others are more inclined to participate in collective political actions.

Regarding the control variables, factors such as age, ethnicity, and religion influence the dependent variables to varying extents. In the second model, Buddhism emerges as a significant predictor (coefficient 0.661, $p < 0.05$), implying that Buddhists might be more likely to take risky actions for a political cause. This is consistent with the long-term influence of religion on the Myanmar political landscape (Cheesman 2017, 477) and the observations of increased riots against military rule after the coup, especially in the Burmese heartland (Pedersen 2023, 41-45).

These interpretations align with and extend the principles of Charles Tilly's mobilization theory, incorporating the WUNC (Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, and Commitment) concept. Our findings suggest that individuals' sense of worthiness and unity significantly influences the commitment to engage in collective actions, whether peaceful protests or risky political gatherings.

Our results show that the elements representing Worthiness and Unity exert positively and significantly affect Commitment. This suggests that respondents with higher levels of worthiness and unity are likelier to participate in or support political and risky actions. These findings serve as robust empirical evidence that validates Hypotheses 2 and 3 of this study.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study explored the factors influencing participation in post-coup demonstrations against Myanmar's military regime, utilizing Charles Tilly's WUNC theory as a conceptual framework. The findings spotlight the pivotal roles of Worthiness, Unity, and Commitment in driving individuals to resist the military junta. Moreover, this study unveils that prior experience of rallying against a quasi-military regime markedly bolsters the likelihood of individuals engaging in street protests once more, observed at the State/Region level.

Our investigation into the WUNC elements within Myanmar's social movement against military rule offers vital macro and micro insights. At the macro level, our analysis furnishes compelling evidence affirming our hypothesis: pre-coup commitment levels are positively associated with the extent of post-coup street demonstrations. Specifically, the correlation matrix delineates a robust positive link between the aggregated willingness (commitment) recorded in the 2019 survey data and the counts of post-coup demonstrations in 2021 across various states and regions.

Our findings bolster prior research emphasizing the pivotal role of commitment in social mobilization. For example, McAdam (1982, 16-19) posited that the degree of commitment to a cause is a fundamental determinant of the persistence and intensity of social movements. Similarly, Klandermans (2004, 373) argued that the depth of commitment explains why individuals maintain their involvement in

social movements, even in the face of potential risks and hardships.

Furthermore, our analysis yields significant insights by applying multilevel regression models. Notably, our data shows that liberal-democratic values, social capital (as indicated by association and general trust), and support for the National League for Democracy (NLD) all positively correlate with individuals' commitment to attend a demonstration and to 'take action or done something for a political cause that put you at a risk of getting injured.'

These findings resonate with the work of scholars such as Norris (2002, 219–223), who stressed the vital role of social capital in fostering civic engagement and collective action, and Dahl (1989, 6–9), who articulated the fundamental role of democratic values in galvanizing social resistance against authoritarian regimes.

From the insights drawn through both our macro and micro analyses, it becomes evident that the WUNC elements are instrumental in shaping the social mobilization against Myanmar's military regime. The robust positive correlations between these elements and the willingness to participate in demonstrations indicate that they are not mere peripheral aspects of social movements; instead, they influence individuals' decisions to engage in protests following the violent overthrow of the democratic regime.

However, our study reveals that support for Myanmar's semi-democratic political system is insufficient to sustain the public's willingness to undertake risky political actions, as evidenced by the lack of significant predictive power of 'diffuse regime support' in our second model (David and Holliday 2018, 46–74). This finding accentuates the intricate dynamics fuelling social mobilizations against military rule in Myanmar, emphasizing the necessity for a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted factors at play.

Moreover, our findings echo prior research, suggesting that social movements are more likely to succeed when they mobilize

broad-based support, maintain unity among participants, and effectively embody all elements of the WUNC framework (McAdam et al. 2001: 148; Bailey et al. 2023, 1210–1212). These findings resonate with recent developments, such as the alliance between the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and Ethnic Resistance Organizations (EROs) in their contestation of land and political authority with the Tatmadaw (Dunford 2023, 159–182; Jolliffe 2023, 125–126). Such alliances may foster the potential for a successful revolution that incorporates more diverse voices across the country and promotes more democratic forms of governance.

Despite its insightful contributions, our study has notable limitations. First, due to constraints in the available data, we could not directly measure certain WUNC elements – specifically, Numbers and Commitment – at the individual level.

Second, our study relied on cross-sectional data, which limits our ability to establish causal relationships. Employing longitudinal data that tracks changes in the WUNC elements and participation in social mobilizations over time would address this issue more effectively.

Nevertheless, even amidst this bleak period for civil liberties, we are optimistic that future research could still significantly benefit from more comprehensive survey data, including measures of WUNC elements. Based on our analysis of the Myanmar people’s unwavering opposition to the military regime, we maintain that survey research, including longitudinal studies, will continue to be viable in Myanmar’s future landscape.

Through this study, we understand that bolstering citizens’ democratic consciousness, fostering stronger connections between individuals and their communities, and providing more opportunities for people to demand their rights empowers them to rise in defense of democracy during times of crisis. However, it has also highlighted the complexity of these dynamics and underscores the need for fur-

ther, more comprehensive research to deepen our understanding of social movements against authoritarian regimes. The people of Myanmar are actively seeking to reclaim the democratic governance they rightfully deserve, and we remain steadfast in our commitment to monitor their progress and support their cause.

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TANELI VIITAHUHTA¹

Adorno on Authoritarianism and Its Transformations in the Current Far-Right Discourse

Abstract: This article proposes a reading into the discourse of the current far-right, utilizing and updating Frankfurt School's studies on authoritarianism. In the first part, the Finns Party is focused on and interpreted as a contemporary far-right party with structurally two-fold communication model and an audience that pertains to more radical and conservative followers. In the second part, this reading is given depth by examining it in the light of post-war Critical Theory, especially Theodor Adorno's views on language, capitalism, and the unconscious, and how these become connected in ethnocentric agitation.

Keywords: Far-Right, Discourse Theory, Critical Theory, Theodor Adorno, Authoritarianism

Adorno o avtoritarnosti in njenih preoblikovanjih v sodobnem diskurzu skrajne desnice

Izvleček: Članek podaja v branje diskurz trenutne skrajne desnice z uporabo in posodabljanjem študij frankfurtske šole o avtoritarizmu. V prvem delu je osredotočenost na Finski stranki, ki je interpretirana kot sodobna skrajno desna stranka s strukturno dvojnimi komunikacijskim modelom in publiko, ki pripada bolj radikalnim in konservativnim privržencem. V drugem delu je predstavljeno poglobljeno preučevanje v luči povojne kritične teorije,

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zlasti pogledov Theodorja Adorna na jezik, kapitalizem in nezavedno ter kako se ti povezujejo v etnocentrični agitaciji.

Ključne besede: skrajna desnica, teorija diskurza, kritična teorija, Theodor Adorno, avtoritarnost

Introduction

Lately, heated public discussion on political doublespeak has arrived in Finland. With the rise of the Finns Party (FP) into the government, the Finnish public has heightened interest in the ambiguous discourse of their far-right politics. After the 2017 and 2021 leadership elections, where first the current Speaker of the Parliament, Jussi Halla-aho, and then the current Minister of Finance, Riikka Purra, were elected to lead FP, the party has taken a sharp turn toward the far-right. In its current formation FP fits the description of Cas Mudde's contemporary 'fourth wave' far-right party: it incorporates nativist, authoritarian, and populist discourses. Following Mudde's demarcation, this broad outline of today's far-right can be further subdivided into radical and extreme. The core distinction between these categories is the following. While the radical right accepts the essence of democracy, opposing merely its liberal version and relying on populist means, the extreme right rejects wholesale the democratic ideas of popular sovereignty and majority rule. Thus, the extreme right would not be so much populist but precisely extremist, relying on a more or less fixed set of ideas in their quest to demolish what they perceive to be false equality and sham democracy. (Mudde 2019)

Yannick Lahti and Emilia Palonen argue in their report on the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on Finnish populism that FP remains mainly inside the more moderate populist outlook of the far-right (Lahti and Palonen 2023, 234). FP operates matter-of-factly within the democratic system instead of seeking to subvert it

in an extremist fashion, and at the moment, the party is in power with the National Coalition Party. Under their government, classical right-wing policies are being introduced in Finland: tax cuts are implemented for the wealthy, and social security programs are being scaled down. Thus, FP can take part in implementing a solidly straightforward right-wing political program.

However, there are essential ambiguities in the communication of FP that point towards integral continuity between the seemingly separate political identities of ‘radical’ and ‘extreme’ versions of the right (the ‘far-right’ and the ‘far-far-right,’ as it were). Clear examples of xenophobic hate speech on the internet, especially towards the Finnish Muslim community, but also towards other minorities, have convincingly been traced to the leading politicians of FP, to Halla-Aho without a doubt, and to Purra with no reasonable doubt. They have been unapologetic in their public replies and have continued their political lives as if nothing significant would be under discussion.² It is difficult not to conclude that an emphatically extremist position has its place within the overall pattern of FP politics.

Instead of gradation of separate positions, it seems that with FP and parties like them, we are dealing with an integral combination of extremist and moderate right-wing positions. The early Frankfurt School would not have hesitated to call such a combination ‘dialectical totality’ because both elements are essential for the functioning of the whole. Viewing contemporary far-right politics as a ‘whole’ does not imply a functionalist explanation. Instead, a holistic viewpoint is crucial not to lose track of the interplay of dif-

² For an overview of the Finnish racism scandals during the summer of 2023, when high-ranking FP politicians were accused of expressing and disseminating descriptions of racial minorities in hateful manner, among others cf.: Yle 2023; Politico 2023; BBC 2023.

ferent ideological and practical positions. Further, this viewpoint by no means touches merely on the Finnish far-right but more generally describes the movement.

I propose that the first generation of Frankfurt School thinkers provide powerful tools for interpreting contemporary far-right. The Frankfurt School viewpoint is that deception and doublespeak are structural, not coincidental, features of the far-right discourse. This means that instead of differentiating between different grades or *topoi* of the far-right's ideational locations, their discourse should be seen as a structure that utilizes several elements. This is proposed especially by Theodor Adorno's analysis of authoritarianism under the superficial democratic values of late capitalism. Adorno's theory is connected with the critical observation that the far-right openly expresses and insidiously hides its affective investment in the psychological mechanisms of denial and projection.

Rhetorical Techniques of the Contemporary Far-Right in Theory and Practice

Language as a field of political signification is central to the far-right, as it buttresses its claim to represent white/majority identity. The polar opposite of this can be constructed in various ways that reflect the political situation, e.g., in Islamophobic or anti-Black terms. What is essential is the binary and quasi-logical nature of this operation. The identity categories must not be fluid or overlap for the operation to be functional. (Haider 2018, 42-64)

Like their current European counterparts, FP is preoccupied with immigration. Andreas Malm and the Zetkin Group stress that for the current far-right, immigration functions as a 'funnel issue' through which even incredibly vast, systemic questions, such as climate change, must be passed (Malm et al. 2021, 41). The term 'funnel issue' was coined by Michelle Hale Williams, who first

claimed that immigration was introduced as an ‘omnibus issue’ by the far-right in the mid-1990s. Other metaphors she uses to illustrate this process are those of bridging and translating. Thus, many social concerns can be translated into a single problem and, in the process, narrowed down, as if through a funnel, whereby they become homogenized and can be connected with a tangible object. Here, the figure of an immigrant serves as a scapegoat (Williams 2006, 57–60).

Just as translation bridges different languages, in the narrative of the far-right, the fear of immigration bridges the (real) experience of social change toward multicultural society and the (fantasmatic-dystopian) imaginary of the threatening apocalypse caused by this demographic/cultural change. This bridge between experience and imagination can be crossed in both directions. Thus, the fear of immigration can start to color the everyday perception of actual immigrants. By introducing theoretical ideas, such as that of ‘the great replacement,’ vague experiences of personal anguish can be amplified with the narrative that the irrational culture of Islam is threatening Western civilization. ‘Replacement’ in this narrative is ambiguous, expressing hidden vulnerability and a call to action. As Mikko Salmela and Tereza Capelos underline, in the emotional framework of the far-right, the complex emotion of *ressentiment* is central, and it can take on different hues: on the one hand, victimhood, on the other hand, superiority (Salmela and Capelos 2021, 191).

Closely connected are the feelings of failed entitlement and privilege, which can easily lead to the narrativization of self as having been unfairly outpaced. As Teemu Tammikko (2019, 76) points out, there is a close connection between acceptance of such racist narratives as the ‘great replacement’ (according to which white Europeans are being replaced with Muslim immigrants) and the outbreak of anti-minority violence. However, an outbreak of anti-social

acting out is only one possible effect. Psychological coping mechanisms can also be applied. Probably the most common one is the silent resentment, connected to a feeling of discrepancy between the values of liberal democracy, where every individual is supposed to be valued, and private feelings of inadequacy and worthlessness. These emotions do not necessarily lead to violence. However, precisely when they become widespread, the liberal world of party politics can start to be appreciated in a different light.

Emotions such as anxiety and anger can be translated into public speech when their 'hot' underpinnings in rage and disappointment, ubiquitous in online communities, are filtered and adapted into the environment of 'cool' political discussion. This happens through discursive practices, paramount among them being irony. Tuija Saresma and Urho Tulonen show in their study of Jussi Halla-aho's Scripta blog that his use of irony is connected with constructing a 'double audience.' This implies that two meanings are at work: one is effective and primarily directed at the core supporters; the other, seemingly detached and rational, is meant for the general public (Saresma and Tulonen 2020, 155). Here, irony acts as a literary device that permits one to present a general and, in principle, perfectly valid claim, e.g., about immigration, while coloring it with hints, allusions and neologisms. These latter can slip unnoticed in the public discussion, acting as a Trojan horse for negatively loaded descriptions of immigration.

Two recent examples by key FP politicians suffice here. They, however, point to a larger discourse context, where the suspicion of relying on the construction of double audience and 'dog whistle' communication is present because the politicians have a past of hostility towards minorities and remain unapologetic. The first concern concerns FP Finance Minister Riikka Purra's blog post in the summer of 2023. In her blog text, she defends herself against

the indisputable accusation that the posting habits of her alias ‘riikka’ on social media before her political career have been racist. In her reply, Purra writes: ‘I have never denied the human dignity of everyone’ (Purra 2023).³ Does this clumsily formulated phrase mean that Purra intends to say that she has not denied the dignity of ‘anyone’? This would be a false statement, yet given the style of her post, the one that comes to mind. Another way of reading would be to insist on literal interpretation, which adds a sinister undertone: she would agree that she has denied the dignity of some groups of people while not everyone’s.

The second example pertains to Halla-aho’s newspaper interview from the same time. He comments on his denial of the role of Parliament Speaker to break the summer vacation of the MPs and call them in to vote on the government confidence, demanded by the opposition. At the time, the government was facing a torrent of controversies connected with racism, one of which is the case of Purra, referred to above. In the interview Halla-aho says: ‘Overall, in the Parliament, we go by the rules of the majority and not by the Left’ (Helsingin Sanomat 2023).⁴ The surprising statement is a mere mistake, Halla-aho later said. Mixed up in his words, instead of ‘the Left’, he meant to say ‘the minority’ (‘Vähemmistö,’ a word for the minority in Finnish, sounds similar to ‘vasemmisto,’ which means the Left). Is this refutation credible? Or, is this a ‘Freudian slip,’ revealing that semantically, the Left and minority are strongly connected in Halla-aho’s mind?

Purra’s and Halla-aho’s political careers have been, to this date, success stories, which underlines the power of their Huntingtonian ‘clash of civilizations’ framework (already evoked by the subtitle of

³ In Finnish, ‘En ole koskaan kieltänyt jokaisen ihmisarvoa.’

⁴ In Finnish, ‘Eduskunnan toimintaperiaate ylipäätään on se, että siellä mennään enemmistön eikä vasemmiston pillin mukaan.’

Halla-aho's Scripta blog, 'writings from the sinking West'⁵). While altering the fate of civilization with the tools of national policies of a relatively minor country seems an unlikely project, there might be other reasons for them to get into politics.

Punishing immigrants with the means of border surveillance, targeting them with police control, and shutting them outside the social benefits system might be a politically ineffective strategy if one were to change the course of civilization. However, these means might produce substitute satisfaction in the core supporters and normalize their negative emotions, such as resentment. Social sadism is proposed by China Mieville (2015) to be connected with the decadent stage of the failing neoliberalism. The psychic hunger for collective punishment and spectacles of injustice in large part of the populace might need to be brought into the equation if the popularity of the far right parties with radical imaginary, but political will only for quite conservative right-wing political programs is to be explained.

The legacy of the Frankfurt School holds an essential place of precedent in theorizing this constellation. From such works as *Punishment and Social Structure* by Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer to *Eros and Civilization* by Herbert Marcuse, this tradition of heterodox Freudian-Marxist interpretation of society seems more pertinent today than any time after the counterculture of the sixties and more acute than any time during the heyday of the Third Wayism, in the 1990s and early 2000s.

In Adorno's post-war writings on social psychology of authoritarianism, the Western political system is understood to be structured around the barring of communist and fascist ideologies from

⁵ 'Kirjoituksia uppoavasta lännestä' is also the name of Halla-aho's book of selected blog entries, published in 2009.

representations within the system. This opens up an interpretative horizon for Adorno (2020, 20), mainly the hermeneutics of the forbidden and the transgressive in the political imagination and how, among these lines, something like an alternative political identity for the far-right could be assembled. Nonetheless, after the collapse of the socialist bloc and the bipolar world order, the structuring logic of politics has changed, and Adorno's idea of the 'forbidden' far-right identity needs to be updated. Lately, Adorno's ideas of identity have been unpacked by Oberle (2018).

Here, the advances discussed above by the far-right are significant. In comparison to liberals, who balk at utopianism, the far-right of today has no problem in imagining the utopia of white ethnostate or some other project of racial segregation and absolute hierarchy. However, the convoluted intellectual history of such ideas makes it difficult for them to embrace such ideas openly. Proclaimed by the German National Socialists and Italian Fascists in the 1920s and 1930s, these ideas have become taboo in Western politics since the defeat of these states (Jackson and Feldman 2014, 7). Further, in practical terms, a far-right party of the FP variety does not seem ready to cross many political lines of business-as-usual, at least not immediately after achieving power.

Tensions between saying and not saying, showing and not showing emotion, being abstractly against politics and concretely pro-political institutions; these tensions mark the contemporary far-right as a whole, unified by the drive towards authoritarianism and with little actual authority. Alberto Toscano claims in *Late Fascism* that the current far-right is defined by a social situation where no mass party dares to promise to 'fix' the broken capitalist system. Instead, phantasmagoric depictions of the racial other and horror stories of the atrocities of the liberal left fill the vacuum of any coherent ideology (Toscano 2023). Sabine Volk's research on the German PEGIDA

shows that the main enemy of at least this far-right movement is ‘left dictatorship,’ a notion which has been so unmoored from reality that even the original Nazis, the National *Socialists*, can be depicted as belonging to this left trajectory (Volk 2023, 544).

While acknowledging these changes in political-institutional, as well as technological and media landscape, the theories of Frankfurt School in general, and Adorno in particular, show that the post-war far-right psychic economy has a deep-seated confluence with ambiguous linguistic and thinking patterns.

Adorno’s Analysis of the Authoritarian Personality

The first generation of the Frankfurt School, contemporary to the far-right’s classical era, sought to analyze their communication mechanisms by studying forms and shapes that ethnocentrism took in anti-Semitism. The question of whether anti-Semitism is a *sui generis* form of ethnocentrism is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, there are limits to Frankfurt School’s analysis of racism, especially from their insufficient attention to the many-sided and complex consequences of colonialism, the slave trade, and racial capital (Baum 2015).

Adorno believes that in anti-minority agitation, what is essential is not the ‘what’ but the method or ‘how’ (Adorno 1997, 38). The Christian far-right agitators that Adorno studied in the post-war United States made an effort to distance themselves from German Nazism and Italian Fascism. Subsequently, Adorno’s studies on extremism deal with anti-democratic agitation and propaganda where the relationship to the Nazis or Fascists is never wholly disclosed. According to Adorno, ethnocentric agitation is based on manipulative linguistic techniques, described by him as ‘tricks.’ In *The Authoritarian Personality*, Adorno presents a typology of the range of the far-right followers. According to it, both the ‘ma-

nipulative type,' bureaucrat to whom no personal contact with the victims of his persecution is needed, as well as the 'crank,' socially failed isolated individual and compulsive fanatic, have their place on the spectrum of the far-right (Adorno et al. 1969, 765-767).

According to Adorno, instead of 'concrete and tangible political issues,' anti-minority sentiment purposely promotes an 'irrational emotional aggressiveness' (Adorno 1991, 132). Irrationality becomes a form through which perfectly ordinary conservative content can be passed. Nonetheless, the anti-minority agitation is recognized to be such by its recipients. Adorno's viewpoint is connected with the psychoanalytic theory that differentiates between unconscious and conscious layers of the mind.

The conscious layer of rationality under late capitalism remains for Adorno an abstract and bureaucratically cleansed entity, while unconscious libidinal drives are shunned from the rational mind. For Adorno, even the libidinal current is not in any unproblematic sense 'primary' but receives its form through social rationality, and thus libidinal impulses reflect their repression. Through technological rationalization and manipulation, the instinctual forces come to be viewed as alien and threatening to the consciousness. Their lack of mediation leads to one-sided relationality and tabooing of dreams and fantasies. (Adorno 1991, 137)

In his analysis of Christian radio evangelist Martin Luther Thomas's broadcasts, Adorno elaborates on this distinction with a view to the apparatus of commercial media. According to him (Adorno 1997a, 50-51), the emphasis on the term 'leader' (*Führer*) galvanizes the follower:

The idolatry of the term leader itself is not simply a relapse into barbarian habits of thought, though it doubtlessly implies retrogressive elements. It is in itself the outcome of late industrial society in a way

which at least may be hinted at. The intermediary between industrial rationality and magical idolatry is advertising. The technique of competition has developed a certain tendency to turn the slogans under which the commodities are sold into magical ones.

Adorno does not claim that the dissemination of far-right slogans would be caused by advertising. However, after the advertising techniques have been made familiar to people, they can be taken over by political agents. Adorno maintains that consumerism introduces new pathways into the unconscious mind. Amid technological modernity, 'magical idols' are no longer sincerely believed to have supernatural powers. However, the supposition that *they might have* can be cynically hinted at in socializing and screening out like-minded people.

The insincerity concerning ethnocentrism emphasized by Adorno seems very much attuned to the 2020s. According to him, in modern anti-Semitism, it does not matter that the Jews are not believed to be the poisoners of wells. However, this and similar outrageous suggestions are not unimportant as they validate the bond between anti-Semites and function as their secret handshake. Adorno notes that Thomas presents the drift toward dictatorship as a historical necessity to which only subjective disposition can help to adapt (Adorno 1997a, 61). Not much updating is needed to bring this analysis to the current far-right rhetoric.

Adorno differentiates between the modern context of rationality and its influence on the manifestation of the instinctual drives. Similarly to his in-depth psychological approach, he proposes that ethnocentric agitation uses techniques and technologies of modernity that complement but never explain the older strata of superstitions. Expressions of the instinctual drives are formed, but not caused, by modern technology and the quest for rationality.

According to Adorno, the mechanisms of modern life have been ‘automatized throughout the buying processes,’ and they can be transferred to the political field. He (Adorno 1997a, 50–51) writes: ‘The mode of ‘selling an idea’ is not essentially different from the mode of selling a soap or a soft drink. Sociopsychologically, the magical character of the word leader and therewith the charisma of the *Führer* is nothing but the spell of commercial slogans taken over by the agencies of immediate political power.’

Focus on how language functions in mediating the contradictory spheres of commercialized/bureaucratic ratio and the ‘primal’ underline of libido are specific to the Frankfurt School’s analysis of ethnocentric agitation. The underpinning Marxist aspect here concerns the necessarily incomplete nature of this linguistic mediation under late capitalism, where language remains partial and ambiguous. In *Prophets of Deceit*, Leo Löwenthal and Norbert Guterman conclude that racial agitator’s hints and ‘suggestions manage to slip through the nets of rational meaning, those nets that seem unable to contain so many contemporary utterances’ (Löwenthal and Guterman 1949, 141).

This tight formulation condenses the Frankfurt School idea of modern ethnocentrist agitation under late capitalist relations. In an inverse image, even hate speech mirrors the actual reification of language in the ‘administered world’ and the hope to escape it. While the turn to innuendo might help in ‘venting spleen,’ psychologically and politically this remains an inefficient trick. Nonetheless, these complexes can be cynically utilized to cause concrete harm and destruction.

Authoritarianism and the Lack of Imagination -argument

According to the first generation of critical theorists, the rise of consumerism affects all social structures, including mass culture

and art. Also politics is transformed. In ethnocentrist agitation, political programs are secondary, if even existent. The primary goal, political power, becomes an end, and the play on atomized individuals' psychological and instinctual needs is a means to such an end. Material suffering under capitalism cannot be alleviated with *Ersatz* politics, and similarly, mental suffering cannot be changed by the substitute satisfaction promised by sadistic politics.

Max Horkheimer formulates this combined crisis tendency in *Eclipse of Reason* (1947): 'The theme of this time is self-preservation, while there is no self to preserve' (Horkheimer 2004, 87). While beautiful, the claim is problematic, reducing the subject to a non-entity. However, Horkheimer and Adorno are concerned with the *chiasmatic structure* and not the self-evident claim: the individual is threatened by individuality. The case is not that self would be completely engulfed in self-preservation. In a discussion after his lecture, 'The Meaning of Working Through the Past,' Adorno admits that he uses exaggeration, as it seems to him 'a necessary medium for social-theoretical and philosophical presentation' (Adorno 1997b, 306). Further, he mentions that 'we must educate people toward the idea that they are more than what simply exists' (Adorno 1997b, 303). The connection between exaggeration and thinking of 'more than what simply exists' touches on imagination.

In *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), a research on the pathologies of the post-war American psyche, Adorno speculates on the role of imagination and the use of fantasy in authoritarian thinking. According to him, anti-Semitic propaganda is partly self-defeating because it involves an irreflexive attitude towards its effectual base that restricts its power. This seems puzzling, as Adorno also holds that an authoritarian mindset is expansive and boundless. For example, he writes that 'totalitarianism means knowing no limits, not allowing for any breathing space, conquest

with absolute domination, complete extermination of the chosen foe' (Adorno 1994, 164).

It seems evident that under post-war democratic Western societies, open agitation for the 'complete extermination' of a minority is not acceptable, as such attempts face severe opposition. This situation may have somewhat changed, but when empirical psychological research for *The Authoritarian Personality* was conducted, expressing anti-Semitic ideas was taboo in the US, with the war against Nazi Germany and the atrocities of the concentration camps firmly established in the American psyche. The interpretation proposed in the study of a potentially Fascist personality type emphasizes the psychological triggers and the malleability of political views as they need to remain partly hidden.⁶

While admitting the difficulty of researching hidden ideological investments, Adorno points out that studying 'secret' and non-expressed thoughts is significant: 'Here may lie the individual's potential for democratic or anti-democratic thought and action in crucial situations' (Adorno et al. 1969, 4). Adorno is thinking of the Nazis' rise to power. Connected with the question of imagination, he makes the following point: 'An important feature of the Nazi program, it will be recalled, was the defamation of everything that tended to make the individual aware of himself and his problems' (ibid., 235).

According to Adorno, the psychic economy of the authoritarian personality revolves around the deep structure of the self that is

⁶ The question of whether at least some critical fraction of Trump, Bolsonaro, or Netanyahu followers are willing to affirm genocide, slavery, and racial hierarchy as part of their way of life should be asked. However, as these leaders are still *de jure* bound by the representational political system, laws and elections, they and their followers need, at least to some extent, control this affirmation of domination, even if it has become louder and more brutal. Interest in *The Authoritarian Personality* has unsurprisingly surged since 2016 (Gordon 2018).

simultaneously hidden and indirectly expressed. The inhibition of imagination connects the relationship between these two aspects, as it is necessary to 'put the brakes' on fantasy so it is not revealed. On the other hand, the unconscious fantasy fuels the psyche with visions of domination.

Adorno searches for personality traits that might reveal a potentially authoritarian mentality and proposes these common features:

- submission towards the in-group (or uncritical attitude toward the authorities),
- conventionalism (or inhering to middle-class values),
- aggressiveness towards the out-group (or rejection of and readiness to condemn and punish people who violate conventional values),
- anti-intracception (or general opposition to the use of imagination and rejection of 'tender-mindedness'),
- tendency towards superstition and stereotypy (disposition to think in rigid categories),
- investment in perceived features of power and 'toughness' (preoccupation with the dichotomic categories of dominance/submission and identification with powerful figures),
- cynicism (or generalized misanthropy),
- projectivity (or projecting one's feelings of threat outwards), and
- exaggerated concern with sex (as what is 'going on' between other people). (Adorno et al. 1969, 228)

Adorno elaborates on anti-intracception and stereotypy in the following manner: 'An important aspect of many high responses is *constriction of fantasy*. [...] It is as if they cannot allow themselves a completely uninhibited fantasy, as if they cannot get away from the 'reality' even for a moment' (Adorno et al. 1969, 573).

Adorno's solution to bring these character traits together happens through narcissism of the authoritarian personality type, which

prevents the subject from becoming aware of these fantasies. However, as argued above, at least the current far-right makes use of an uninhibited fantasy world. Frankfurt School's general line of argument is that the self has become 'flat' (without longing, memory, and others) and merely functional, which seems to be out of step with the current social situation and belittles the far-right's capacities.

This claim is reductive, and ultimately, its argument somewhat typologizes itself, so essential criticisms have been brought forward. In his history of the psychological concept of authoritarianism, Markus Kimmelmeier points out that while Adorno et al. propose authoritarianism to be one coherent construct, it has, in research, been broken into subcategories. Most persistent further differentiates between RWA (Right-Wing Authoritarianism) and SDO (Social Dominance Orientation). The main difference between the two is that while RWAs seek to uphold social hierarchies and are often conservative, SDOs identify more readily with domination and risk-taking in general and are prone to support leaders who stand out and propose bold solutions (Kimmelmeier 2015, 264-265).

With the help of this criticism, Adorno's concern for the lack of imagination and the different ways that this constellation flares up in the contemporary far-right can be appreciated in a new way. One possible way of seeing the contemporary far-right as a dialectical totality would point out that its ambiguous communication needs to rest on two feet, as it were, or two different pools of supporters. Firstly, there is the more conservative group (RWA), beholden to nostalgia and appreciating national insignia and culture. Their tendency to divide people into 'us' and 'them' can be interpellated with gestures towards nationalistic myths and ideology. Restrictions of fantasy draws them close to ideas of law and order and adherence to bourgeois principles of duty, trustworthiness, and others.

On the other hand, the dominance-seeking pool (SWO), more adventurous and prone to revel in utopian visions of racialized future society, can have their need for images of dominance satisfied by the messages towards the other half of the 'double audience.' The sinister underground of meaning, e.g., that some groups of people should be subjected to corporal punishment or have their fundamental human rights stripped, can be positively enjoyed by this group. Having both of these pools addressed requires meticulous work, and at times, the proverbial fig leaf falls off, allowing those who do not share the essential anti-democratic views of the far-right to challenge them.

While inconclusive, this article could help recognize the multifaceted identity of the current far-right and its continuum with the 20th-century Western patterns of authoritarian agitation. In the current situation of late capitalism, it has become self-limiting for the far-right to restrict its political signaling to the primarily 'rational' or the primarily libidinous register. Both are utilized, and new strategies to address both are searched for. While more identities should probably be recognized and analyzed, at least this proposed focus on dual structures of communication, envisioned by Frankfurt School thinkers, might help decipher and point out weaknesses in the far-right's discourse. Its cohesion is never solid, and points of weakness are visible to anyone interested in looking at it closely. These critical points need to be made more prominent, and the tools for debunking these harmful and defamatory narratives made more widely known. As Adorno points out in his 1967 lecture on the new right-wing extremism, we are to be held accountable, and one cannot assume a 'spectator-like relationship'. Responsibility lies in our hands. (Adorno 2020, 22)

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LEWIS ALEXANDER LUARTZ¹

A Theory of the COVID-19 Pandemic's Impact on the Government-Citizen Relationship

Abstract: This paper explores how crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, can impact political behavior amid restrictions. Specifically, this paper builds a theoretical model suggesting the pandemic promoted restriction-oriented policies from the government in response to the crisis while promoting populist tendencies among citizens who disagree with those policies. Moreover, through a formal two-player extensive form game, the model promoted in this paper suggests restrictions are unpopular enough that citizens may push back on such policies regardless of crisis severity. The theoretical outcomes here have significant implications on governance, given that politicians care about re-election.

Keywords: COVID-19 Pandemic, Democracy, Populism, Pluralism, Game Theory

Teorija vpliva pandemije COVID-19 na odnos med vlado in državljani

Izvleček: Članek raziskuje, kako lahko krize, kot je pandemija COVID-19, vplivajo na politično vedenje med omejitvami. Natančneje, članek gradi teoretični model, ki nakazuje, da je pandemija kot odgovor na krizo spodbudila politike vlade, usmerjene v omejitve, hkrati pa populistične težnje med državljani, ki se s temi politikami ne strinjajo. Poleg tega, predstavljen model v

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članku, s formalno igro ekstenzivne oblike za dva igralca nakazuje, da so omejitve dovolj nepriljubljene, da lahko državljani zavračajo takšne politike ne glede na resnost krize. Teoretični rezultati pomembno vplivajo na upravljanje, glede na to, da je politikom mar za ponovno izvolitev.

Ključne besede: pandemija COVID-19, demokracija, populizem, pluralizem, teorija iger

Introduction

What impact does a crisis have on democratic institutions? How will a government react in the face of a crisis? How will citizens react to government policies during crises? The recent COVID-19 pandemic uprooted and replaced standard social behavioral norms with fear-based sentiment in several countries to varying degrees. Some countries locked down, others did not, but in retrospect, the actual outcomes of government policies varied: massive hospitalizations and loss of life, protests, and some survivors suffering from 'long COVID'. As crises can significantly impact domestic politics, predominantly in how they shape government responses, they can also influence public opinion. While outcomes may vary relative to the context of a crisis, whether it is a natural disaster, a health emergency, an economic recession, or a form of political upheaval such as a coup, the COVID-19 pandemic crisis created significant challenges for policymakers and politicians given its dual impact at the institutional and social levels. This paper attempts to build two generalized formal models that can theoretically explain the potential behavioral outcomes associated with citizen-state relationships during a crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic.

This study explores how crises can impact politics. The author argues that the pandemic promoted a rejection of government policies akin to a more populist than a pluralist political approach. As

this is driven by fear and uncertainty towards the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic, this paper presents a two-player extensive form game to model the situation across two possibilities: one in which the pandemic is likely severe and another in which there is an equal likelihood for the pandemic to be severe or not-severe. These games focus on the government and the citizen as rational players, suggesting the COVID-19 pandemic potentially promoted increased restrictions on the government's side while promoting a shift in the general public's opinion towards those restrictions. The pushback proposed by the models in this paper further suggests a potential increase in populist tendencies among citizens. This paper thus demonstrates how impactful fear made manifest through a crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic can deteriorate the principle of pluralism in modern democratic systems.

Pressure to Act: Reacting to the COVID-19 Pandemic

One of a crisis's most immediate, familiar, and ultimately crucial impacts is its pressure on politicians to act as quickly and decisively as possible. When a crisis strikes, governments must respond rapidly to mitigate its effects and protect their citizens. However, this is not necessarily because politicians are benevolent inasmuch as they have an underlying motivation to be re-elected in a democratic system. By performing well during a crisis, politicians can maximize their prospects. Nevertheless, what performing well means is difficult to determine under a crisis, given that voter considerations matter.

Understanding how voters make decisions can explain how politicians decide. While the American voting literature has often been critical of citizens and their ability to make well-informed voting decisions (Campbell et al. 1960, 34-37; Converse 2006, 57; Dahl 1989, 332-341), the literature does suggest voters can pick up

heuristics or cues to make reliable voting choices (Downs 1957, 267-268; Mondak 1993, 186-190; Popkin 1991, 16; Sniderman et al. 1993, 276). Partisanship is one cue voters can pick between representatives and referenda at the ballot box.

However, identifying and supporting a political party congruent with one's policy positions is not the only factor voters consider, as there are also instances when politicians are successful at establishing a 'personal vote' through position-taking, credit claiming, and advertising on the campaign trail (Mayhew 1974, 24). In these instances, politicians can, and have an incentive to, connect with their constituents based on their personal qualities rather than party affiliation or policy positions. Doing so can win voters over in what may otherwise be close, highly contested elections due to trust built between the representative and their constituents.

Trust and COVID-19

Trust between representatives and voters significantly impacts democracy not only at the electoral level but also at the institutional level. Bianco (1994, 148-167) suggests that the trust fostered between constituents and their representatives is essential to democracy and requires representative commitments to transparency, accountability, and responsiveness. Indeed, those who distrust government are more likely to be dissatisfied with political parties or their policy choices (Miller 1974a, 963; Miller 1974b, 989; Miller and Listhaug 1990, 382-383). In other words, trust effectively determines when, if at all, voters may be at least accepting policies they may not necessarily agree with completely. Within the context of a crisis, such as COVID-19, trust becomes an even more significant decision-making factor, given the variable restrictions governments adopted. Indeed, the COVID-19 pandemic was significant because it forced politicians into a corner: democratic regimes

were forced to adopt strict measures to control the spread of the virus, which included the use of lockdowns, travel restrictions, and vaccination campaigns. Focusing on one predominantly popular strategy, such as lockdowns, provides a clear understanding of the dilemma with restrictive policies.

The use of lockdowns, which are measures put in place by governments to restrict the movement of people and activities, was meant to reduce COVID-19 infection rates by slowing the spread of the disease. However, the extent to which a state locks down can lead to disparities in that reduction. In other words, there are variations in the scope, duration, and strictness of lockdowns. Nevertheless, they typically involve closing non-essential businesses and services, restrictions on gatherings of people within and outside one's immediate family, and general limitations on travel for non-essential purposes.

As lockdowns represent a forced change in lifestyle through government policy, is it inherently an anti-democratic action? A study by Glasius (2018) suggests that some government practices may be considered authoritarian and others are not. The standard in Glasius (2018, 517) suggests authoritarian practices are an organized pattern of actions either sabotaging accountability to people ('the forum') over whom a political actor exerts control or sabotaging their representatives by restricting access to information and their capacity to voice. It is difficult to establish what this means during an emergency, as the circumstances behind invoking it and when precisely such measures extend beyond what is necessary to deal with it are not always clear. This is a problematic situation for politicians to navigate since, if it is not evident among constituents that a forced lifestyle change is essential, forced restrictions such as lockdowns may hurt politicians' re-election prospects. If some constituents do not feel forced restrictions are necessary, they may push back against restrictions.

Given the disadvantages, do politicians have incentives to lockdown? Examining partisanship and ideology may help explain why these behaviors occur under some governments since ruling parties make decisions based on their ideologies (Budde et al. 2018, 445-446; Potrafke 2017, 745-746; Schmitt and Zohlnhöfer 2019, 987-989). Indeed, a discussion in Jahn (2022, 582) reasonably suggests that the left-right dimension may matter in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic: right-wing governments may be more hesitant than left-wing governments to implement strict lockdowns in an effort to avoid economic collapse, while left-wing governments may be more willing to lockdown since workers and underprivileged groups have a higher risk of infection.

Although lockdowns may be a relatively unpopular behavior for governments to adopt, Bol et al. (2021, 502) suggested that incumbents and prime ministers both benefit from broad public support during a crisis as citizens look to leadership for guidance. While these effects transcend the traditional left-right dimension in the democratic literature, non-parliamentary governments like the United States may serve as evidence that two-party systems promote downplaying severity among right-wing parties while undermining expert warnings on the potential consequences associated with COVID-19 (Conway Iii et al. 2021, 8-9; Gadarian et al. 2021, 10; Painter and Qiu 2020; Pennycook et al. 2022, 700). Suppose we assume that left-wing parties are more likely to restrict while right-wing parties are less likely to. In that case, the issue at hand is whether a government can determine when a situation is indeed severe or not severe enough to merit restrictions while balancing out the ramifications of said restrictions on politicians' rational career prospects. Assuming politicians are rational, it would make sense that there may be incentives to avoid restrictions if politicians feel restrictions may be non-conducive to their re-election efforts later.

Perceptions of Governance

The gravity of a crisis and the restrictions implemented, such as lockdowns during COVID-19, may or may not lead to support from most of society. Whether politicians receive such support will depend predominantly upon whether voters perceive their government as adopting pluralist approaches to governance. When voters do not feel the government is considering their preferences, however, they may adopt increasingly populist approaches to government, which can be problematic for democracies.

Under the pluralist perspective, the government represents diverse interests among heterogeneous groups in society. This way, power is dispersed among different actors, including interest groups, political parties, and social movements. Since the diversity of interests complicates explanations of group cooperation and competition relating to policy decisions, pluralism assumes liberal democracy is best at explaining democratic governance while serving the interests of all members of society (Dahl 1989, 322). The principle of diverse interests in a participatory democracy directly contrasts with Schumpeter (1942, 243-245), who suggests that people define those who are and are not entitled to participate in the democratic process. Indeed, as power shifts among different actors, marginalized groups can have an impact on policy through democracy's cornerstone: public deliberation (Barber 1983, 267-278; Connolly 1993, 121-124; Dahl 1989, 312-325; Dewey 1927, 166-167; Fishkin 1992, 124-128; Fishkin 1995, 141-154; Habermas 1996, 298; Mansbridge 1983, 300-302). Dynamic shifts in power within the ideal form of pluralism are thus a staple of this perspective.

However dynamic this process may be, and however heterogeneous a society's makeup and interests, most democracies do not ascribe to deal forms of pluralism. Scholars such as Olson (1965, 14-16) suggest that collective action by significantly large but dis-

persed groups of individuals is, at best, defrayed and, at worst, prevented by free-riding or a collective lack of incentives to form or join an organized group personally. Schattschneider (1960, 35) suggests that free-riding harms society's 'heavenly chorus' by giving it an 'upper-class accent,' where elites are set to gain most and influence policies. Schlozman et al. (2012, 576) suggest this is more of an 'unheavenly chorus,' given that the governments can shift their policymaking powers towards benefitting corporate business interests over constituent interests. In other words, ideological benefits aside, elite or business influences can significantly harm pluralism.

Under the populist perspective, constituents adopt a contrasting position to the pluralist perspective. Populism is typically considered a thin-centered ideology consisting of a struggle between two homogeneous and antagonistic groups - 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite' - with a proposed preference for normatively promoting politics as an expression of the general 'will of the people' (Mudde 2004, 543). Thus, at the center of populism is the idea of popular sovereignty, or that the people authorize the establishment of the state (Yack 2001, 523). As such, the ordinary people under populism command politicians who represent the interests of those people as their elected officials. While at face value, it is not an immediate issue, since democracy by definition requires representation of constituents by politicians, it is problematic due to a common claim made by populists: Nothing should constrain the will of the people because the people are sovereign. In other words, populism goes beyond the need for a representative elected official, with Urbinati and Warren (2008, 391) suggesting this relationship takes the form of an imperative mandate: politicians are temporarily granted the power to take actions specified by the citizens, but the will to make decisions is not delegated as it is reserved for citizens.

Although populists support direct democratic mechanisms for decision-making, such an approach to decision-making is problematic due to a lack of clarity on the representation dimension: to whom are populist forms of decision-making representative? In the same way, group decision-making can yield non-transitive decisions when choosing between multiple alternatives (Arrow 1963, 120); individuals cannot unify their wills and agree upon one concrete policy representative of society. In other words, attempting to achieve a 'will of the people' presupposes the pre-existence of a 'people' that individuals must join (Ochoa Espejo 2011, 43). Indeed, in a collective form of assimilation into a nation with a dominant identity, those who have adjacent, disagreeing, or non-conforming identities or opinions are excluded or, in some societies, killed (Mann 2005, 2-9). For these reasons, some scholars propose populism is a 'democratic disease' or 'pathology' that necessitates treatment (Abts and Rummens 2007, 414; Alonso et al. 2011, 10-12; Rosanvallon and Goldhammer 2008, 265; Taggart 2002, 62-80; Urbinati 1998, 115). Others suggest populism is not anti-democratic but democracy's shadow (Arditi 2004, 140; Canovan 1999, 3); it is an inseparable consequence of democracy.

This suggests an exciting puzzle: There are two general approaches to reacting to a crisis in a democracy. Since a dominant identity through 'the people' should collectively control the policymaking process under the populist perspective, restrictions like those adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic could produce adverse reactions among voters if they do not feel represented or included in the democratic process. Indeed, a recent study on trust during COVID-19 by Bavel et al. (2020, 465-466) suggested that greater trust in government promotes increased compliance with health policies, including those restrictive policies promoted during the pandemic. If voters adopt an increasingly populist

perspective, they may lose trust in their government and refuse to comply with restrictive policies meant to save lives or improve health outcomes. However, a study by Jennings (2020) found that trust in political authorities increased following COVID-19 outbreaks due to the ‘rally-round-the-flag’ dynamic (Mueller 1970), as well as policy saliency and performance (Hetherington and Husser 2012, 322–323; Hetherington and Rudolph 2008, 510). If this is the case, trust in the government in some countries may have been higher than in others. If this is true, assuming politicians are rational and care about both saving lives and getting re-elected, what policies would they promote when facing a crisis? When would voter trust and, thus, acceptance of restrictive policies in the face of an uncertain crisis diminish? When would that trust and subsequent acceptance of restrictive policies flourish among voters?

In the following section, this paper makes several assumptions to provide a formal model to respond to these questions. First, given that crises require action by politicians, the severity of the crisis should determine the severity of the action. Governments should be incentivized to adopt restrictions to save constituent lives when the severity is high. This may be a moral imperative, but it is at least rational, given that a high number of deceased constituents would likely not bode well electorally for any politician. Politicians who care about getting re-elected must ensure their supporters are alive to vote. Alternatively, when the severity is low, the imperative to restrict should be lower, as politicians are less likely to lose their supporters to illness.

Second, the model assumes that citizens cannot determine precisely how deliberative their democracy is at any time. This is problematic for citizens, given both perceptions of the severity of the crisis and perceptions of deliberation condition that trust. When a crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic is perceived as severe,

trust should be much higher among citizens in a liberal democracy with the understanding that restrictions save lives as opposed to non-restrictions (or 'freedom'). However, suppose citizens cannot perceive the accurate levels of deliberation within a democracy. In that case, they may begin to believe that the 'will of the people' is being violated by unilateral decisions (i.e., populism) and subsequently push back upon restrictive policies.


Modeling the COVID-19 Pandemic

Based on this information, the following section presents two forms of a formal two-player game featuring politicians who form the government (the 'Government') as one player and individual voters (a 'Citizen') as a second player. These games necessitate uncertainty at the top level, with 'Nature' representing the severity of the pandemic. The pandemic is either 'Severe' or 'Not Severe.' The government will either promote restrictions ('Restrictions') or advocate for no restrictions ('Freedom'). In contrast, voters fall into one of two camps: approval of government decisions ('Accept') or disapproval of government decisions ('Reject'). The first form of the game, where the crisis is more likely severe than not severe, is formalized in Figure 1.

The first point to note in Figure 1 is that there is incomplete information concerning the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic. In other words, the government is not aware of the actual severity of the COVID-19 pandemic in this model, although it is, in actuality, more likely severe than not severe. However, as the government notices that infections are spreading, they will be more likely to believe it is severe. Likewise, as other countries begin to adopt restrictions, they may further feel the pandemic is severe. As such, 'Nature' is provided a probability of $2/3$ for the case in which the pandemic is Severe and $1/3$ for the case in which the pandemic is

Not Severe. In other words, it is only slightly more than 66 percent more likely for the game to take the pathway for *Severe* compared to *Not Severe* in the game.

Figure 1: Government vs Citizen Model: Severity More Likely



Given that severity among players is unknown, this study uses expected utility equations to determine what the government should do given its beliefs about its citizens when the perceived probability of the severity is $\frac{2}{3}$. Following the *Severe* branch, if the government chooses *Restrictions*, then the expected utility for the government is:

$$EU_i(\text{Action}) = p [c(\text{pay}_j) + c(\text{pay}_k)] + \sim p [c(\text{pay}_l) + c(\text{pay}_m)] \quad (1)$$

Equation (1) calculates a player's EU_i 's utility for some *Action*. In the government's case, these are either *Restrictions* or *Freedom*, while the citizen can only choose *Accept* or *Reject*. This is equal to the probability p associated with the severity of the pandemic, multiplied by the sum of the choices made available to the player c . In the case of the government, this is equivalent to $\frac{1}{2}$ as they only choose *Restrictions* or *Freedom*; the citizen, however, has $\frac{1}{4}$ as they can either choose *Accept* under *Restrictions*, *Accept* under

Freedom, *Reject* under *Restrictions*, or *Reject* under *Freedom*. This product is then added to the product of the opposite probability $\sim p$, representing *Not Severe*, multiplied once more by the sum of the choices made available to the player c . Calculating and comparing expected utility function outcomes will provide insight into each player's best strategies.

Starting with the *Severe* branch, if the government chooses *Restrictions*, the expected utility for the government is:

$$EU_G(\text{Restrictions}_1) = \frac{2}{3} \left[\frac{1}{2}(2) + \frac{1}{2}(0) \right] + \frac{1}{3} \left[\frac{1}{2}(2) + \frac{1}{2}(0) \right] = 1 \quad (2)$$

Repeating this for the situation when the government chooses *Freedom* under the *Severe* branch yields:

$$EU_G(\text{Freedom}_1) = \frac{2}{3} \left[\frac{1}{2}(1) + \frac{1}{2}(0) \right] + \frac{1}{3} \left[\frac{1}{2}(2) + \frac{1}{2}(1) \right] = \frac{5}{6} \quad (3)$$

The utility functions thus far suggest that when the government believes the pandemic is more likely severe, it will be much more willing to adopt restrictions. However, things begin to look interesting when examining the citizen's behavior under this scenario. The citizen's expected utility when they opt to *Accept* restrictions is:


$$EU_C(\text{Accept}_1) = \frac{2}{3} \left[\frac{1}{4}(2) + \frac{1}{4}(0) \right] + \frac{1}{3} \left[\frac{1}{4}(0) + \frac{1}{4}(2) \right] = \frac{1}{2} \quad (4)$$

While the citizen's expected utility when they opt to *Reject* restrictions is:

$$EU_C(\text{Reject}_1) = \frac{2}{3} \left[\frac{1}{4}(1) + \frac{1}{4}(1) \right] + \frac{1}{3} \left[\frac{1}{4}(2) + \frac{1}{4}(1) \right] = \frac{7}{12} \quad (5)$$

These utility functions suggest that the government is seemingly better off restricting behavior under the assumption of *Severe* pandemic conditions. However, the citizen is incentivized to reject any restrictions the government may adopt. These outcomes have significant implications for the government as they suggest that it should be more likely to adopt restrictions whenever a crisis is likely severe.

Figure 2: Government vs Citizen Model: Equal Likelihood of Severity



Given the model's suggestions, the next step consisted of testing a similar game under an extremely conservative model, specifically, one in which the government honestly does not know whether the pandemic is severe. This is achieved by changing the *Severe* and *Not Severe* probability to $1/2$ each. The game theoretic model for an equal likelihood of severity is found in Figure 2. Note that this is the only difference between Figure 1 and Figure 2, so the payoffs for each player remain precisely the same values across both models.

Repeating the previous strategy with the updated severity probability yields new utility functions for the government and the citizen. In this iteration, both p and $\sim p$ are $1/2$, given an equal likelihood of severity. Calculating the government's expected utility when choosing *Restrictions* versus *Freedom* yields the following:

$$EU_G(\text{Restrictions}_2) = \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{2}(2) + \frac{1}{2}(0) \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{2}(2) + \frac{1}{2}(0) \right] = 1 \quad (6)$$

$$EU_G(\text{Freedom}_2) = \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{2}(1) + \frac{1}{2}(0) \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{2}(2) + \frac{1}{2}(1) \right] = 1 \quad (7)$$

The following utility functions repeat this process for the citizen based on whether they are better off choosing *Accept* or *Reject*. As before, both p and $\sim p$ are $1/2$, given an equal likelihood of severity. The equations are as follows:

$$EU_C(\textit{Accept}_2) = \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{4}(2) + \frac{1}{4}(0) \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{4}(0) + \frac{1}{4}(2) \right] = \frac{1}{2} \quad (8)$$

$$EU_C(\textit{Reject}_2) = \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{4}(1) + \frac{1}{4}(1) \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{4}(2) + \frac{1}{4}(1) \right] = \frac{5}{8} \quad (9)$$

These utility functions suggest another exciting scenario: when severity and non-severity is equally likely, the government has an equal incentive to adopt restrictions as it does to avoid adopting restrictions. However, the citizen is again better off when they reject government policies. As the citizen still has an incentive to reject government policies, even under the more conservative model, these findings have significant implications for democratic governance as they provide insights into the potential rational voters' perspective on restrictive policies.

Discussion

Given that most models simplify scenarios, so were the models in this study simplified to present the interactions between the government and the citizen. Those simplifications provide exciting implications. If a rational government can mix its strategy, then elite perceptions of severity may be based on two factors. The first is a within-game factor: whether the citizens perceive the pandemic as severe. A rational government actor would consider this before adopting restrictive policies, given the incentive to keep their citizens happy and get re-elected. The second potential factor is an external-game factor: whether infection and mortality rates are not significantly higher relative to non-pandemic instances. Since perceptions of emergencies among citizens are shaped by perceptions

of the world as well as by the government itself, we can expect that the government would likely have a significant say in how citizens perceive the severity of the pandemic and, indeed, adopting less restrictive policies is a signal to citizens that the government at least does not perceive the pandemic as severe, whereas adopting more severe policies signals the opposite message. Nevertheless, if the government were to signal toward one level of severity while hospitals were being overrun, the outcome could suggest the government is potentially incompetent at dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. While this game's theoretical outcome suggests the government can mix its strategy, its capacity is relative to real-world conditions.

Of course, the increased likelihood of the government adopting restrictions when they perceive the pandemic as severe, coupled with the partial impact the government would have on the citizen's perceptions of severity by either adopting or not adopting restrictions, does suggest the role of government in shaping perceptions is quite significant. However, it also suggests two potential outcomes relevant to democratic theorists. The first is the potential threats to pluralism. Restrictive policies across even the more conservative model presented in this paper are likely to be rejected by citizens. Restrictive policies, while necessary under severe conditions for obvious reasons (i.e., to save lives), are also non-conducive to pluralistic approaches towards democracy, given that they restrict the social decision-making narrative by shifting the pendulum towards an increasingly unilateral approach to policymaking. Granted, this is typically justified from a more normative lens under emergencies. However, it is nevertheless a democratically fragile perspective given how unwilling the citizens in the models presented are to accept those restrictions.

Furthermore, the government is interested in its own continued survival under the rationality assumption, potentially increasing a citizen's likelihood to adopt a populist perspective of govern-

ment. Indeed, in the second model presented, where it was unclear whether the pandemic was severe, the government had an equal incentive to restrict as it did to avoid restrictions. However, the citizens still preferred rejecting restrictions. If the game were further iterated and given the importance of re-election, common sense would suggest that the government in that game would simply adopt whatever position the citizen may have on the issue. In other words, we would encounter a more populist outcome, potentially hurting pluralism as the government would listen almost exclusively to their constituents' worries regarding the pandemic. While that is not to say the government ceases to listen to constituents under the pluralist model, the second game suggested the government could choose either strategy, so why would we expect it to avoid the direct democracy approach and listen to constituents who refuse restrictions? Indeed, the government's ability to mix its strategy suggests this outcome would take the form of adopting non-restrictive policies too early should the citizens no longer feel the need for them (i.e., the perception among the citizens is that the pandemic is no longer severe when it is still indeed severe). The danger, however, is that the government could adopt restrictive policies long after the need for those policies has passed (i.e., the perception among the citizens is that the pandemic is still very severe and concerning, even if it is no longer severe). In short, although politicians may have experienced difficulty in decision-making, restrictive measures can have real effects on citizens due to their direct and potentially harmful effect on pluralism.

Conclusion

What impact does a crisis have on democratic institutions? How will a government react in the face of a crisis? How will citizens react to government policies during crises? This paper has attempted to

explore these questions in a theory-building manner to clarify the interactions between government and citizens in society during crisis. Specifically, this paper developed a two-player game based on the COVID-19 pandemic, with the 'government' and the 'citizen' as players attempting to determine what their best strategies are given the novelty of the COVID-19 pandemic. The model presented in this paper thus suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic promoted restrictive policies by governments and pushback from citizens who may have adopted increasingly populist perceptions of government.

The game findings suggested that the government will likely adopt restrictions when they believe the pandemic is severe. They may opt for increasing restrictions or promoting no restrictions when there is an equal likelihood of severity versus non-severity. However, the citizen always seems to be incentivized to reject government policy given the conditions in these games, regardless of the severity. More interesting is that this suggests a point wherein citizens may cease supporting the government's attempts at dealing with crises through restrictions.

The theoretical model established in this paper serves as a starting point for more empirical-oriented studies and further theory-building. In the case of the former, studies may seek to empirically test public opinion towards restrictive policies during the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises to determine if there are unique factors to the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, such studies may seek out single or comparative cases. In the latter's case, this study did not examine the turning points where potential 'rally-round-the-flag' flags diminish in favor of negative sentiment. In other words, do citizens continuously emanate negative feelings towards restrictions, even during crises? Or was there some unique theoretical characteristic associated with the COVID-19 pandemic? Alternatively, is it possible for politicians to reverse their fortunes when faced with

crises? Indeed, if politicians are rational, they have incentives to get re-elected. However, they cannot be re-elected if their constituent supporters die in a crisis. The grand political balancing act at the heart of politics during crises may thus be more complicated.

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MATEJ ZUPANC¹

Medijski okviri protestniških gibanj v času pandemije covida-19

Izvleček: Članek analizira, kako so mediji uokvirjali proteste v času epidemije covida-19, ko je takratno desno-sredinsko vlado vodil Janez Janša. Protesti so bili posledica vladnih odločitev, ukrepov za zajezitev okužb in upravljanja epidemije. Z uporabo deduktivnega pristopa avtor identificira splošne okvire, ki so pogosto prisotni v medijih, ter induktivno določi vsebinsko-specifične okvire, ki so vezani na proučevane proteste. V članku predstavi njihovo pojavnost v časniku Delo, tedniku Demokracija in reviji Mladina. V nadaljevanju s kvalitativno analizo predstavi vsebinske razlike pri uokvirjanju med izbranimi mediji. Na osnovi tega avtor proučuje vzroke za razlikovanje pri uokvirjanju in identificira ključne dejavnike, ki prispevajo k tej raznolikosti pri poročanju o protestnih.

Ključne besede: covid-19, protesti, mediji, okviri

The media frameworks of protest movements during the Covid-19 pandemic

Abstract: The article examines how the media framed the protests during the COVID-19 pandemic under the Janez Janša's right-wing government. The protests movements were the result of the government's decisions, the measures taken to contain the infection and the management of the epidemic. Using a deductive approach, the author identifies general frames in the media and inductively analyses content-specific frames related to the protests under

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study. In the article, he presents their occurrence in the newspaper Delo, the weekly Demokracija and the magazine Mladina. He then uses a qualitative analysis to illustrate the differences in framing between the selected media. On this basis, the author analyses the reasons for the differences in framing and identifies the factors contributing to this diversity in the coverage of the protests.

Keywords: COVID-19, protests, media, frames

Uvod

Mediji imajo v družbi osrednjo vlogo pri filtriranju, interpretaciji in predstavitvi informacij širši javnosti. Skozi različne medijske kanale – od tiskanih medijev, radija in televizije do digitalnih platform in družbenih omrežij – mediji vplivajo na naše razumevanje sveta okoli nas, oblikovanje mnenj in odločanje o tem, kaj je resnično ali pomembno (Couldry 2012). Način, kako mediji predstavljajo določeno zgodbo ali dogodek, je pogosto bolj pomemben kot dejanska vsebina te zgodbe. Eden izmed načinov, ki vpliva na to, kako občinstvo razume in interpretira informacije, je uokvirjanje, s čimer posredno usmerja javno mnenje in sooblikuje družbene norme. Entman (1993, 52) je opredelil uokvirjanje kot izbiro nekaterih vidikov dogodka in njihovo poudarjanje v komunikaciji, s čimer spodbuja določeno interpretacijo problema, vzročne povezave, moralno presojo in/ali priporočeno rešitev. Ko novinarji uokvirijo zgodbo na določen način, lahko to vpliva na to, kaj ljudje dojamejo kot »normalno« ali »pravilno« v družbi. Torej, okviri ne le poudarjajo in izpuščajo določene informacije, ampak tudi sooblikujejo percepcijo tega, kaj je družbeno sprejemljivo ali pričakovano. Proučevanje okvirov nam pomaga razumeti, kateri vidiki so v medijih izpostavljeni kot relevantni.

Osrednji namen članka je bil analizirati način poročanja o protestih v časopisu Delo ter revijah Mladina in Demokracija. Proučevani protesti so nastali kot odziv na vladno upravljanje izrednih

razmer v času epidemije covida-19 med leti 2020 in 2022, ki je močno vplivalo na takratno življenje. Med najbolj pogostimi so bili petkovi protesti, ki so potekali skoraj vsak petek v Ljubljani ter v večjih in manjših krajih po Sloveniji – skupno jih je bilo 105. Njihova glavna zahteva je bila odstop takratne desne vlade Janeza Janše, ki so jo kritizirali zaradi avtoritarizma, nestrpnosti, korupcije in slabega vodenja države v času epidemije. Občasno so potekali tudi četrtekovi protesti, znani po večji stopnji nasilja in s podobnim ciljem kot petkovi protesti. Svoje proteste sta organizirali tudi stranka Resnica in Civilna iniciativa Maske dol. Oboji so prav tako nasprotovali vladnim ukrepom, vendar so imeli proticepilski značaj. Pojavljali so se tudi shodi in protestniške akcije gibanja OPS, na katerih so predvsem širili različne zarotniške teorije in imeli prav tako proticepilski značaj. V tem času se je kot odziv na petkove proteste pojavila tudi skupina fantov imenovanih Rumeni jopiči, ki so predstavljali protiprotestniško gibanje in izražali podporo vladi ter delili nekatere skrajno desne oziroma nacistične poglede.

V analiziranem obdobju se je zaradi pogostosti petkovih protestov pojavljalo največ prispevkov o njih. Občasno so se pojavili tudi prispevki o četrtekovih protestih in Rumelih jopičih. Drugi protesti so potekali zunaj časovnega obdobja analize in vanjo niso bili zajeti.

V analizi kombiniram induktivni in deduktivni pristop; z deduktivnim pristopom sem zbral splošne okvire, ki se najpogosteje uporabljajo v medijih na splošno in so jih identificirali drugi avtorji (Koenig 2006, 64; Valkenburg idr. 1999, 551–552; Godefroidt idr. 2016, 781–182), z induktivnim pristopom pa sem definiral vsebino specifičnih okvirov, vezanih na obravnavani problem, tj. proteste v času epidemije covida-19. Glavni namen analize je (1.) identificirati vsebinsko specifične okvire, (2.) ugotoviti, kateri splošni okviri so se najpogosteje pojavljali in (3.) pojasniti potencialni učinek okvirov na javno podobno protestov in protestnikov.

Uokvirjanje

Goffman (1986, 21) okvire pojasni kot »sheme interpretacije«, ki nam omogočajo »poiskati, identificirati in označiti« dogodke v našem vsakdanjem življenju in širšem svetu. Gamson idr. (1992, 390) pravijo, da gre pri uokvirjanju v osnovi za vključevanje »izbire« in »poudarjenosti«. To pomeni, da avtor skozi proces uokvirjanja izbere nekatere vidike in jih v določenem sporočilu naredi bolj poudarjene. Na takšen način se spodbujajo določene opredelitve do problema, interpretacije po določenih vzorcih, moralne ocene ali kot priporočilo za oblikovanje določenega sporočila. Okviri tako izpostavijo določene dele sporočila in jih naredijo bolj vidne. Pomembno je opredeliti opaznost, kar pomeni, da so informacije bolj izpostavljene, poudarjene in nepozabne za občinstvo. Povečana opaznost povečuje možnost, da bodo prejemniki informacije zaznali, razumeli njihov pomen in jih obdelali ter shranili v spomin (Fiske in Taylor 1991, 199–200).

Vsaka novica, ki jo ustvarijo novinarji, ima določen namen, ki ga želi avtor ali medij doseči, zato je uokvirjanje nepogrešljiva tehnika, ki jo novinarji uporabljajo za ustvarjanje naracij, ki so ne nazadnje določene tudi z žanrom (Buozis in Creech 2017, 2). Mediji kot institucije oblikujejo in usmerjajo novinarsko delo ter vplivajo na izbiro okvirov in naracije novinarjev preko institucionalnih norm, pravil in pričakovanj, ki jih novinarji ponotranjijo ter se jim prilagajajo pri oblikovanju in predstavljanju zgodb (Hanitzsch in Vos 2017, 15). Tudi Gitlin (1980, 7) pravi, da so medijski okviri večinoma neizrečeni in neopaženi in urejajo svet tako za novinarje, ki o tem poročajo, kot do neke mere tudi za nas, ki se zanašamo na njihovo poročanje oziroma novice. Tuchman (1978, 1) je opisala, da so novice okno v svet, skozi katerega se posamezniki učijo o »sebi« in »drugih«, »institucijah«, »voditeljih«, »življenjskem slogu« ter »drugih narodih in ljudeh«. Cilj novic je, da nam povedo to, »kar želimo

vedeti, moramo vedeti in kar bi morali vedeti«. Okvir nam ponuja pogled skozi »okno«, odvisno od tega, ali je veliko, majhno; ali ima veliko stekel oziroma malo; je prozorno ali neprozorno; ali okno gleda na ulico ali dvorišče (ibid.). S tem avtorica preprosto ponazorila, kako okviri »oken« določajo, kaj se skozenj vidi in to aplicira na novinarske prakse.

V primeru raziskovanja določenega pojava in vpliva medijev na družbo je pomembno razumevanje okvirov, ki se pojavljajo v medijih, saj na takšen način lažje razumemo, kako je bil določen problem preko medijev predstavljen javnosti.

Robert Entman (1993, 52–53) je prvi poskušal poenotiti tipologijo okvirov, ki v svojem članku »*Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm*« trdi, da je okvir »skupek idej, ki oblikuje razumevanje določene teme ali dogodka«. Opisal je pet ključnih elementov medijskih okvirov; izbrane informacije: okviri izberejo določene informacije, ki se bodo prikazale, in ignorirajo druge. Pomembnost: okviri določijo, kaj je pomembno in kaj ni pomembno v določeni temi ali dogodku. Interpretacija: okviri ponujajo interpretacijo določene teme ali dogodka. Pomeni: okviri določajo pomen določene teme ali dogodka. Ciljno občinstvo: okviri so usmerjeni v določeno ciljno občinstvo.

Iz omenjenega članka je pri definiciji okvirov izhajal tudi Koenig (2006, 64), ki je predlagal razlikovanje med splošnimi okviri in vsebinskimi okviri, da bi se izognili množici okvirov. Splošni okviri: 1. konfliktni okvir, ki se osredotoča na nesoglasja med posamezniki, skupinami ali institucijami; 2. okvir človeških zgodb, ki poudarja življenjske zgodbe kot primere širšega trenda in emocionalne značilnosti; 3. okvir ekonomskih posledic, ki se osredotoča na finančne učinke situacij, zadev ali dogodkov na občinstvo. Vsebinsko specifični okviri pogosto izhajajo iz tako imenovanih vodilnih okvirov, ki imajo visoke kulturne resonance. V medijih pa

se pojavljata še dva splošna okvira: okvir odgovornosti, ki pripisuje odgovornost ali krivdo za problem oziroma situacije določeni instituciji ali posamezniku (Valkenburg idr. 1999, 552), in moralni okvir, ki se osredotoča na moralna in verska načela ter prepričanja, v katerem novinarji pogosto poudarjajo, kaj je prav in kaj ne (Godefroidt idr. 2016, 782)

Metodologija

Zbiranje podatkov je potekalo v okviru Svoboda mnenja in izražanja skozi naracije izrednega stanja: antropološka študija slovenske (anti)demokratske zavesti v času epidemije covid-19 (ARRS J6-3128). Časovni okvir zbiranja podatkov je bil določen na obdobje med 1. marcem 2020 in 28. februarjem 2021, ko je prišlo do prve okužbe s takrat novim koronavirusom covid-19 in popolnim zaprtjem države zaradi omejevanja širjenja koronavirusa. V vzorec sem vključil tiskane različice Demokracije, Dela in Mladine. V izbor sem vključil prispevke z vsebujočimi gesli »protesti«, »zbiranje«, »svoboda« in »izražanje«. Vsak članek sem fotografiral oziroma v primeru digitalizirane tiskane edicije naredili posnetek zaslona in jih shranil v temu pripravljeno datoteko.

Odločil sem se za taksonomijo okvirov, ki jo je določil Koenig (2006, 64). Za prepoznavanje splošnih okvirov sem na podlagi vprašalnika, ki so ga pri svoji raziskavi uporabljali Godefroidt in ostali (2016, 785), preoblikoval vprašanja, ki so specifično vezana na raziskovano tematiko in so predstavljena v spodnji tabeli.

Tabela 1: Vprašanja za splošne okvire

Ime okvira	Vprašanja
Konfliktni okvir	Ali se zgodba vrsti okoli nesoglasij med dvema stranema, posamezniki, skupinami? Ali zgodba omenja spopad, dvoboj, izgrede, soočenja med dvema stranema, posamezniki, skupinami? Ali zgodba omenja dve ali več strani problema? Ali zgodba omenja zmagovalce in poražence?
Okvir človeških zgodb	Ali zgodba ponuja človeški primer oziroma človeško podobo problema? Ali zgodba uporablja osebne prigode ali pridevnike, ki vzbujajo občutja? Ali zgodba poudarja, kako so posamezniki in skupine prizadeti zaradi določenih vprašanj, problemov ali situacije? Ali zgodba seže v zasebno udeležencev?
Okvir ekonomskih posledic	Ali je omenjena finančna izguba ali določen dohodek? Ali je omenjena cena/stopnja stroškov? Ali so omenjene gospodarske posledice (ne)sledenju določenim ukrepom?
Okvir odgovornosti	Ali zgodba nakazuje, da ima akter zgodbe sposobnost omiliti problem/vprašanje? Ali zgodba nakazuje, da imajo akterji določeno stopnjo odgovornosti za vprašanje/ali problem? Ali zgodba nakazuje na rešitve na vprašanje/problem? Ali zgodba nakazuje, da problem zahteva nujno ukrepanje?
Moralni okvir	Ali zgodba vsebuje kakršnokoli moralno sporočilo? Ali zgodba omenja moralnost? Ali zgodba omenja boga ali druge nauke? Ali zgodba ponuja konkretne družbene ureditve, predpise o tem, kako se obnašati?

Vsebinsko specifične okvire sem določil s kvalitativno analizo na induktiven način s kodiranjem novinarskih prispevkov, pri čemer sem kode najprej določil na opisni ravni in jih v nadaljevanju smiselno kategoriziral ter na koncu kategorije združil v vsebinsko specifične okvire. Za enoto analize sem določil celoten članek in mu določil prevladujoči okvir.

Za vsak vsebinsko specifičen okvir sem napisal operativno definicijo, saj po Woodu (2004, 65) te definicije natančno določajo fenomen zanimanja. Prav tako pravi, da je to ključno, če želimo, da te koncepte na enak način uporabijo tudi drugi raziskovalci in jih med seboj primerjajo ter povezujejo. V skladu s Capella in Jamie-

son (1997, 89) sem iskal prepoznavne koncepte in jezikovne značilnosti, ki morajo biti pogosto opaženi v novinarskih praksah, biti ločljivi od drugih okvirov ter jih morajo prepoznati tudi drugi in ne smejo biti samo plod domišljije avtorja. Identifikacija okvirov je potekala v treh korakih: 1. Splošno branje člankov in hkratno zapisovanje opisnih opomb o vsebini in natančna določitev tipologiji okvirov in njenih operativnih definicij; 2. drugo branje za identifikacijo ponavljajočih se tem, in specifičnih okvirov; 3. poglobljena interpretacija člankov (Alozie 2005, 66). Identificiranje okvirov sem tako izvedel glede na »značilne elemente«, ki se nahajajo v novičarskih zgodbah (Gamson in Lasch 1983, 399). Te elemente pa sem zbral na podlagi predlogov različnih avtorjev (Entmanu 1993; Gamson in Lasch 1983; Tankard v Reese idr. 2003), ki so: ključne besede, metafore, zgledi, ulovne zanke, upodobitve ter naslovi, podnaslovi, podpisi pod slikami, uvodi, viri, citati, zaključne izjave oziroma odstavki.

Podatke sem analiziral s programom Nvivo, v katerega sem vnesel že nekatere prej nastavljene kode, druge pa sem definiriral s kvalitativno analizo. Vsakemu izmed analiziranih člankov sem določil dva okvira, eden je bil splošen, drugi pa vsebinsko-specifičen. Skupno sem zbral 127 prispevkov. V analizo je bilo vključenih 41 člankov Demokracije, izmed katerih je bilo 14 komentarjev, 9 reportaž, 7 poročil, 5 novic, 5 kolumn in 1 intervju. Iz Dela je bilo vključenih 35 prispevkov, od tega 20 novic, 7 reportaž, 3 poročila, 3 komentarji, 2 kolumni, in iz Mladine 50 prispevkov od tega 13 reportaž, 13 komentarjev, 13 poročil, 6 novic, 4 kolumne in 1 intervju.

Od splošnih do vsebinsko-specifičnih okvirov: pojavnost okvirov v prispevkih o protestih v času covid-19

Izmed splošnih okvirov je bil najpogosteje uporabljen okvir konflikta (67), sledijo si moralni okvir (19), okvir odgovornosti (18), okvir človeških zgodb (14) in okvir ekonomskih posledic (4). Med

vsebinsko-specifičnimi pa se je najpogosteje pojavljala represija nad protestniki (40), sledijo slabi protestniki (29), legitimni protesti (14), dobri protestniki (13), nasilni protestniki (12), kaznivi protesti (6) in mirni protesti (5).

S kodiranjem sem definiral sedem vsebinsko specifičnih okvirov: *Dobri protestniki* uokvirja tiste, ki so prikazani kot odgovorni in miroljubni udeleženci, ki si prizadevajo za pozitivne spremembe. *Legitimni protesti* uokvirja tiste proteste, ki so prikazani kot upravičeni, s trdnimi argumenti in razlogi za njihovo izvajanje. *Mirni protesti* uokvirja proteste, na katerih so udeleženci izražali svoje mnenje brez uporabe sile ali povzročanja nemirov. *Represija nad protestniki* uokvirja primere, kjer so mediji izpostavili prekomerno silo ali ukrepe s strani oblasti proti protestnikom. *Protizakoniti protesti* uokvirja primere, kjer so mediji izpostavili proteste kot dejanja, ki zaslužijo pravno posredovanje ali so v nasprotju z zakonom. *Nasilni protesti* uokvirja proteste, ki so v medijih prikazani kot agresivni, kjer so udeleženci uporabili silo ali povzročili škodo. *Slabi protestniki* uokvirja udeležence protestov, ki so v medijih prikazani kot moteči elementi, ki delujejo iz sebičnih razlogov ali brez jasnega namena.

V reviji Demokracija (tabela 2) so o protestih novinarji največkrat pisali o slabih protestnikih; ta vsebinsko specifičen okvir je bil umeščen v konfliktni (14), moralni (8) in okvir ekonomskih posledic (2) ter okvir človeških zgodb (1). Pogosto so se navezovali na nasilnost protestov, in sicer znotraj konfliktnega (6) in moralnega okvira (2) ter okvira človeških zgodb (1). Pet prispevkov je poudarjalo njihovo protizakonitost; dva v okviru konflikta, dva v okviru odgovornosti in eden v moralnem okviru. O dobrih protestih je v okviru človeških zgodb pisal en članek.

Tabela 2: Demokracija

	Dobri protestniki	Kaznivi protesti	Legitimni protesti	Mirni protesti	Nasilni protesti	Represija nad protestniki	Slabi protestniki	Ostalo	Skupaj
Okvir ekonomskih posledic	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
Moralni okvir	0	1	0	0	2	0	8	0	9
Okvir človeških zgodb	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Okvir konflikta	0	2	0	0	6	0	14	0	22
Okvir odgovornosti	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Skupaj	1	5	0	0	9	0	25	1	41

V Mladini (tabela 3) so o protestih najpogosteje pisali z vidika represije nad protestniki; ta vsebinsko specifičen okvir je bil umeščen v konfliktni okvir (12), okvir odgovornosti (11) ter po eden v moralni okvir in okvir ekonomskih posledic. Pogosti so bili prispevki o dobrih protestnikih, največ v okviru človeških zgodb (4) ter po eden v konfliktnem in moralnem okviru. Novinarske nariče so poudarjale legitimnost protestov, kjer se je največ člankov pojavilo v konfliktnem okviru (4), nekaj manj pa v moralnem okviru (2), okviru človeških zgodb (2) in ekonomskem okviru (1). Na temo nasilnih protestov se je v okviru človeških zgodb in konfliktu pojavljal po en članek. Najmanj prispevkov je bilo uokvirjenih v perspektivi mirnih protestov, in sicer eden v okviru konflikta.

Tabela 3: Mladina

	Dobri protestniki	Proti zakoniti protesti	Legitimni protesti	Mirni protesti	Nasilni protesti	Represija nad protestniki	Slabi protestniki	Ostalo	Skupaj
Ekonomski okvir	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
Moralni okvir	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	4
Okvir človeških zgodb	4	0	2	0	1	5	0	0	13
Okvir konflikta	1	0	4	1	1	12	1	1	21
Okvir odgovornosti	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	0	11
Skupaj	6	0	9	1	2	30	1	1	50

V Delu (tabela 4) so prevladovali prispevki, ki so poudarjali vidik represije nad protestniki; ti so se najpogosteje pojavljali v okviru konflikta (6), moralnem okviru (3) in okviru odgovornosti (1). Okvir dobrih protestnikov se je najpogosteje pojavljal v konfliktnem (4) in moralnem okviru (2). Enako pogosti so bili prispevki na temo legitimnih protestov, in sicer znotraj konfliktnega okvira (5) in okvira odgovornosti (1). Najmanj prispevkov je govorilo o slabih protestnikih – dvakrat v konfliktnem okviru in enkrat v moralnem. Nasilni protesti so bili v ospredju dvakrat v konfliktnem okviru ter protizakoniti protesti enkrat v okviru odgovornosti.

Tabela 4: Delo

	Dobri protestniki	Proti zakoniti protesti	Legitimni protesti	Mirni protesti	Nasilni protesti	Represija nad protestniki	Slabi protestniki	Ostalo	Skupaj
Ekonomski okvir	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Moralni okvir	2	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	6
Okvir človeških zgodb	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Okvir konflikta	4	0	5	3	2	6	2	4	26
Okvir odgovornosti	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3
Skupaj	6	1	6	3	2	10	3	4	35

Okviri protestniških gibanj v času covid-19: primerjava med Delom, Demokracijo in Mladino

Primerjava podatkov iz prejšnjega poglavja (tabela 2, 3, 4) pokaže, da se je v vseh treh medijih izmed splošnih okvirov najpogosteje pojavljal konfliktni okvir. Ne glede na to, pri splošnih okvirih izstopata Mladina, ki prednjači s prispevki v okviru človeških zgodb (13) ter okviru odgovornosti (11), in Demokracija, pri kateri je v

ospredje prišel moralni okvir (9). Pri vsebinsko-specifičnih okvirih so razlike med obravnavnimi časniki večje. Demokracija je proteste največkrat umestila znotraj okvira slabih protestnikov (25) in nasilnih protestov (9). Okvir legitimnih, mirnih protestov in okvir represije nad protestniki se v Demokraciji v obravnavnem obdobju nista pojavljala. Na drugi strani sta Mladina in Delo prispevke o protestih uokvirjala precej podobno; tu so se najpogosteje pojavljali prispevki, ki so poudarjali perspektivo represije nad protestniki (Delo 10, Mladina 30), legitimnih protestov (Delo 6 in Mladina 9) in dobrih protestnikov (Delo 6 in Mladina 6).

V Demokraciji so pisali o slabih protestnikih in nasilnih protestih, ki predstavljajo grožnje predsedniku vlade, vladi in njenim volivcem: »Bikeštrajkerji« zahtevajo, »smrt janšizmu«, torej smrt vsem drugače mislečim 220.000 slovenskih državljanov, ki so na volitvah 2018 glasovali za stranko SDS« (Suša 2020a, 43). Protestniki so bili označeni kot »skupina nasilnih levičarskih protestnikov«, »rdeči džihad«, »teroristi«, »maskirani teroristi«, »radikalno levi«, »ekstremisti«, »pripadniki tujih kriminalnih združb«, »lenuhi«, »poulični prevratniki«. Trdili so, da te proteste podpirajo in spodbujajo »strukture« prejšnje komunistične države, kot to ponazarja naslednji primer: »Moralna podpora prihaja od vseh strank nedemokratske levice, naslednic prejšnje edine stranke ...« (Klemenčič 2020, 42). Omenjene komunistične strukture so mestoma imenovane »globoka država«, ki »vzdržuje razklanost slovenskega naroda, da mu formalno in neformalno vlada« (ibid.). Protesti so bili predstavljeni kot politično sredstvo »levice«, ki želi prevzeti oblast in znova vnesti diktaturo in komunistični sistem. V navezavi na to so bili protestniki predstavljeni kot izvajalci protidržavnih dejanj in podporniki totalitarnega sistema: »[...] komunistične revolucije so ljubitelji Irana, fanatičnega verskega diktatorskega režima, ki je lani novembra na ulicah postrelil 1500 demonstrantov, ki so prote-

stirali, ker se je podražil bencin« (Suša 2020b, 45). Takšne trditve so bile podkrepjene z različnimi zgledi, med katerimi ponazarjajo podobnost med petkovimi protesti in Italijanskim nacionalističnim gibanjem Črnosrajčniki ter antifo: »Še bolj ste prepričljivi, ker so vaši glasniki zakrinkani črnosrajčniki Antife« (Klemenčič 2020, 43). Protestniške akcije so bile označene kot dejanja, ki nas vodijo v preteklost, kar ilustrira naslednji primer: »Ekstremni levičarji pa nas vneto pehajo 100 let nazaj v zgodovino in v Afriko. Zakaj že od tam ljudje bežijo k nam?« (Suša 2020b, 44). Na ta način je bila poudarjena implikacija, da protestniki slovensko družbo pomikajo v preteklost. Protestniki so bili predstavljeni kot potencialna nevarnost za demokratični red v Sloveniji. S tem je bilo poudarjeno stališče neodobravanja protestov in vzbujanja strahu. Nelegitimnost protestov je bila dodatno podkrepjena s poudarjanjem antagonističnega odnosa med protestnimi shodi in predsednikom vlade Janezom Janšo; v tem odnosu je bil Janša označen za simbol slovenskega osamosvajanja, svobode, in »oče« Slovenske države, ki se bori proti starim strukturam komunizma in s tem varuje svobodo in demokracijo, kar ponazarja naslednji primer (Klemenčič 2020, 44):

[...] bodimo že konkretni. Je vlada Janeza Janše kakorkoli slovensko demokracijo suspendirala? Janez Janša je vendar simbol slovenske demokracije. Zato je bil večkrat zaprt. Ker jih kot demokrat ogroža, se stare sile tako borijo proti njemu. Vam je denimo vlada prepovedala protestne shode, in to kljub temu, da ste bili neprijavljeni, nezaščiteni in vas je bilo mnogo preveč skupaj, kot je dovoljeno? Je policija na vašem druženju uporabljala pendreke? Solzivec? Vodni top? Je zaradi pandemije razglasila izredne razmere kot nekatere evropske države? Je bila v Ljubljani oborožena vojska kot v nekaterih evropskih mestih? Je bila uvedena policijska ura kot ponekod v Evropi? So s tanki v tisočih pregazili vas

in vaša kolesa, kot je kitajska komunistična oblast obračunala s stavkajočimi na pekinškem Trgu nebeškega miru leta 1989?

V ponavljanju navedb o nenehnem »bojevanju« Janeza Janše in njegove vlade proti domnevnim »starim komunističnim« silam ter »globoki državi« ter prikazovanju Janše kot žrtve zarotniških dejanj, je bilo v časniku Demokracija možno prepoznati prakso širjenja teorij zarote, kar opisujeta naslednja primera:

Pravica, da to stori Janez Janša, pa ni drugorazredna pravica, ampak prepoved, ki je po moje zapisana vsaj v tajnem uradnem listu, če ne kar v tajni ustavi. (Krašovec 2020, 35)

In ker je predsednik vlade Janez Janša, imajo protestniki vso podporo in simpatije velikih medijev, kot sta RTVS in POP TV. Ti dve televiziji in še nekaj radiev in revij napihujejo pomembnost teh zbiranj in jih celo zagovarjajo. RTVS je šla celo tako daleč, da je vpitje peščice zbranih na Prešernovem trgu označila za voljo ljudstva. Protestom se daje neverjetna teža v informativnih programih, spremlja se vsaka zahteva in vsak premik protestnikov. (Rant 2020, 34)

V Demokraciji je bil okvir dobrih protestnikov uporabljen izključno za Rumene jopiče, ki so se samoidentificirali kot protiprotestniško gibanje in podporniki vlade Janeza Janše (Sekulović 2020, 32–34). S tem je bila podeljena legitimnost ne le Rumenum jopičem²

² Rumenum jopičem se je oznaka neonacisti nadela, ker so njihovi pripadniki pogosto javno izrazili naklonjenost Adolfu Hitlerju in nekaterim nacističnim idejam. Njihovo društvo je pod takratno vlado oziroma Ministrstvom za kulturo, ki ga je takrat vodil Vasko Simoniti, prejeli celo status nevladne organizacije. (Vorkapić 2021)

kot neonacističnemu gibanju, pač pa hkrati tudi nacistični ideologiji. Demokracija je Rumene jopiče predstavljala kot avtentično *grassroots* gibanje v podporo vladi Janeza Janše. Rumeni jopiči so bili s tem predstavljeni kot »pravi« borci za »prave« pravice, medtem ko je bila levim »kulturnim bojevnikom« legitimnost odvzeta. V ospredje je bila postavljena tudi težnja po »uravnoveženju« protestniškega prostora in odpravi privilegijev levega političnega pola: »Na naših shodih se nam lahko pridruži kdorkoli, ki deli naše »protiprotetniške« vrednote in se bori proti zgoraj omenjenim skupinam oziroma proti privilegirancem iz prejšnjega sistema in proti soroševcem, ki jih plačuje in financira mednarodni kapital« (Sekulović 2020, 32–34). V Mladini so bili protestniki prikazani kot žrtve vladne represije. V prispevkih so poročali o različnih oblikah te represije, kot ilustrira naslednji primer: »V zadnjem mesecu smo postali država, kjer policija slehernika kaznuje, če s kredo na pločnik napiše nedolžno geslo ‚Čas je za odstop‘« (Repovž 2020, 19). Pogosto je bilo obravnavano tudi potencialno kršenje človekovih pravic s strani organov pregona, zlasti v kontekstu omejevanja pravice posameznikov do mirnega zbiranja in izražanja stališč, kot na primer: »Policisti so Jenullu pri tem brez dvoma kratili pravice. Če namreč policisti doslej otrok, ki so risali po pločnikih, niso kaznovali, bi to moralo veljati tudi za protestnike, saj je izražanje političnih stališč tako zakonsko kot ustavno še posebej zaščiteno« (Mekina 2020a, 22).

V trditve o represiji in kršenju človekovih pravic so bile pogosto umeščene izjave posameznikov s področja prava in človekovih pravic, s čimer so bili podkrepljeni ali oslabljeni določeni pogledi z namenom vplivanja na končno interpretacijo dogodkov (Kosicki 1993, 60). Nazoren primer te prakse je izjava profesorja upravnega prava na ljubljanski pravni fakulteti Rajka Pirnata, ki je komentiral izbris Zlatana Čordića iz registra samozaposlenih: »Tako slabo vodenega postopka in slabo napisane odločbe še nisem videl. Z

gledišča pravnika si skoraj ne morem predstavljati, da ministrstvo izda tako odločbo. Povsem prepričan sem, da jo bo Upravno sodišče odpravilo, če jo bo gospod Čordič (v nadaljevanju: stranka) le izpodbijal v upravnem sporu. Take odločbe skoraj ni mogoče resno obravnavati« (Košir 2020, 23).

Mladina je okvir določila že z naslovi prispevkov: »Hojs bi protestnike spravil v zapor«, »Nove oblike discipliniranja«, »Policisti dosledno popisovali protestnike«. Protestnike je uokvirila kot aktiviste za ohranjanje demokracije in svobode, vlado pa kot tisto, ki z ukrepi in odločitvami omejuje svobodo in krši demokratične norme.

Izmed vseh obravnavanih medijev je bila Mladina tista, katere prispevki so pri poročanju o protestih najpogosteje uporabljali okvir človeških zgodb (12 prispevkov). Ti so poudarjali osebne zgodbe udeležencev protestov, njihove razloge za sodelovanje v protestih ter njihove izkušnje z represijo. S takšnim načinom poročanja so bili protestniki v veliki meri individualizirani, in predstavljeni kot posamezniki, ki se borijo za temeljne demokratične vrednote, kot je svoboda:

Če bom le mogla, bom šla ta petek ponovno na manifestacije, to pot predvsem zaradi seznamov odpisanih za bolnišnično zdravljenje ob obolelosti za boleznijo covid-19. (Mikuž Kos 2020, 52)

»Zelo težko je prekiniti ta naš zagon,« pravi Brane Solce. »Kot da bi bil utečen ritual, kot da to od nas pričakujejo tako ljudje kot oblast. Pri tem vztrajanju še najbolj pomaga oblast, vsak teden je nova inspiracija.« Tudi Sanja Fidler priznava, da je včasih težko. »Imamo krize, pojavlja se utrujenost, včasih si izčrpan, vedno znova zgrožen nad tem, kar se dogaja v Sloveniji, nemogoče je ostati pasiven, če ne bi protestirali, bi se morali izseliti. Vsak teden nas oblast znova dvigne, potisne nas na ulice. Janez Janša je res glavni organizator teh protestov, odličen je v tej vlogi mo-

bilizacije ljudi. Vztrajali bomo, vsak dan avtoritarnega vladanja Janeza Janše je dan preveč. Zdaj je zunaj mraz, a mraz ni problem, problem je represija oblasti. (Mekina 2020b, 7)

Tovrstna retorika okvira človeških zgodb lahko med bralci vzbudi občutek empatije, povezanosti in identifikacije, saj posameznike, ki nastopajo v prispevku, prikazuje kot žrtve zatiranja s strani avtoritarnega režima in borce za vrednote demokracije. S tem pristopom so prispevki Mladine izkazovali podporo petkovim protestom in jih usmerjali k razumevanju individualnih zgodb in motivacij udeležencev.

V Mladini sta se v obravnavanem obdobju pojavila tudi dva članka z okvirom nasilnih protestov. Nanašala sta se na četrtkove proteste, v katerih so pričali o nasilnih izgredih ter s tem izpostavljali ločnico med petkovimi in četrtkovimi protesti. Pri tem je bila poudarjena legitimnost mirnih petkovih protestov, medtem ko so bili četrtkovih protesti označeni kot nasilni in posledično problematični: »Nasilni del četrtkovega protesta se petkovih protestov ne udeležuje prav zaradi protestniških pozivov k nenasilju, saj (petkova) protestniška množica zavrača nasilno vedenje na protestih« (Petrovčič 2020, 30).

Prispevki v časniku Delo so proteste in protestnike uokvirjali podobno kot prispevki Mladine – petkovi protestniki so bili predstavljeni kot aktivisti za svobodno, odprto in demokratično družbo. Enako kot v Mladini so prispevki navajali jasno ločnico med četrtkovimi in petkovimi protesti: »V Ljubljani so se zbrali protestniki, toda v primerjavi s tradicionalnimi petkovimi protesti so bili tokratni nasilni, saj so se zamaskirani ljudje s policijo najprej spopadli na Trgu republike, nato pa se je dogajanje preselilo k Drami« (Delo 2020, 2). Kljub omenjenim podobnostim je bilo pri poročanju med Mladino in Delom mogoče opaziti tudi nekaj razlik. V Delu se okvir človeških zgodb, v katerem bi prispevki predstavili osebne zgodbe protestnikov, ni pojavljal. Prav tako so se mestoma pojav-

ljali prispevki, ki so protestnike uokvirili kot slabe, eden takšnih primerov je kolumna Mojce Pišek (2020, 7): »Na proteste ne grem, ker ne prinašajo razprave o progresivnih politikah in ker me zvajajo na pripadnost enemu od dveh taborov. Češ če nisi proti Janši, si za njega. In pa, proti Janši si lahko le tako, da protestiraš.«

Različno uokvirjanje protestnih gibanj – razlogi, razprava in zaključek

Primerjava med mediji jasno pokaže na razlikovanje uokvirjanja protestov v času covid-19 z vidika vsebinsko-specifičnih okvirov. Ta razlika se prepozna predvsem v poudarjanju in izpuščanju ključnih vidikov dogodkov, kar sta eni izmed glavnih značilnosti uokvirjanja (Entman 1992, 52–53). Novinarji pri Demokraciji so v prispevkih o protestih poudarjali zgodbe o izgrelih in nasilju, izpostavljali žaljive izjave in napise na transparentih protestnikov ter izpuščali name-ne in vzroke protestov. Če so prispevki izpostavili določene zahteve protestnikov, so le-te uokvirili s cinizmom in žaljivimi besedami. Prispevki Mladine in Dela so za razliko od Demokracije pri petkovih protestih pogosto izpostavljali nesorazmerno uporabo represije nad protesti, protestnike označevali kot borce za svobodo in vrednote demokracije ter izpuščali izgrede ali nasilje, ki se je odvijalo med petkovimi protestnimi akcijami. S tega stališča je ključno, kar sta izpostavila Lazarsfeld in Merton (1999, 28–29), in sicer, da pri medijih ni pomembno le to, kaj povedo, ampak je pogosto pomembnejše tisto, česar ne omenjajo. Omenjeno medijsko prakso denimo ponazori poročanje o alternativni proslavi,³ ki so jo organizirali petkovi prote-

³ Ob 30. obletnici samostojnosti Slovenije je bila 26. junija 2021 na Prešernovem trgu v Ljubljani organizirana alternativna proslava. Prireditev je bila organizirana s strani skupine neodvisnih kulturnih ustvarjalcev in aktivistov, ki so želeli izraziti svojo kritiko do trenutnega političnega stanja v Sloveniji. (Kosmač 2021)

stniki. Na tej proslavi se je eden izmed udeležencev slekel in pokazal zadnjico. Ta »incident« je bil zelo poudarjen v Demokraciji, medtem ko Mladina in Delo o dogodku sploh nista poročala.

Različnost oziroma podobnost medijev pri poročanju o protestih, ki se kaže predvsem v času epidemije covid-19, lahko pojasnimo s homologijo (prekrivanjem) novinarskega in političnega polja. Med političnim in novinarskim poljem obstajajo določene strukturne podobnosti, ki omogočajo in vzdržujejo podoben sistem vrednot, praks in hierarhij. Novinarji in politiki sodelujejo na različne načine. Novinarji lahko vplivajo na politično polje tako, da poročajo o izbranih političnih dogodkih in temah. Politiki lahko vplivajo na novinarsko polje tako, da zagotavljajo informacije in dostop do političnih akterjev (Hovden 2012, 57).

Homologija med petkovimi protesti ter Delom in Mladino se kaže ravno v načinu uokvirjanja teh protestov, ki so jih večinoma predstavili kot dobre, legitimne in mirne. V prispevkih so reproducirali njihove kritične vidike do vlade in vladnih ukrepov ter jih predstavljali kot aktiviste za demokracijo in svobodo. Skozi okvir represije pa so v prispevkih po drugi strani izpostavljali, kako vlada z ukrepi za zaježitev epidemije krši tudi posameznikove človekove pravice, kot sta pravici do izražanja mnenj in mirnega zbiranja. Vlada pa je bila v tem primeru predstavljena kot avtoritarna, nedemokratska s strani obvladovanja epidemije pa kot neprofesionalna, ki ni kos takšnemu upravljanju izrednih razmer.

Prispevki v Demokraciji so interpretacije protestov v homologiji z desnim političnim poljem. Tu so proteste ali akterje, ki so bili kritični do vlade, predstavili kot del zarote leve politične strani, ki deluje iz ozadja in si prizadeva za zrušitev desne vlade. To se kaže tudi skozi uokvirjanje protestov – le-ti so bili predstavljeni kot slabi, nasilni in protizakoniti. Ravno pojavljanje določenih zarotniških dejanj in predstavljanje strahu, da nas protesti vračajo v preteklost

in nazadnjaštvo, nakazuje na prisotnost postfaktičnosti, v katerih je resnica zasenčena in sekundarnega pomena (McIntyre 2018, 10–11) ter je razlikovanje med lažjo in resnico nepomembno (Kalpokas 2019, 13), saj zavestno izkorišča čustvene prizive, ki spodbujajo in krepijo predsodke (Zackariasson 2018, 2). Ravno zato gredo avtorji v Demokraciji celo do točke, kjer si izmišljajo trditve, ki ne temeljijo na dejstvih in so oblikovane zgolj z namenom pritegniti pozornost in podpreti lastna stališča.

V desnem novinarskem polju se pogosto pojavljajo trditve o tem, da so mediji neuravnoteženi oz. da je leva ideologija tista, ki dominira in prežema medijski prostor (Hovden 2012, 68–70). Podobno je tudi za slovenski desni politični spekter, kjer je značilna misel, da »osrednje« medije v Sloveniji »še vedno obvladujejo leve sile kontinuitete«, zato je treba »bodisi demokratizirati obstoječe medije – jih odpreti tudi za desne poglede, ali ustanoviti lastne medije, ki bodo podpirali desno politiko in razbijali mnenjski monopol leve« (Kučić 2019). V tem primeru se to kaže tako, da so t. i. leve medije označevali kot trobilo protestnikov, ki dajejo preveliko pozornost protestom, ki ne odražajo »širšega« interesa prebivalcev. Ti mediji so prav tako del »leve« zarote, ki si želi nasilne zamenjave oblasti in levičarske prevlade.

Poleg tega je za razumevanje uokvirjanja protestov pomembno, da na novinarski poklic ne gledamo iz tradicionalnega pojmovanja novinarstva in medijskih študijev, kot so objektivnost, nepristranskost in profesionalnost, ampak jih je treba obravnavati kot »interpretacijske skupnosti«,⁴ skozi katere si novinarji delijo skupne interpretacije ključnih javnih dogodkov. Skozi skupen diskurz, ki ga oblikujejo, se legitimirajo kot novinarski akterji. Ta legiti-

⁴ Interpretacijska skupnost Hymes (1980, 2) opredeli kot interpretativno skupnost kot skupino, ki združuje skupne interpretacije.

macija izhaja iz njihovega oblikovanja lastnih narativov preteklih dogodkov, ki si jih rutinsko in neformalno med seboj izmenjujejo. Ti narativi vključujejo določene konstrukcije resničnosti, značilne pripovedne strukture ter specifične prakse (Zelizer 1993, 223). Novinarstvo nikoli ni popolnoma objektivno in nepristransko, čeprav se je, ko pravi Schiller (1981, 123), znotraj novinarskega poklica ustvarila avra »avtoritativnosti«, ki poudarja potrebo po določenih pristopih k poročanju, kot so objektivnost, nepristranskost in uravnoveženost v pisanju. Torej je tudi novinarstvo zaznavno kot levo ali desno usmerjeno. Kadar gre za kršenje temeljnih človekovih pravic, ni »nevtralnega« poročanja; novinar ne more biti zunaj okvira, ki ga poskuša navidezno objektivno ustvariti, temveč mora zavzeti stališče, saj mora v osnovi novinarstvo podajati politične in ne »nevtralne« opise dogodkov (Bašić Hrvatinić 2013, 78). Zavzemanje takšnih pozicij do pravice mirnega zbiranja in izražanja mnenja se kaže tudi skozi okvire petkovih protestov, kar sem pojasnil že prej. V analiziranih člankih je tudi možno opaziti, kako se je v prispevkih različno vzpostavila hierarhija pravic. V Mladini pravica do mirnega zbiranja in izražanja prevladuje nad javnim zdravjem. V njih je bistveno več poudarka o tem, kako je omenjena pravica kršena. V Delu je opaziti, da mestoma prevladuje skrb za javno zdravje, vendar še vedno v ospredje postavljajo kršitve teh pravic. V Demokraciji pa je jasno izpostavljeno, da je javno zdravje absolutno na prvem mestu, pred pravico do mirnega zbiranja in izražanja, saj so se pogosto pojavljale trditve, da so protesti nepotrebni in protizakoniti in bi se lahko za voljo javnega zdravja vzdržali ter protestirali na način, ki ne bi ogrožal zdravja drugih.

Uokvirjanje ima pomembno vlogo tudi pri oblikovanju javnega mnenja, kar so v svojih raziskavah potrdili Iyengar (1991), Fisk in Hall (v Luthar idr. 2004, 151-174 in 195-208). Zato sem želel preveriti, ali obstajajo tudi morebitne korelacije med uokvirjanjem prote-

stov in javnim mnenjem. Zato sem rezultate te analize primerjal z rezultati javnomnenjske raziskave⁵ in skušal prepoznati podobnosti med okviri medijev in odnosom bralcev do protestov v javnomnenjskih raziskavah. Za proučitev sem vzel tri trditve iz javnomnenjske raziskave, ki se precej povezujejo z raziskovanimi okviri in jih primerjal med seboj. Vendar je bilo število bralcev demokracije zelo nizko (zgolj 8), zato sem za primerjavo vzel podatke bralcev portala Nove24 (pojasnilo⁶). V anketi se s trditvijo »Petkovi protesti so bili nasilni« ni strinjalo 81,8 odstotka vprašanih, ki berejo Mladino, 66,5 odstotka tistih, ki berejo Delo, in 33,3 odstotka tistih, ki berejo portal Nova24. S trditvijo »Cilj protestnikov je bil zaščita demokracije« se je strinjalo 47 odstotkov tistih, ki berejo Delo, in 69,1 odstotka vprašanih, ki berejo Mladino. Na drugi strani se s to trditvijo ni strinjalo 60 odstotkov tistih, ki berejo Demokracijo. Prav tako se jasno vidi razlikovanje pri trditvi »Protestov so se udeleževali tisti, ki živijo na račun davkoplačevalcev«. S trditvijo se ni strinjalo 56,7 odstotka vprašanih, ki berejo Delo, in 76,4 odstotka tistih, ki berejo Mladino. Na drugi strani so ponovno anketirani, ki so bralci Demokracije – med njimi se jih je 53,4 odstotka z navedeno trditvijo strinjalo.

Podatki nam kažejo jasno ločnico v pogledih na proteste in protestnike. Anketirani, ki berejo Delo in Mladino, kjer so bili protesti uokvirjeni dobri, legitimni in kot žrtev represije, večinoma proteste

⁵ Javnomenjska raziskava je bila narejena na reprezentativnem vzorcu v sklopu projekta Svoboda mnenja in izražanja, del katerega je tudi ta članek. Število respondentov ankete je bilo 802. Rezultati podatkov bodo objavljeni v ločeni raziskavi. V anketi je odgovorili, da Delo bere 105 anketirancev, Mladino 55 in Nova24 52.

⁶ Za primerjavo sem vzel bralce portala Nove24, saj je večina prispevkov Demokracije objavljanjih tudi na portalu Nova24 in ker si Demokracija in Nova24 delita uredništvo, saj zanju pišejo isti novinarji in so v tistem času imeli istega urednika (Kučič 2019). Torej so medijski sorodni in v tem primeru gre zgolj za ponazoritev ujemanja.

ne dojemajo kot nasilne in protestnike ne kot porabnike proračunskih sredstev, ampak kot »borce« za demokracijo. Pri portalu Nova24 je to razmerje ravno nasprotno in bralci vidijo proteste kot nasilne, protestnike kot porabnike proračunskih sredstev ter se ne strinjajo s tem, da so protestniki borci za demokracijo. Rezultati kažejo določeno mero ujemanja med okviri in mnenjem anketiranih. Mladina je bolj pozitivno uokvirjala proteste, medtem ko so tudi njeni bralci imeli najbolj pozitiven pogled nanje. V podobnem razmerju so Delo in njegovi bralci. Kot portal Nova24, ki je uporabljala sorodne okvire Demokracije, ki vsebujejo negativno konotacijo, so tudi njeni bralci razumeli proteste kot negativne in nelegitimne. Čeprav je to le poskus ponazoritve, kako se okviri določenih medijev lahko ujema-jo z mnenjem bralcev, o vplivu medijev na oblikovanje mnenja na podlagi moje raziskave ni možno govoriti. S to primerjavo sem zgolj poskušal ponazoriti, da se kažejo določena ujemanja, ki bi jih bilo v prihodnje vredno raziskati – predvsem v kontekstu, kako uokvirjanje v slovenskih medijih oblikuje javno mnenje.

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ALEKSANDR KUKLIN¹

Social Activism of Russian NGOs during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic posed significant challenges to the non-profit sector, which responded with sustainability and adaptability. Russian NGOs quickly adjusted their programs to virtual formats, engaging with beneficiaries and stakeholders online. However, reduced funding and financial strain became prevalent as donations decreased, prompting organizations to optimize operations and seek new sources of support.

Amid the crisis, NGOs demonstrated their indispensable role in directly assisting vulnerable populations, delivering essential goods and medical supplies, and offering psychological and legal support. Mobilizing volunteers was crucial in extending the impact of NGO aid initiatives.

The pandemic also allowed NGOs to influence policy changes and advocate for targeted support measures for vulnerable groups. Despite existing constraints, they actively shaped policies that addressed social inequalities exposed during the pandemic.

In the future, the sector must address financial dependence on government funding and focus on developing sustainable, long-term solutions. The Russian non-profit sector can continue to address social challenges and promote societal change by building on the newfound culture of charity and civic engagement,

Keywords: COVID-19 pandemic, Russian non-profit sector, NGO, Social policy

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Družbeni aktivizem ruskih nevladnih organizacij v času pandemije COVID-19

Izveček: Pandemija COVID-19 je pomenila velik izziv za neprofitni sektor, ki se je odzval trajnostno in prilagodljivo. Ruske nevladne organizacije so svoje programe hitro prilagodile virtualnim oblikam ter z upravičenci in zainteresiranimi stranmi sodelovale prek spleta. Vendar so zaradi zmanjšanja donacij prevladovali zmanjšano financiranje in finančni pritiski, kar je organizacije spodbudilo k optimizaciji delovanja in iskanju novih virov podpore.

Med krizo so nevladne organizacije dokazale svojo nepogrešljivo vlogo pri zagotavljanju neposredne pomoči ranljivim skupinam prebivalstva, pri dostavi osnovnih dobrin in medicinskih pripomočkov ter nudenju psihološke in pravne podpore. Mobilizacija prostovoljcev je imela ključno vlogo pri povečanju učinka pobud NVO za pomoč.

Pandemija je nevladnim organizacijam ponudila tudi priložnosti za vplivanje na spremembe politike in zagovarjanje ciljno usmerjenih podpornih ukrepov za ranljive skupine. Kljub obstoječim omejitvam so imele aktivno vlogo pri oblikovanju politik, ki so obravnavale družbene neenakosti, razkrite med pandemijo.

V prihodnosti mora sektor odpraviti finančno odvisnost od vladnega financiranja in se osredotočiti na razvoj trajnostnih in dolgoročnih rešitev. Ruski neprofitni sektor lahko na podlagi novo odkrite kulture dobroteljnosti in državljanskega udejstvovanja še naprej obravnava družbene izzive in spodbuja spremembe v družbi.

Ključne besede: pandemija COVID-19, ruski neprofitni sektor, nevladne organizacije, socialna politika

Introduction

Non-profit, non-governmental organizations improve the living standards of vulnerable groups, participate in structural changes in the social, economic, and political areas, make legislative initia-

tives, and conduct fundamental research. Such organizations can deal with the consequences during local or global crises, helping the most affected population groups. However, at the same time, NGOs depend on funding sources and feel the consequences of any economic downturn due to their status and peculiarities of functioning.

The term ‘Non-Commercial Organization’² in Russia covers various legal entities of various organizational and legal forms. For this article, NGOs can be conditionally divided by areas of activity into Socially Oriented NCOs (SO NCOs), which are engaged in solving social problems practically without interference in political activities, and organizations whose purpose is human rights, lawmaking and development of civil society.

During the COVID-19 virus pandemic, the Russian society and state also faced complex tasks of overcoming this crisis’s medical and socio-economic consequences. Social changes and constraints have revealed and exacerbated pre-existing socio-economic inequalities in society. Vulnerable populations, including the elderly, low-income families, persons with disabilities and marginalized groups, were disproportionately affected by the pandemic.

The pandemic was a severe test for the non-profit sector, which by 2020 was in a situation of structural imbalance under the influence of legislative and political reforms of the second decade of the 21st century. New challenges manifested themselves in the problems of financing non-profit activities, the emergence of global tasks in the field of solving social problems and the lack of volunteer resources, imperfect legislation, and uncertainty of the status of NGOs within the framework of economic and political processes in the country.

2 In Russian legislation and research practice, the terms ‘non-commercial/non-profit organization’ (NCO / NPO) and ‘non-governmental organization’ (NGO) formally have the same meaning. For this article, these terms will be used as synonyms.

Under these conditions, on the one hand, the role of civil society organizations has become even more significant, as NGOs have become more active in addressing the population's pressing problems and providing support to vulnerable segments of the population. Many NGOs in Russia were highly adaptable to rapidly changing conditions, socially engaged, and played a significant role in assisting, disseminating important information, and building solidarity throughout the pandemic. As traditional ways of working became impossible due to restrictions and social exclusion measures, NGOs embraced digital transformation, using online platforms and technologies to remotely provide essential services and support to those in need.

Another factor that has increased the effectiveness of NGOs' social work has been the growth of the volunteer movement. This has increased the reach and impact of their efforts to help those in need and has positively impacted system building and the development of organizational tools (skills) for long-term engagement with volunteers for many NGOs.

During the pandemic, under the influence of financial and organizational problems, preconditions for institutional changes in the non-profit sector were created. There is a reduction in the number of NCOs due to the displacement of organizations that failed to cope with new challenges, a reduction in the range and volume of NCO services, and a reduction in administrative and organizational support. The split between SO NCOs and human rights NGOs deepened even further during this period.

This research examines the responses to change and various aspects of social activism of Russian NGOs in facing new risks, threats, and constraints during the COVID-19 pandemic. We explore the critical role of NGOs in providing information transparency, combating misinformation, and advocating for policy change

to address emerging issues and pooling resources of various entities (private, public, governmental) to create a more comprehensive and coordinated response to the crisis. Using a systems approach, we will explore these organizations' diverse contributions and strategies for assisting healthcare providers and supporting vulnerable communities. We aim to gain insight into the adaptive responses of NGOs to the pandemic, including their use of digital technologies to sustain their activities in the face of blockages and measures of social distancing. The study and analysis of the processes outlined will allow us to more accurately determine new directions for the development of the non-profit sector in the future, including in the context of new political and economic crises.

Theoretical Framework for the Study

The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the essential role of non-profit, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in addressing social challenges. Civil society, encompassing a diverse array of non-governmental organizations, plays a pivotal role in shaping the interaction dynamics between society, including various social groups and governmental entities. This involvement stretches across social, economic, and political realms, often operating as intermediaries between the state and society. This study's theoretical framework is grounded in the concept of civil society, which recognizes NGOs as vital agents of social change.

Moreover, the interactions between state and non-state structures are characterized by interdependence. This interdependence fosters cooperation, replacing elements of competition with mutual complementarity. This cooperative framework allows for joint problem-solving, harnessing the potential of both sectors, while simultaneously exposing potential organizational vulnerabilities within private organizations.

Within the framework of this study, the participation of NGOs in crisis response, serving as an extension of the state to provide social services to the population, is considered within the concept of indirect public management (Salamon 2002). Additionally, new philanthropy is highly relevant for examining the changes in funding mechanisms and support for Russian NGOs during the pandemic and their adaptation to evolving philanthropic activities (Salamon 2014).

The COVID-19 pandemic represented an unparalleled global crisis, challenging the adaptability and resilience of NGOs. This study examines how NGOs navigated the challenges posed by the pandemic, adapted their activities, and continued to fulfill their missions by drawing from the concept of crisis management and resilience.

A comprehensive understanding of social activism and volunteerism is necessary to analyze the response of Russian NGOs to the pandemic. This framework encompasses the concepts of social activism, volunteering, and the mobilization of civil society to address pressing social issues.

Data Collection Methods

A mixed method and data triangulation approach was used to collect and analyze data related to Russian NGOs' response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This approach included both primary and secondary sources.

Primary data were collected through semi-structured interviews with NGO leaders from Nizhny Novgorod, Vologda, and Rostov regions. The main objective of the interviews was to obtain detailed information about NGOs' experiences, strategies they used in response to the pandemic, challenges they faced, and mechanisms for interacting with the authorities.

NGOs were selected for interviews based on a purposive sampling strategy. NGOs were selected based on their involvement in

community activities during the pandemic, ensuring that different types of organizations were represented. Thematic analysis was used as the primary method of data processing.

Secondary data were collected from available reports, publications, and official documents posted on the Internet related to NGO activities during the pandemic. Desk-based secondary analysis techniques were used to extract relevant information from these documents.

Adapting to new realities

The COVID-19 pandemic outbreak in Russia required non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to adapt quickly and deeply to respond effectively to the crisis while respecting sanitary norms and restrictions. This section reviews the adaptation measures taken by Russian NGOs to overcome the difficulties caused by the pandemic.

At the end of March 2020, *restrictive measures* against the spread of coronavirus infection were introduced at the state level. A temporary quarantine was declared, and a remote format of work and activities was introduced in most areas of the economy. In this regard, most NGOs also had to adapt programs, projects, and activities to online formats. Virtual meetings, webinars, and online seminars have become acceptable alternatives for conducting trainings, sharing information, and interacting with beneficiaries and stakeholders. This transition has allowed many NGOs to maintain continuity of their activities and important links with target groups. However, as the March 2020 CAF Charitable Foundation survey of Russian NGO representatives shows, many respondents noted difficulties adapting to the new conditions (CAF 2020). These include insufficient technical infrastructure and competencies for remote (online) work, difficulty adapting current programs and projects to the new conditions, and unpreparedness of

beneficiaries to interact in online (Kosygina 2021, 29–30). However, only 5% of NGOs suspended their activities due to the emergency and restrictions imposed. Most organizations were able to adapt to the new conditions to a greater or lesser extent. Moreover, 20% of NGOs launched new programs to support pandemic survivors in the first months of the crisis. Most organizations assisted in the area of childcare (51%), support of people with disabilities (35%), and the elderly (22%) (Klishina et al. 2022, 29–32). By July 2020, 49% of NGOs had launched new programs to support people through hotlines, food, and non-food aid delivery for life support, and assistance to medical organizations (Kosygina 2021, 30). Thus, the need to adapt activities to the conditions of the pandemic has led, on the one hand, to a reduction in activities in the field of social services for needy categories of the population, on the other hand, to an increase in demand for emergency direct charitable services, volunteer assistance and the development of remote formats of work (online counseling, helplines, and others).

The second aspect the non-profit sector has had to adapt under the state of emergency is the *reduction in funding*. One of the structural features of Russia's non-profit sector at present is its strong dependence on government funding, poor development of fundraising tools, and independent sources of resource support for the activities of most NGOs. This situation resulted from a series of political and economic changes that took place in 2006–2020 and led to a significant disproportion both in the scope of Russian NGOs' activities (about 80% of organizations are engaged in helping people in difficult life situations and implementing projects in science, culture, and education) and in the availability of the primary sources of funding (about 10% of all organizations regularly receive government grants and subsidies from budgets of various levels) (Efimova 2023, 194–195). A significant proportion of NGOs

in Russia operate with minimal funding: about 30% of organizations have budgets of less than 100,000 rubles (1.5 thousand euros) annually. The funding for most organizations comes from individuals and organizations. In 2020, about 60% of charitable NGOs experienced a significant reduction in donations due to the difficult economic situation. Receipts from these sources decreased up to 80% compared to previous years. At the same time, profits from providing paid services in the social sphere (including at the expense of the state order) decreased (Mishina 2022). Many non-profit sector representatives note the reduction of state funding in the form of grants at the local level: 'In the year when the pandemic started, the annual grant competition for local NGOs was discontinued to optimize the city budget. Since then, this competition has never been resumed, despite our (NGO representatives) appeals to the authorities' (Chernova, personal interview). This led to optimizing expenditures, reducing staff, searching for new funding sources in new conditions, and changing strategic planning and organizational development. Insufficient diversification of funding sources and its significant reduction became obstacles to developing and implementing practical business processes and strategic development of most NGOs despite actualizing these tasks

In response to these challenges, many non-profit organizations have stepped up fundraising activities by launching online fundraising campaigns, and virtual charity events. Interaction with donors and supporters through digital crowdfunding platforms helped to expand outreach and maintain financial stability for ongoing aid activities. Another necessary consequence of this situation was the increased activity of NGOs in obtaining support measures from the state, especially since the state introduced 2020–2021 several new support measures for organizations affected by the COVID-19 epidemic and improved the legislative regu-

lation of measures available to NGOs earlier. Thus, in mid-2020, a federal register of socially oriented NGOs and a register of organizations affected by the COVID-19 epidemic were formed. The creation of these registers became the basis for the emergence of new measures to support NPOs in the country. The most demanded measures were:

- Rent and tax vacations for tenants of state and municipal property, allocation of new premises from municipal and state property for SO NGOs,³
- Temporary exemption of NGO employees from paying personal income tax on their salaries,
- Reduced rates for compulsory social and medical insurance for NGO employees,
- State subsidies for employee training and payment of salaries of newly hired NGO employees,
- Preferential loans for NGOs to finance their activities,
- Increased state support for NGOs to implement socially significant projects and provide social services to citizens (additional grant competitions primarily at the federal level),
- Reduction in the number of control measures by government agencies,
- Tax incentives and subsidies to commercial enterprises. On June 08, 2020, the Tax Code of the Russian Federation was amended to return the profit tax exemptions for businesses

³ According to the legislation of the Russian Federation, Socially Oriented Non-Profit Organizations (SO NCOs) are NCOs engaged in activities aimed at solving social problems and developing civil society. In 2020, a state register of SO NCOs was created, which by the end of 2020 included about 40 thousand organizations. Participation in state grant competitions was the main criterion for inclusion in the register. The organizations included in this register must have a priority right to receive a wide range of state support measures.

supporting SO NCOs, which were abolished in 2005. Thus, commercial enterprises could allocate a portion of their income from tax savings to support NGO activities.

Despite the significance of the adopted measures of state support for NGOs, the third sector's representatives still have questions. As the researchers note, the support measures were mainly aimed at socially oriented NGOs – only organizations that were included in the relevant state register (about 30 thousand organizations in 2020 out of more than 209 thousand NGOs), and not all of them used the full range of new instruments of state support (Kosygina 2021, 32–33). Second, some of the measures were significantly delayed or did not apply to the activities of NGOs due to the length and complexity of bureaucratic procedures (Kovalenko and Zayakin 2020, 7–9). However, for many non-profit organizations, this situation has become an opportunity for development. It was essential for small regional NCOs to intensify their interactions with government structures, businesses, and the public.

Another vital aspect of NGOs' adaptation to pandemic challenges has been adopting *digital and distance technologies* in very different areas of activity, in addition to the already mentioned direct work with beneficiaries (online consultations, distance learning, video-conferencing activities, virtual psychological support networks, and others) and online fundraising (crowdfunding platforms, remote communication with donors, collection of private donations, and others). The use of social networks, websites, and online platforms to disseminate reliable information about COVID-19, prevention measures, and available assistance and healthcare resources in the Russian non-profit sector has reached a significantly higher level than before. In addition, many NGOs actively participated in targeted information campaigns to promote public health practices such as wearing masks, hand hygiene, and

physical distancing (Korneeva 2020, 11). These were forced measures during the pandemic, but active NGOs now use the acquired competencies and resources to digitize current activities, communicate with beneficiaries, volunteers, donors, and authorities, and scale up activities.

However, for most Russian NGOs, the low level of digitalization made it difficult or impossible to restructure work processes in the new realities, as it required organizational readiness and substantial logistical resources. The complexity of transition to remote work and online communications also depended on the format of the organization's functioning. NCOs mainly working with wards of social institutions (prisons, hospices, hospitals, boarding schools, and others) faced the inability to maintain social work activity at the previous level (Skokova et al. 2021, 62–64). The same situation is typical for organizations whose activities are aimed at helping people with socially significant diseases or disabilities. Developed large NGOs with highly qualified staff and sufficient material and technical resources to develop online formats have become more involved in activities with authorities and patients and have reached wider audiences. For NPOs that are less organizationally developed, the transition to an online interaction format with beneficiaries and donors reduced the number of events, the audience of participants, and the social impact of activities (Center for Humanitarian Technologies and Research 2022). Many of the leaders of small regional NGOs we interviewed note that '*digitalization*' of activities required significant efforts and resources: 'Organizations that owned online formats of work began to hold more events [...] to work from different cities with both specialists and beneficiaries [...] Many small NGOs were not able to adapt to the new realities, including due to the lack of resources for organizational activities' (Grishina, personal interview). 'Our specialists

had to master digital technologies at a higher level in working with clients and solving administrative tasks. Had it not been for the grant (as part of the Potanin Foundation's competition for organizational development of NGOs), we might not have had enough resources of our own' (G. Smirnova, personal interview).

Adapting to new realities during the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the Russian third sector's resilience, flexibility, and resourcefulness. By embracing digital transformation and adjusting their strategies, many NGOs continued to serve their beneficiaries and support communities. However, for most organizations, restrictive measures and economic obstacles caused a decline in social engagement, loss of financial stability, and organizational problems.

NGO participation in pandemic emergencies

The introduction of quarantine and self-isolation affected all categories of the population. However, it was especially difficult for representatives of vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, people with disabilities, low-income families, children in orphanages, students, migrants, prisoners, the homeless, and others. (Barysheva, Antipanova, and Thanh 2020, 106–109; Walker 2023) NGOs during the pandemic began to adapt their activities and programs to provide the most needed assistance, primarily to their primary beneficiaries. NGO initiatives for affected communities can be categorized in the following areas:

- Direct assistance to specific categories of people in need, primarily providing vulnerable categories of the population with food, essential goods, medical equipment, and means of protection;
- Psychological and legal assistance to those affected by the pandemic;
- Support for health care institutions and medical workers;
- Promotion of information transparency;

- Participation in developing and adopting political decisions supporting the non-profit sector and individual social groups and overcoming the crisis.

Assistance to vulnerable people

The most active assistance of Russian NGOs during the pandemic was manifested in supporting unprotected categories of the population. The regime of self-isolation and economic restrictions worsened the situation of population groups that were at risk even before the pandemic. The most demanded and widespread assistance measures to these categories were providing foodstuffs and delivering necessities and medical supplies. Narrowly specialized NGOs aided their primary beneficiaries, members, and patients. Organizations whose main activities were suspended under pandemic restrictions were included in interagency or partnership projects with other NGOs, commercial enterprises, or authorities of different levels (Korneeva 2020, 3-6).

In addition to providing food and necessities to those in need in forced isolation, specialized NGOs aided their beneficiaries, taking into account their specific needs and conditions (Klishina et al. 2022, 30-32; Korneeva 2020, 5-7; Mikov 2020, 5-7). Among the numerous initiatives, it is worth highlighting projects that have influenced long-term development in their field. Thus, providing temporary accommodation in daycare centers and families of wards of orphanages, psychoneurological boarding schools, and children's hospices became a significant step in developing accompanied accommodation for these categories of people in need. Many experts note that this practice did not become mass, despite the introduction of temporary measures of additional state support for guardians: 'In our and other regions, there was a practice when children from orphanages were taken into families for the

duration of the pandemic... both private volunteers and employees of non-profit organizations. However, it was not mass and did not affect adults with disabilities and the elderly at all' (Smirnova, personal interview). The specialized NGOs faced the problem of access to boarding schools with which they cooperated before the pandemic: 'We came to the boarding school to help our charges, but they would not even open the gates for us' (Lyubimova, personal interview). Providing electronic means of communication (tablets, smartphones, laptops) to lonely elderly people in nursing homes accelerated the digitalization processes of these institutions. The involvement of NGOs in providing people living with HIV with antiretroviral drugs has actualized the problem of availability of these medicines in the country and the vulnerability of these people's rights. The need to control the spread of COVID-19 in prisons and colonies and the struggle for prisoners' rights in the new conditions intensified the activities of human rights organizations helping convicts and their families (Mikov 2020, 6; OSCE 2022). The experience of implementing distance support programs to address mental health problems, combat social isolation, and protect rights has significantly expanded the market of social services in general and the capacity of NGOs in this direction, in particular.

One of the critical strategies for social activism during a pandemic is *partnership and collaboration* between NGOs, businesses, and government agencies. Many organizations are united in formalized or informal coalitions on sectoral or regional basis. The pooling of resources has improved the quality and quantity of mutual information and methodological and organizational support between non-profit organizations. In different regions, the coordinating role was played by large local charitable foundations, community foundations, regional Public Chambers, or party organizations (Gimazova 2021, 149; Semikova 2021, 43-44; Telitsina 2020,

122-123). The digitalization of NGO work played a significant role in this: ‘The possibility for specialists from NGOs from different cities to work together, hold meetings, organize strategic planning, and training in an online format have brought non-profit organizations closer together not only within the local community but also in areas of activity at a fundamentally higher level than before’ (Grishina, personal interview).

It was also common practice to implement joint projects with business companies ranging from large industrial enterprises and retail chains to local individual entrepreneurs (Mikov 2020, 4-5). Mainly due to such features of non-profit organizations’ functioning as local presence, close contact with target audiences, and the ability to make quick decisions allowed for a rapid response to acute needs for the needy categories of citizens most severely affected by the situation of self-isolation and quarantine (Kulko-va 2020). The experience of cooperation with businesses and authorities became the basis for the growth of trust in the non-profit sector and infrastructural development. Many business representatives and large NGOs during the pandemic period significantly increased charitable donations not only to address social problems but also to develop NGO activities in general, including strategic, infrastructural, and organizational development of the sector (Berhin 2020; Kosygina 2020, 34-35; Kovalenko 2020, 9-12).

Mobilizing and engaging volunteers during a pandemic

Data from several sociological surveys conducted in 2020-2022 show that during the pandemic period, there was a significant increase in public demand for NGO participation and volunteer assistance to those in need (Pevnaya et al. 2021; Mersianova 2020). At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic caused an upsurge in solidarity and people’s desire to contribute to the relief efforts. At

the same time, the processes of public involvement in volunteer activities are intensifying across the country. Spontaneous initiatives are being formed by citizens trying to provide emergency aid to those in need with their resources. Non-profit organizations promptly mobilized their volunteers and attracted new ones to solve various tasks to help their beneficiaries.

They were volunteers who played a crucial role in increasing the impact of NGO aid initiatives. In turn, they were non-profit organizations that most often became the coordinators and organizers of volunteer work at the local and regional levels. New volunteer training programs were developed and implemented in many regions to engage volunteers effectively. For volunteers with specific roles, specialized training was provided, such as medical protocols, crisis counseling, or remote communication techniques. NGO specialists drew on their experience and expertise to match volunteers with tasks matching their competencies, ensuring their contributions were meaningful and impactful.

As in other areas of NGO social activity, the need for social distance has impacted volunteering. Remote volunteering initiatives were introduced and actively developed in the Russian third sector. Volunteers performed tasks such as data entry, translation, content creation, and virtual support from the comfort of their homes. One of the in-demand areas of remote volunteering was educational work, combating false information, and promoting vaccination (Center for Humanitarian Technologies and Research 2022, 12; Korneeva 2020, 11). Besides, remote volunteering helped to reduce the acuteness of psychological problems of self-isolation.

In general, non-profit specialists note that the absolute number of organized volunteers in Russia grew modestly during the initial period of the pandemic. 'Many local and regional volunteer associations appeared, which started their activities in solving the

problems of the pandemic and continued to actively expand their work after the pandemic was over' (Smirnova, personal interview). About 3% of Russians were involved in systematic volunteer activities through NGOs in 2020, as in previous years. However, during the expansion of the fight against the consequences of the coronavirus, there were significant structural changes in volunteering: a significant increase and renewal of the composition of volunteer communities and organizations, an increase in the share of volunteers between 31 and 40 years of age, an increase in internal (self-esteem) and external requirements for the health status of volunteers, active use of mass media and social networks to highlight their activities (Berhin 2020; Mersianova and Ivanova, 2021, 120–123). During this period the growth of spontaneous (self-organized) volunteer initiatives began and continues, increasing the number of people who independently participate in charitable or volunteer activities. This, on the one hand, contributes to the development of the culture of charity and mutual aid. On the other hand, these processes shift the trends of civil activism development from the solution of political, human rights, and acute social problems to charity and social assistance to needy categories of the population to a greater extent than before the pandemic. 'Our organization [before the pandemic] attracted a small number of volunteers due to the specifics of work [professional psychological assistance to families with disabled children]. During the pandemic, this direction stopped altogether because they [volunteers] [...] saw their activities only in the interests of those directly affected by COVID-19' (Ivanova, personal interview).

Support for healthcare workers

One of the Russian NGOs' most significant social activity during the pandemic was assistance to healthcare institutions and

medical workers who were on the front line of the pandemic, facing a shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE), medicines, and other necessary materials. This was especially important during the early stages of the pandemic when there was a worldwide shortage of personal protective equipment. Many major charitable foundations organized fundraisers to purchase medical supplies. Others organized independent production of PEE (Korneeva 2020, 8). Significant funds and efforts of charitable organizations were also directed to equipping additional hospital beds. They procured and distributed artificial lung ventilation devices, oxygen concentrators, test kits, and other necessary medical equipment. Some organizations set up temporary medical centers to receive patients. In collaboration with businesses and involving volunteers, initiatives were organized in many cities to provide food and drinking water to medical teams. By supporting health infrastructure, NGOs sought to reduce staff workload and improve the quality of patient care.

The pandemic harmed the psychological and mental state of health workers, who faced enormous stress and workload (Galkina and Egorova, 2021). To address this problem, some NGOs with relevant experience in working with target groups initiated mental health support programs designed specifically for health workers. Professional counseling, self-help groups, and virtual therapy sessions helped health workers cope with emotional difficulties related to their work. During the pandemic, new specialized non-profit organizations and charitable foundations were established in different regions of Russia to help, support, and protect health workers' rights. 'Our (Charitable) Foundation was established during the pandemic to assist health workers when facing the toughest psychological and professional challenges. However, we want this work not to stop after the pandemic is over' (Kouletova, person-

al interview). NCOs initiated mass media campaigns to support medical workers and express public gratitude to them. Later, this work was continued by educational organizations and state structures to raise the prestige of medical professions and specialties.

Participation in political decision-making

Characteristic features of the non-profit sector in Russia under the existing political system are its dependence on and control over the authorities, its focus on social problems, and the riskiness of political participation and human rights activism. The existing legal practice of administrative pressure and control has led to the fact that most NGOs do not risk actively participating in political processes and building subjective relations with the authorities. An exception is a small number of specialized NGOs working in advocacy for specific vulnerable categories of the population, monitoring civil and political processes, solving environmental problems, and having experience in implementing and promoting political decisions. The current legislation seriously limits the opportunities and potential of third-sector organizations in political and civic activism.

The COVID-19 pandemic brought challenges and vulnerabilities that required the government and organizations to make rapid decisions and seek new measures. In March 2020, a high alert and self-isolation regime was introduced in Russia. This was followed in April by introducing penalties for violating anti-epidemiological restrictions in criminal and administrative legislation. The introduction of sanitary and epidemiological restrictions and the general socio-economic crisis during the COVID-19 pandemic had a severe and multidirectional impact on the opportunities and manifestations of civic activism and political participation worldwide. This situation exacerbated the existing forms of social inequality in Russian society and gave rise to new ones, many of which had

not been previously manifested: between intellectual workers and those directly employed in industry, between the inhabitants of capitals (Moscow and St. Petersburg) and regions, and in favor of the latter, age inequality, infringement of the rights of people suffering from various diseases (HIV, cancer, diabetes, tuberculosis), gender inequality – the burden on mothers has increased due to the transfer of children to distance learning (Baturenko 2020, 14; Viktorov 2020, 18-19; Volkova 2020, 20-22). In response, Russian NGOs and individual activists intensified information and advocacy activities aimed at policy change and addressing the challenges posed by the pandemic. Social activism has risen from an informal level to a more organized phenomenon in some areas. To begin with, it concerns the protection of the rights of vulnerable categories. Many initiatives of non-profit organizations aimed at identifying and eliminating inequalities in access to health care, social support, and economic assistance were supported by the authorities at the local and regional levels. One of the main areas of advocacy was the formation of assistance measures aimed at targeted support for vulnerable groups. The efforts led to the expansion of the social safety net and the creation of extraordinary financial assistance programs for specific categories of the population most affected by the economic impact of the pandemic. The spread of new ways has also facilitated this and approaches to communicating with administrations using remote technologies.

Another trend is that NCOs tried to continue lawmaking and human rights activities in specialized areas. For example, in April 2020, nine Russian NPOs involved in the prevention of domestic violence addressed the government with a proposal to take several urgent measures in this area. However, in July 2020, in their report to the Council of Europe on domestic violence during COVID-19 in Russia, the authors stated that despite a positive shift in

the perception of domestic violence by the Russian authorities, the response of the authorities appears to be inconsistent and insufficiently effective (ANNA et al. 2020, 7-10). Another example is the protection of prisoners' rights. Non-governmental organizations working to protect the prisoners' rights have proposed measures to reduce the risk of coronavirus infection in prisons. Government authorities have considered some of these but have implemented them minimally (Human Rights 2020, 17-20).

In April 2020, measures were adopted to promote temporary custody of residential care residents (minors and adults with disabilities, elderly people) (Gentilini et al. 2022, 683; Walker 2023), according to some data for April-June 2020, about 5.5 thousand people were taken under temporary custody (Lenc 2021). However, this primarily concerned children and many specialized organizations note that the legislative framework's imperfection in distributed guardianship did not allow these initiatives to be fully implemented: 'We are at a legal impasse' (Allenova 2020).

The situation with political and civic activism during the pandemic period intensified the existing contradictions and imperfections in certain aspects of the Russian third sector. The current legislation and the mechanisms of pressure on organizations make it possible to limit the activities of independent organizations.

Conclusions

The COVID-19 pandemic was a test for the entire global community and brought risks and new opportunities for developing the Russian non-profit sector. They contributed significantly to mitigating the pandemic's effects on vulnerable groups, developing a sense of solidarity in society, and increasing the activity of volunteer initiatives.

Most organizations were able to adapt and restructure their activities successfully. This allowed them to learn new tools for work-

ing with counterparties, partners, and beneficiaries, to increase the digitalization of internal administrative and working processes, to reach new audiences, and to acquire skills for effective interaction with donors and authorities. Many socially active NGOs formed new relationships with business structures and introduced effective fundraising and crowdfunding tools. All this continues to support the third sector's development even after removing the main epidemiological restrictions.

At the same time, many NGOs during this period were forced to reduce the scope of their work or cease to exist altogether. This affected small regional NGOs, which did not have the resources and opportunities to restructure their activities in the new realities, and large organizations and foundations, which could not find new resources and donors sufficient to maintain and adapt their activities to replace those who stopped regular donations during this period. Many NGO leaders noted the emotional burnout of sector professionals during the pandemic as one of the reasons for the decline in the organizations' activities: 'After the death [from COVID] of the leaders of two active NGOs in our city, their activities stopped. Many professionals [...] could never rehabilitate themselves and left the social sector. Moreover, many such examples exist among colleagues' (Grishina, personal interview).

The critical factors of NGO sustainability during the pandemic that allowed them to maintain and even intensify their activities were flexibility and readiness to adapt to new conditions, a combination of statutory activities to implement the mission of the organization with active work on direct assistance to those in need, a combination of short-term planning and strategic priorities, ability to adapt services to support beneficiaries, and ability to receive public funding or availability of diversified sources of resources.

Russian NGOs advocated for policy changes during the COVID-19 pandemic, influencing relief efforts and shaping policies to meet the needs of vulnerable populations. Their work resulted in more inclusive relief efforts, improved health policies, and targeted support for those most affected by the pandemic. The activity and significance of the contribution of non-profit organizations in addressing the social problems of this period influenced the changing relationship of the third sector with the state. NGOs suddenly turned out to be a socially significant force. It affected the willingness and readiness of non-profit organizations to consolidate and build long-term partnerships, including the development of common standards of quality and forms of work, ethics, and joint activities in the advocacy of political goals.

Another significant consequence of the epidemic was the quantitative growth of the volunteer movement in Russia, both organized and informal. Volunteer activity spreads to other areas of care and social protection. In the long term, this may become the basis for the recovery and development of civic activism.

At the same time, all the weaknesses of the Russian third sector related to institutional imperfection, non-self-sufficiency, and dependence on state policy appeared. Organizations that tried to influence the solution of problems of disadvantage groups not only failed to achieve significant changes compared to pre-pandemic times but also faced increased pressure and restrictions from the state under the pretext of anti-vaccine measures. The principle of selective access to financial and resource support measures for NGOs, depending on their status and sphere of activity, has been preserved. This is another risk for further sustainable development of the non-profit sector.

The negative consequences of the epidemic period for the third sector also include the increased bias towards 'low-level' volunteering instead of systemic work. Meeting the need for humanitarian assistance has led to a decline in integrated programmatic activi-

ties of professionalized NGOs in various areas of the social sphere. Humanitarian aid as a type of volunteer activity, on the one hand, is accessible and has evident effectiveness. The comprehensive development of volunteerism cannot replace long-term targeted work to overcome problems in the social area.

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OSTALI
PRISPEVKI

LUKA TREBEŽNIK¹

The endless community of writing

Abstract: The article provides a critical examination of conventional concepts of community, which traditionally relied on shared presence and a sense of completeness, whether tied to a nation, idea, language, land, race, and others. However, contemporary perspectives suggest that defining community in this manner is increasingly untenable, as the notion of completeness has proven illusory. Today's communities cannot depend on the traditional foundations of presence. Consequently, this article explores potential future directions for understanding community beyond these metaphysical constructs. The discussion delves into philosophical efforts to conceptualize a postmodern, post-metaphysical community. The central focus is on Jean-Luc Nancy's notion of the 'inoperative community' from the early 1980s, as well as Maurice Blanchot and his idea of the 'unavowable community,' Georges Bataille with his idea of the 'negative community, the community of those who have no community,' and Jacques Derrida, who introduced the concept of 'community of the question or community of allegoresis.'

Keywords: Community, Blanchot, Nancy, Derrida, Absence, Writing, Question

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Neskončna skupnost pisave

Povzetek: Članek podaja kritiko ustaljenih konceptov skupnosti, ki so tradicionalno temeljili na skupni prisotnosti in ideji polnosti, ne glede na to, ali so bili vezani na narod, idejo, jezik, zemljo, raso itd. Vendar pa sodobni razmisleki kažejo, da je opredelitev skupnosti na ta način vedno bolj nevzdržna, saj sta se pojma polnosti in prisotnosti izkazala za iluzorna. Današnje skupnosti ne morejo temeljiti na tradicionalnih pojmovanjih prisotnosti. Posledično ta članek raziskuje možne prihodnje smeri za razumevanje skupnosti onkraj teh metafizičnih konstruktov. Razprava se pogloblja v filozofska prizadevanja za konceptualizacijo postmoderne, postmetafizične skupnosti. Osrednji poudarek je na pojmu »nedelujoče skupnosti« Jean-Luca Nancyja iz zgodnjih osemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja, poleg tega pa so predstavljeni še Maurice Blanchot in njegova ideja »neizrekljive skupnosti«, Georges Bataille s svojo idejo o »negativni skupnosti, skupnosti tistih, ki nimajo skupnosti«, ter Jacques Derrida, ki je uvedel koncept »skupnosti vprašanja ali skupnost alegoreze«.

Ključne besede: skupnost, Nancy, Blanchot, Derrida, odsotnost, pisava, vprašanje

Thinking² about democracy, forms of government, and political decision-making must begin with thinking about the communal being. The crisis of the political is, above all, a crisis of community (coinciding above all with the proclaimed end of the tremendous communitarian projects), which in itself is first and foremost a crisis of truth and a crisis of the metaphysical foundations (i.e., the assumptions of purity, self-presence, simultaneity, originality, homogeneity, transparency, and others) that have dominated traditional notions of community. Today, as we grapple with the utter emptiness of the term 'political' itself, where it simply no longer denotes a topos of communal decision-making, we face the difficult task of thinking communally and thinking community. This is certainly no easy task when all the registers for this reflection have been exhausted. Suppose the concept of community has the possibility of returning to philosophical thought. In this case, this community can no longer be a community of essence, identity, or origin but a community that is somehow free of all these concepts. The traditional notion of community is characterized by unreflected metaphysical assumptions that lead to aporias and conceptual dilemmas; that is, the conditions of the possibility of community simultaneously imply its impossibility, no concrete community can be at the level of its concept – the problem lies in the fact that its notions start from the schema of fullness, of identity, which is only subsequently confronted with difference; at the core of these formulations, which seem to be exhausted, is the presupposition of a transparent self-presence.

Continuing this text, we will look at some French debates from the last century that emerged from the community experience as

² This article will be republished in a modified form in the forthcoming publication of the scientific monograph on research of cultural formations in 2024.

the articulation of a lack. We have to start with Georges Bataille and his writings from the 1930s, which mainly revolved around the journal and secret society *Acéphale* (the term is derived from the Greek word ἀκέφαλος, which means ‘headless’). This attempted community showed that for Bataille (and his fellows), the community must be headless, decapitated, born of a decapitation, and thus represent a negation of any leading principle and reason. This can only happen through a violent act of sacrifice that allows the participants to share the profound experience of a lack that binds them together in actual communication. This Bataille’s vision of a violent and destructive vision of community shows that it must be without a recognizable end or goal. As he wrote in his unpublished postscript for the planned book on inner experience, we must return to a reflection on ‘the absence of community and insist on the negative community: the community of those who have no community’ (Bataille 1973, 483).

Immanent community

Bataille’s simple realization was that the community could never be fulfilled and that the manifestation of fullness or abundance could not be contained. The sources of fullness and completeness that underlie traditional discourses on community are not necessarily to be sought in the past as the origin or foundation of community, but the projected fullness may also lie in the future, as a collective vocation. The contemporary French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy criticizes both ideals as formulations of an ‘*immanent community*,’ i.e., a total community that controls and possesses both its beginning and its end, whose boundaries are fixed and whose law is homogeneity. In classical philosophical language, immanence denoted complete self-presence. This being is enclosed and has no contact or need for contact with the transcending other.

‘Immanence, communal fusion, contains no other logic than the suicide of the community that feeds it,’ wrote Nancy in his central text (Nancy 1991, 12). Creating a community of fullness or returning to the community of the unmediated present is undesirable and, as he claims, impossible.

A pristine community based on a unity of ideas about the common good, as postulated in the heights of ancient Greek philosophy, seems to us only a myth and a pipe dream today. However, contemporary communitarian philosophies still frequently speak of community as something that has been lost, existed on a larger scale in the past, and therefore needs to be revived. Alasdair MacIntyre, a foremost exponent of communitarian theories, expressed this attitude clearly in his major work *After Virtue* when he wrote, ‘What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the dark ages which are already upon us’ (MacIntyre 1981, 263). For the great communitarian thinker, the possibility of forming living societies in ‘the dark ages which are already upon us’ is so far from realization that he resorted to hopes for the arrival of the new Saint Benedict, a communitarian genius who will restore the prospects of living together. However, even a simple historical review rejects the idyllic image of past times on which these hopes are based. The perception of times when life was shared entirely is fueled by the idea of history as degradation – but these totalitarian ideas are based only on ideological and not on empirical grounds. This kind of philosophical nostalgia for fullness was criticized by Jacques Derrida in his early writings, primarily through studies of Levi-Strauss’s reference to the relationship between culture and nature, which in some ways are just echoes of Rousseau’s call for a return to the uncorrupted savage. Rousseau rightly recognized a decay in a contemporary decadent

culture that led to an alienated society, the instrumentalization of reason, and, consequently, the corruption of interpersonal relations. We can share his point of view, which embodies the desire for an original community, a community of present sense, entire of meaning, freedom, and love. However, at the same time, we must recognize the unrealistic character of this desire and the dangers it brings.

Community and deferral of destination

The recent past, therefore, offers us a whole series of examples of people coming together and claiming to belong based on a common essence, communities entire of presence united by the typical race, blood, soil, nation, class, caste, and others that ties its members as a kind of invisible insignia. The extreme political communitarian projects of the past century are classic examples of the entire community of self-presence; they represent a historical realization and are perceived as such. Even for these communities, fullness or realization has not been achieved yet but is imminent; it waits shortly. Nancy describes these kinds of projects as '*politics of the goal or destination*,' purposeful undertakings that seek the fulfillment of a communal project. In this context, he criticizes Heidegger's conception of *Mitsein* in *Being and Time*, where Being appears as a destiny, a communal fate, a mystical element of historicity that grounds a joint mission. According to Nancy, the community itself appears as a goal and therefore has no goal; its mode is becoming and coming to sense; we are always already together, so we can only create sense in community. Nancy contrasts goal-oriented communities, which follow a logic of destination, with an essential but often overlooked neologism of Derrida's – *destinerrance*, which can be loosely translated as a wandering (or straying) of destination. This term was invented by Derrida in a de-

bate with Lacan (published in *La carte postale*), where, in contrast to Lacan's psychoanalytic theory of communication, he writes that the goal of projected transmission can easily be missed, communication is thus characterized by the structure of failure – 'the letter does not always arrive at its destination, and since this belongs to its structure, it can be said that it never really arrives there and that when it arrives its possibility-not-arriving torments it with an internal divergence' (Derrida 1979, 517). Destinnerrance sets up the possibility for the community to veer off course, miss the mark, and never reach it. The community must be a community of failure since its destination is (and has to be) constantly changing.

The idea of a happy and peaceful community is a classic projection work. The extent of this projection is perhaps best exemplified by Levi-Strauss, who, in the spirit of Rousseau, praises the extremely aggressive traditional Amazonian community of the Nambikwara for how pure and uncorrupted it is, even illustrating this by saying that 'it has not yet been corrupted by writing' (cf. Lévi-Strauss 1961, 289 ff.). Here, we see what Derrida was talking about when he claimed that tradition's relation to writing is a kind of revelatory symptom of the entire Western metaphysical construction as a logocentric prejudice. In its most widespread form today, this manifests as a desire to return to that which is supposed to have been lost, but of course, this pure originality never existed – in the beginning, there was a difference; the origin is always already divided, the contamination is not after the fact but at work from the beginning.

The community as its threat

We can easily understand why Derrida himself, in his own words, hesitated to use the term 'community.' He was bothered by the word itself, which he 'never liked very much since it carries connotations of participation and even of fusion and identification' in

which he recognized ‘more threats than promises’ (Derrida 1995, 46). He explains at greater length that he also disliked the word because of its sound, for in French, the word for community (*commun*) sounds the same as the expression for ‘like one’ (*comme-un*). Derrida’s first emphasis on the theme of community is that it is a self-deconstructive, unstable entity, always already in the process of disintegration. Its logic is best described by the term Derrida introduces in his late publications, most of which appeared in the last decade of his life and are devoted primarily to the theme of sovereignty – community, according to Derrida, is *autoimmune*. There is always the germ of decay in the community, so it is threatened not only by outsiders but by its foreignness, which is always already at work. This is why Derrida calls it, probably with a word more appropriate for him, ‘*auto-co-immunité*,’ autocoimmunity. (Derrida, 2003, 59)

‘Auto-immunitary haunts the community and its system of immunitary survival like the hyperbole of its own possibility. Nothing in common, nothing immune, safe and sound, *heilig* and holy, nothing unscathed in the most autonomous living present without a risk of auto-immunity’ (Derrida 2002, 82). This is the state of the community, of the ever-decomposing organism, that seeks to immunize itself, above all, against the outside that threatens it and founds its identity. At the same time, it is attacked by its immune system. We must try to accept that the community in its origins is destined to decay as something that does not necessarily mean the end of the community but rather opens the possibility for its future.

In other words, the community is structured as impossible, its existence is impossible, and the conditions that establish it are, at the same time, the source of its decomposition. However, this is not necessarily an end for the community. The fact that community is structured as impossibility means that it can carry sense or that it is sense since sense is also structured as impossible, and

it can never be possessed or grasped in the scheme of presence. Therefore, the sense always remains before us, just as the community is always a task to be accomplished. In any case, we must insist that lack is a constitutive fact and that the community must remain incomplete; all other attempts, i.e., fusion, association, and other forms of union, transform the community into something else or dissolve it. The community must always remain open and incomplete – in this sense, let us consider two proposals for such a non-absolute, open community.

Community of question and allegorical community

The first is despite his objections to the concept of community offered by Derrida himself in his early work on the philosophy of Levinas entitled *Violence and Metaphysics* (first published in 1963), where he speaks of a particular community that bears some accents of what we want to emphasize here. It is not a community of fullness or presence, but the opposite: community of absence and lack of knowledge. Derrida calls it the ‘community of the question’ or ‘community of questioning,’ a community marked by philosophy as the asking of questions. In this context, Nancy says later that philosophy is an exposure to sense. In the background we can undoubtedly recognize Heidegger’s famous saying that concludes *The Question Concerning Technology*, which states that the ‘questioning is the piety of thought’ (Heidegger 1977, 35), and questioning is the respect for the world around us. Derrida, then, imagines a pious community of philosophical questioning that comes on the scene after the death of community and philosophy.

A community of decision, of initiative, of absolute initiality, but also a threatened community, in which the question has not yet found the language it has decided to seek, is not yet sure of its

own possibility within the community. A community of the question about the possibility of the question. This is very little—almost nothing—but within it, today, is sheltered and encapsulated an unbreachable dignity and duty of decision. An unbreachable responsibility. Why unbreachable? Because the impossible has already occurred. The impossible according to the totality of what is questioned, according to the totality of beings, objects, and determinations, the impossible according to the history of facts, has occurred: there is a history of the question, a pure memory of the pure question which in its possibility perhaps authorizes all inheritance and all pure memory in general and as such. The question has already begun—we know it has—and this strange certainty about an other absolute origin, an other absolute decision that has secured the past of the question, liberates an incomparable instruction: the discipline of the question. Through (through, that is to say that we must already know how to read) this discipline, which is not yet even the inconceivable tradition of the negative (of negative determination), and which is completely previous to irony, to maieutics, to epoché, and to doubt, an injunction is announced: the question must be maintained. (Derrida 2001, 98–99)

This view can be complemented by Derrida's reflections on the university and the right to philosophy, where he calls for a 'community of thought,' a responsible community that 'questions the essence and principles of reason [...], thereby also questioning what community and institution mean' (Derrida 2004, 148). Every thought is in some way already a thought of community and, at the same time, a thought about community, and it does not even have to be completely sane; the community also contains unreasonable elements. In the same work, Derrida

elaborates on this theme and says that a community of thought must also include *polemos* – an element of discord that is traditionally perceived as destructive of community (ibid., 169). The community is usually understood as a common mind, but we naturally forget the aspect of unreason, of madness. This element destroys the ideal schema of community. ‘Let us suppose that everyone has his private madness. Knowledge without truth would be the labor or the attention to an intense singularity analogous to this ‘private’ madness – for everything private is madness to the extent, at least, that we seek, through it, to communicate it,’ wrote Maurice Blanchot (1995, 44). He brings up a crucial question of communicating madness, which corresponds to the excessive nature of the question. For Blanchot, the questioning community will manifest itself as openness to the unforeseeability of a call, the coming otherness that shakes our established schemata. Its mode of existence is openness to arrival and, thus, of course, to exposure (Nancy refers to this condition in the context of corporeality as *ex-peau-sition*). The threat is always present, and the monster’s arrival is on the horizon. This is the essential condition, ‘the community lives and feeds on this vulnerability; it must be so’ (Derrida 1995, 23). To be exposed is to be alive; this exposure is not just a relationship to the external environment; the law of autoimmunity determines everything that exists.

So, the truth of the community can never be possessed; it is always conceived as a secret (that there is no secret, as Derrida would say). The community can only be a community of unknowing and questioning. Its movement is a constant oscillation between outside and inside; each time it comes close to possessing the secret, it encounters a trace of its otherness and outsideness. The foundation of the community is thus outside; it can never be included,

and it represents its edge and end. This is the case not only when it is formalized as negation in death but also every time it takes the form of absolute knowledge or absolute presence.

Community of writing or community without end

Twenty years after Derrida conceives a community of question, Nancy and Blanchot, in their debate, emphasize the ‘community of writing’ and the ‘literary community’; Nancy (who even speaks of ‘literary communism’ in this context) says that ‘under the idea of ‘writing’ he tries to think of a movement of saying that transcends all sense.’ For Nancy, the reference to writing and textuality is primarily a formulation of absent sense. The writing announces the end of the age of the book (as proclaimed in the title of the essential introductory chapter of Derrida’s magnum opus *Of Grammatology*) and thus presupposes an absence that entails the ‘death of the father of logos’ and replaces the void created by that death. Presence in writing is formulated only as a sign of a sign, a trace of a trace, and a trace of the erasure of a trace, an endless game of signifiers that never leads to a transcendental signified. Traditional communities were communities of the book, and after the end of this epoch, the only possible point around which a community can gather is absence. With its materiality, writing appears as the exterior of being and its self-effacement as absolute uncontrollability, as relation to the other and otherness. Signification is thus characterized by absolute singularity, and signification, in general, does not exist; there is no general ‘making of sense.’ Signification or signification is an individual event; as such, it can represent the making of sense. “Writing” in the modern sense denotes the event of sense and sense as an event,’ says Nancy (1995, 30). The sense as such is transferred from one being to another in address; indeed, it is a sharing that does not take away from what is shared. The

sense that is communicated must make sense to someone. Otherwise, it does not create a bond. Otherwise, this communication is just the mere transmission of information. Sense cannot exist in isolation at all; it is always already shared. Sense is communicable and shareable, but it is not the transmission of information – in this case, it would be better to speak of meaning (for Nancy, meaning, unlike sense, is a matter of signification, of marking, it is something that happens in language, the union of signifier and signified – sense, on the other hand, can happen beyond language, when something is communicated and thereby becomes shared and common, e.g., a smile). Literature says that we are sense – but this saying has no content (as opposed to meaning), but rather the opposite; it communicates non-content: the word sense ‘does not contain that something is signified; rather, it contains the difficulty of speaking. The communication of sense, or the sense of sense, its sense as that which binds, can only be communicated as a concern and a problem.’ (Nancy 1995, 31) Sense, then, is sharing; as such, it is ‘simply here, like the world. Sense is found in an indefinite multiplicity of origins and in their coexistence’ (Devisch 2013, 94). Nancy thus describes the community as the double bind of sharing and being shared that best characterizes the community of writing.

Writing characterizes a community that is the exaltation of the undivided, as Blanchot says: ‘Inasmuch as the community on behalf of everyone rules (for me and for itself) over a beside oneself (its absence) that is its fate, it gives rise to an unshared though necessarily multiple speech in a way that does not let it develop itself in words: always already lost, it has no use, creates no work and does not glorify itself in that loss.’ (Blanchot 1988, 12) To speak of loss might be problematic at this point, for such discourse always serves a kind of return, in this case, the return of something that never entirely existed and existed only as a phantom. Commu-

nication marks the point of community failure since community communicates nothing, produces nothing, and has no use. This failure, Blanchot argues, ‘associates the community with a certain type of writing, a writing that has no choice but to look for the last words of hospitality to what we cannot expect.’ (ibid.) Thus, the community of writing is directed toward the future; its source and foundation are always there, not as destiny, telos, end, goal, or destination, but as *destinerrance*.

Community without community is to come. In the sense that it is always coming, endlessly, at the heart of every collectivity (because it never stops coming, it ceaselessly resists collectivity itself as much as it resists the individual). It is no more than this: to come to the limit of compearance, to that limit to which we are in effect convoked, called, and sent. The call that convokes us, as well as the one we address to one another at this limit (this call from one to the other is no doubt the same call, and yet not the same) can be named for want of a better term, writing, or literature. (Nancy 1991, 71)

Hence, the community is always in the making, which can only be articulated in writing and erasing. Since we live in the literal world, where the absent foundations of sense appear spectrally through textuality, after the end of the epoch of the book, the task of reading and translating, and thus of coming together in a community, is the only possibility of sense, seems to be even more critical.

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IGOR IVAŠKOVIĆ¹

Konflikt federalizma in centralizma v KPJ v drugi svetovni vojni

Izvleček: Prispevek obravnava problematiko narodnega vprašanja znotraj Komunistične partije Jugoslavije do leta 1945 in posledice na različne načrte ureditve povojne države. V tem kontekstu analizira trenja, ki so se pojavljala na relaciji med vrhom KPJ in organizacijami pod njenim vplivom na slovenskih in hrvaških področjih v okviru antifašističnih koalicij. Avtor ugotavlja, da so si posamezniki tako na Slovenskem, še bolj pa na Hrvaškem, ne glede na svojo privrženost povezovanju južnoslovanskih narodov, prizadevali za državo na dejanskih federalnih temeljih, kar je vključevalo tudi decentralizacijo oblasti. Na drugi strani je vrh KPJ avtonomna gibanja toleriral le zaradi taktičnih vojnih razlogov, a je dopuščal le nominalno teritorialno federalizacijo s centralizirano oblastjo. Šlo je torej za spopad želje po nacionalni emancipaciji na eni in želje po oblasti na drugi strani.

Ključne besede: Komunistična partija Jugoslavije, federalizem, centralizem, Osvobodilna fronta, ZAVNOH

The Conflict of Federalism and Centralism in the CPY during the World War II

Abstract: The article analyses the frictions that occurred on the relation between the headquarters of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the antifascist organizations among Slovenians and

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Croats from an aspect of national question and consequential nature of planned federalist post-war state. The author notes that individuals among Slovenians, and even more so among Croatians, regardless of their commitment to the integration of the South Slavic nations into one state, pursued the idea of a South Slavic state on a genuine federal basis, which included actual decentralization of powers. On the other hand, the central authorities of the CPY allowed only nominal territorial federation with centralized political authority. This was, therefore, a conflict between the goal of national emancipation on one and the ambition for power on the other side.

Keywords: Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Federalism, Centralism, Liberation Front (OF), ZAVNOH

Uvod – predvojna izhodišča

Jugoslovanska državna ideja, ki je imela za cilj postavljanje skupnega političnega okvira za več južnoslovanskih narodov, od svojega rojstva buri duhove v celotnem spektru družbenega življenja tudi v znanstveni skupnosti. Skozi celotno obdobje razvoja številnih različic vizij države je jugoslovansko idejo ves čas spremljala polemika o temeljnem politično-pravnem okviru, ki je vključevala tudi naravo notranje ureditve. V tem kontekstu se z jugoslovanstvom tesno povezuje ideja oz. konstrukt sestavljene ali kompleksne države. Tudi nosilci dveh uresničenih jugoslovanskih idej, ki sta obsegali narode od Slovencev na zahodu do Srbov in Makedoncev na vzhodu, so morali v določenem trenutku upoštevati dejstvo, da obstaja več variacij urejanja države. Razlike med njimi so od samega začetka povzročale nesoglasja med različnimi interesnimi skupinami, ki so predstavljale nosilce teh idej. Nekatere so namreč favorizirale bolj, druge pa manj centralizirano ureditev. Istočasno so določene politične skupine zahtevale notranjo razmejitev v

skladu z zgodovinskimi ali narodnimi mejami, drugi so spet želeli te meje začrtati na novo in poskušati odpraviti narodne delitve v državi. Vprašanje oblike sestavljene države južnih Slovanov je bilo torej večinoma v tesni povezavi z narodnim vprašanjem. Slednje je razvidno tudi iz dosedanjih študij. Ne glede na različne aspekte proučevanja jugoslovanskih državnih tvorb se težko izognemo razpravi o narodnem vprašanju. Odnos do tega vprašanja je še posebej zanimiv pri Komunistični partiji Jugoslavije (KPJ), ki je praktično pol stoletja predstavljala najvplivnejšo politično silo na naših območjih. Pričujoči prispevek obravnava problematiko odnosa KPJ do narodnega vprašanja in posledične načrtovane notranje ureditve povojne države, in sicer v kritičnih dogodkih druge svetovne vojne. V tem kontekstu analizira trenja, ki so se pojavljala na relaciji med vrhom KPJ in organizacijami, ki so pod njenim vplivom delovale na slovenskih in hrvaških območjih v okviru antifašističnih koalicij, in so izhajala iz drugačnih percepcij jugoslovanstva.

Pri analizi vizij jugoslovanske države, ki so bile prisotne med člani ožjega vodstva KPJ, bi bilo iluzorno govoriti o strogo determiniranem cilju oz. o enotni državni ideji, ki se ni spreminjala od začetkov jugoslovanskega komunističnega gibanja vse do realizacije komunistične državne ideje. Enako kot pri drugih političnih strankah, ki so delovale na območju Kraljevine Jugoslavije pred drugo svetovno vojno, so se posamezni parametri državne ideje v vrhu KPJ spreminjali oz. prilagajali širši geopolitični stvarnosti v Evropi. Vendar se zdi, da so bili določeni elementi komunistične državne vizije nekoliko bolj rigidni kot pri večini drugih političnih gibanjih. Jugoslovanski komunisti so bili namreč od samega začetka močno vezani na sovjetsko matico, kar pa nikakor ne pomeni, da so vsi jugoslovanski komunisti ves čas delili identične poglede z Moskvo glede ureditve južnoslovanskega prostora. Ne glede na dejstvo, da je Stalin vsaj na videz odstopil od ideje

svetovne revolucije, ki je bila v določeni meri prisotna pri Leninu, si avtonomnih komunističnih gibanj, ki ne bi iz Moskve dobivala direktive glede strateških vprašanj, nikakor ni želel. Večina novejših analiz formiranja jugoslovanskih komunističnih struktur in zapolnjevanja posameznih funkcij v tej organizaciji potrjuje domnevo o tesni povezanosti KPJ in sovjetskih tajnih služb GPU (*Gosudarstvennoje političeskoje upravljenje*) oz. NKVD (*Narodnyj komissariat vnutrennih del*). Poročila zgodovinarjev in publicistov, ki so imeli dostop do ruskih državnih arhivov, namreč kažejo na to, da bi Josip Broz Tito težko prevzel dominanten položaj v KPJ, če ne bi bil deležen ravno pomoči sovjetskega obveščevalnega aparata (Dedijer 1981, 324). Pred drugo svetovno vojno se je soočal s konkurenco znotraj jugoslovanskih komunističnih struktur, pri čemer sta se izpostavljala Milan Gorkić in Petko Miletić (Eiletz 2009, 157). Številni viri pa poročajo, da naj bi v procesu boja za mesto na vrhu KPJ Josip Broz posređoval številne informacije in dezinformacije, ki so v očeh Kominterne diskvalificirale njegove politične konkurente. Ti so bili praviloma v zelo kratkem roku po Titovih dopisih kadrovskega oddelku Kominterne (oz. policijskega odseku tega oddelka) odstranjeni s strani sovjetskih obveščevalnih služb, s čimer naj bi si moskovska centrala zagotavljala lojalnost KPJ.

Stališča politične Moskve so močno vplivala na odnos KPJ do narodnega vprašanja. Sprva so bili jugoslovanski komunisti zaradi svoje kadrovske sestave naklonjeni unitarni ureditvi Kraljevine Srbov, Hrvatov in Slovencev (Kraljevina SHS) (Banac 1988, 307–315), kar je bilo potrjeno tudi na znamenitem vukovarskem kongresu junija 1920 (Koprivica-Oštrić 1984, 144). Na ne ravno najboljše razumevanje narodnega in nacionalnega problema med južnoslovanskimi narodi so kazali strankarski dokumenti, nastali po formiranju Kraljevine SHS. KPJ se je namreč v teh zavzemala za »eno nacionalno državo z najširšo samoupravo oblasti, okrožij in občin«

ter je zase trdila, da stoji na »braniku ideje nacionalne enotnosti in enakopravnosti vseh narodov v državi« (Banac 1988, 311). S formulacijo o široki lokalni samoupravi in obstoju več narodov, a vendarle v kontekstu države, kjer bodo ti narodi tvorili eno nacijo, se zdi, da v KPJ niso nasprotovali unitaristično-centralistični miselnosti, ki je prevladovala tudi pri tedanjih oblasteh monarhične jugoslovanske države. To je bilo glede na večinsko sestavo prvih jugoslovanskih komunističnih organizacij razumljivo, saj so bili njeni člani, po besedah hrvaškega pisatelja Miroslava Krleže, »bivši zmedeni nacionalni romantiki, ki so bili v svojih predvojnih pogledih in prepričanjih glede narodne osvoboditve nacionalistično orientirani, bili so otroci iz predvojne jugoslovanske mladine, ki je umirala na balkanskih bojiščih ...« (Banac 1988, 311). Takšno dožemanje narodnega vprašanja je bilo faktor, ki je odbijal dober delež prebivalstva nekdanje Jugoslavije, predvsem njenega ruralnega dela, KPJ pa se je bolj kot narodnim sporom posvetila poudarjanju dela s postavljanjem industrijskih delavcev v ospredje svojega političnega programa. Vendar so tudi v tistem času pri posameznih slovenskih komunistih živele federalistične južnoslovanske ideje, predvsem pri Dragotinu Gustinčiču (Glose k narodnostnemu vprašanju 1923, 3). Te ideje so do sredine desetletja vse večjo veljavo dobile tudi v vrhu KPJ, kar je svojo kulminacijo doživelo sredi tridesetih let, ko je še na pokrajinski konferenci v decembru 1934 mogoče slišati, da je treba Kraljevino Jugoslavijo razbiti. Tako radikalna ideja je bila sicer kmalu opuščena ravno zaradi širše sovjetske geopolitične vizije, vztrajalo pa se je na pravici do samoodločbe tako Slovencev kot Hrvatov, ki naj bi se po tem samostojno odločili, ali in na kakšen način bodo ostali v jugoslovanski državi oz. državni skupnosti (PleTERSki 1967, 305–306). Iz moskovske perspektive bi namreč Jugoslavija ob prevladi komunistov lahko postala sovjetski most do Jadrana, s čimer bi svoj vpliv razširila do Sredozemlja,

ki je bilo sicer tradicionalno v sferi britanskega vpliva. V tem kontekstu je bilo tudi s sovjetskega vidika boljše Jugoslavijo ohraniti pri življenju (Pirjevec 2011, 34).

Medvojne determinante narodnega vprašanja

Z začetkom vojne so se evropska komunistična gibanja v ključnih točkah še vedno povsem podrejala moskovski matici. Posledično tudi njihovo delovanje ni moglo odstopati od temeljnih okvirov sporazuma Molotov-Ribbentrop. Res je sicer, da medtem ko so se posamezni slovenski komunisti navduševali nad sporazumom Sovjetske zveze (SZ) in Nemčije, so obstajali tudi tisti simpatizerji Partije, ki so bili do tega skeptični, predvsem niso imeli zaupanja v dobrohotnost Berlina in Moskve z vidika slovenskih interesov. Pri tem je izstopal Lojze Ude, ki je bil za razliko od, na primer, Dušana Kermavnerja že pred vojno mnenja, da na SZ ni mogoče gledati v absolutno pozitivni luči (Kocbek 1982, 295). Vendar pa v KPJ sporazumu med SZ in Nemčijo niti niso smeli glasno oporekati, saj obstoj v komunističnem sistemu ni bil možen brez brezpogojnega sledenja moskovskim navodilom, kar je na svoji koži občutila Angela Vode, ki je bila izključena iz Partije ravno zaradi nasprotovanja zvezi z nacistično Nemčijo (Tršan 1994, 125).

Pri načrtovanju Hitlerjevega napada na Jugoslavijo Sovjetska zveza (SZ) ni sodelovala, obenem pa je na okrnjeno harmonijo med Berlinom in Moskvo kazalo tudi dejstvo, da si je SZ prilastila več ozemlja, kot je izhajalo iz dogovora, sklenjenega 23. avgusta 1939, saj je poleg aneksije Besarabije okupirala tudi Severno Bukovino (Krizman 1975, 121). Videti je bilo, da glede jugoslovanskega vprašanja Stalin nastopa indiferentno, a je kljub temu z vlado Petra II. Karađorđevića ohranjal stike še dober mesec po nemškem napadu na Jugoslavijo, in sicer vse do 8. maja

1941. Tedaj je namreč SZ zaradi očitkov, da ni obsodila okupacije Kraljevine Jugoslavije, izgnala jugoslovanskega veleposlanika. Nekatera pričevanja kažejo na to, da moskovska centrala ni imela ambicij po začetku revolucije v Jugoslaviji vse do nemškega napada na SZ v juniju 1941. V tem času naj bi se celo razmišljalo o ustanovitvi posebne Komunistične partije Neodvisne države Hrvaške (NDH), čemur je bil naklonjen tudi del zagrebških komunistov, nenaklonjena pa večina v vrhu KPJ (Horvatić 2017). Večina jugoslovanskih komunistov je po napadu na Jugoslavijo delovala po ustaljeni praksi oz. v skladu s sovražnim odnosom do jugoslovanske vlade in kralja Petra II. Posledica je bila spodbujanje dezerterstev med jugoslovanskimi vojaki s širjenjem teze, da so vojaki v kraljevi vojski le topovska hrana za britanske imperialistične načrte (Tomasevich 1979, 86). Razbitje stare Jugoslavije je bilo sicer v skladu s predvojnimi ambicijami članov KPJ, vendar se je to nanašalo na spremembo oblasti in notranje ureditve države, obenem pa se zdi, da drugi parametri temeljnega geopolitičnega okvira, predvsem zunanje in eventualne notranje meje ter središče države (oz. držav), v KPJ niso bili v prvem planu. A dejstvo je, da je SZ s konkludentnim ravnanjem indirektno kazala na tiho priznanje novonastalega stanja, v katerem je bil zrušen državni subjekt, ki je imel na makro-geopolitični sliki pomembno funkcijo predvsem v britanski in francoski viziji ureditve Evrope. Posledično je tudi del slovenskih komunistov takoj sprejel novonastalo situacijo. Prekmurski slovenski komunisti so po priključitvi Prekmurja k Madžarski nemudoma poslali svojega predstavnika v Budimpešto, enotnost slovenskih in madžarskih komunistov v Prekmurju pa je bila motivirana z medsebojnimi pričakovanji glede začetka revolucije v samem jedru Evrope – v Nemčiji (Godina 1980, 35–37). Obenem so konec junija 1941 italijanski in nemški vojaki z letaki slovenskih

komunistov vabljeni, naj sledijo ciljem Rdeče armade, ki je tako »vaša (italijanska in nemška) kot naša najboljša zaveznica«. Tudi slovenska komunistična elita ni kazala drugačnih stališč. Boris Kidrič naj bi maja 1941 celo zapisal: »Ponosen sem, da smo zrušili ta jugoslovanski nestvor!« (Godeša 2006, 19–25). Kljub temu so slovenski komunisti takrat vsaj deklarativno poudarjali že znano načelo samoodločbe celotnega slovenskega naroda, a jugoslovanskega državnega okvira se med 6. aprilom in 22. junijem 1941 ni omenjalo (Vodušek Starič 1992, 36).

Razmere so se dramatično spremenile z napadom Nemčije na Sovjetsko zvezo. Ravno 22. junija 1941 je jugoslovansko zgodovino pisje zabeležilo prve diverzantske akcije komunistov na Hrvaškem in v Srbiji. Te akcije vsaj z vidika narodnega vprašanja sicer niso imele tako pomembnega učinka (Žarić 1988, 150–151), kot ga je imel poskus sklepanja sporazuma z manjšimi političnimi strankami s ciljem preprečevanja vrnitve »na staro«. Primer tega je bil sporazum KPJ s predsednikom Zemljoradniške stranke Dragoljubom Jovanovićem, v katerem se je poleg skupnega boja proti okupatorju in skupnih delavsko-kmečkih odborov opredeljeval tudi boj za sovjetsko oblast ter skupni boj proti angleškim agentom in njihovim poskusom vzpostavitve starega sistema (Broz 1977a, 42). Od tega trenutka dalje je bilo v letakih in glasilih KPJ mogoče zaznati ponoven trend istovetenja fašizma z najpomembnejšim ideološkim sovražnikom komunistov – kapitalizmom. Kominterneta je takoj po začetnem šoku nemškega izdajstva začela iskati možnosti za izkoriščanje celotnega vojaškega potenciala komunističnih gibanj, kar bi lahko zmanjšalo pritisk »Wermachta« na SZ. Tako je vrhovna komunistična organizacija 9. julija 1941 uradno sprejela odločitev o vzpostavitvi vzporednega centra oblasti na celotnem območju nekdanje Jugoslavije (Banac 1990, 20; Cencić 1983, 226–227). To

je označilo formalni začetek rušenja oblasti, postavljene na različnih delih pogorišča Kraljevine Jugoslavije s strani Nemčije in njenih zaveznikov, žarišče operativnega delovanja KPJ pa je končno spet prišlo v neposredno zvezo z njenimi temeljnimi ideološko-strateškimi cilji. Ravnanje jugoslovanskih komunistov je bilo tudi tokrat determinirano z navodili Moskve. Izkušnja preživetih predvojnih dni v SZ pa naj bi samemu Josipu Brozu Titu očitno vcepila strah pred dolgo roko NKVD, ki se ji je na vsakem koraku poskušala dokazati lojalnost. Iste kaznovalne metode je Broz uporabljal ob posamičnih deviacijah članov KPJ. Te so varirale od suspenza, kot se je to zgodilo v primeru Borisa Kidriča, ko je slovensko vodstvo najelo kredit pri zahodnih zaveznikih (Vodušek Starič 1992, 81), prek odrekanja pomoči neubogljivim članom, kar je na svoji koži občutil Lovro Kuhar (Prežihov Voranc) (Gabrič 2010, 78–80), vse do najbolj radikalnih represivnih metod. Močno opiranje na SZ je bilo posledično skozi celotno vojno mogoče občutiti ne le na ideološko-simbolični ravni, na primer pri uporabi simbolov in v verzih partizanskih pesmi, temveč so se celo pri vodenju pravnih procesov partizanska vojaška oz. »ljudska« sodišča pogosto sklicevala na zakonodajo in pravni red SZ, saj domačih komunističnih predpisov na tem področju ni bilo (Vodušek Starič 1992, 14).

Na vojno oz. na okoliščine, ki jih je ta prinesla, je bila KPJ sorazmerno dobro pripravljena. Poleg dejstva, da je revolucionarni prevrat v vojni relativno lažje izvedljiv, je KPJ zaradi odnosa z medvojnimi monarhičnimi vladami praktično celotno medvojno obdobje izvajala priprave na revolucionarno zamenjavo oblasti. Ker je bila potisnjena v ilegalo, ni niti imela možnosti osvojiti oblasti po demokratični poti, tudi če bi ji uspel podvig prepričevanja ljudskih množic. To je vsekakor vplivalo na večjo stopnjo pripravljenosti delovanja v izrednih razmerah v primerjavi z drugimi strankami,

ki niso bile vajene delovati zunaj zakona in se niso znašle v anarhiji druge svetovne vojne. V skladu s strategijo prevzema oblasti je bil temeljni cilj stranke uničevanje oz. prevzem državnega aparata predvojne Jugoslavije, kar je pozneje potrdil tudi sam Josip Broz na petem kongresu KPJ (Simić 2009, 165). Istočasno, na samem začetku vojne, zavzemanje za južnoslovanski državni okvir (brez Bolgarije) ni bilo samo po sebi umevno. Pred vojno so se namreč nekateri jugoslovanski komunisti spogledovali celo z idejo nacionalnih komunističnih tvorb (Tomasevich 1979, 29), vendar je vodstvo Partije zelo hitro uvidelo, da bi se s takšnim zagovarjanjem komunisti po vsej verjetnosti utopili v mednacionalnih sporih, značilnih za tradicionalne politične stranke. Navzven je zato KPJ poudarjala poslanstvo osvobajanja celotnega jugoslovanskega območja, kar je istovetila z nacionalno osvoboditvijo vseh južnoslovanskih narodov. V tem pogledu se je politični program KPJ v veliki meri prekrival ravno z njihovim tedaj največjim političnim nasprotnikom. Propagandni aparat KPJ je posledično ves čas opozarjal na ideološko razliko s predvojno oblastjo, ki ji je očital brezobzirno izkoriščanje delavskega naroda in individualno ter kolektivno kršenje pravic. Po prepričanju komunistov so bili namreč državljani kraljevine Karadorđevićev brez političnih pravic, obenem pa naj bi bili tudi sami narodi v tej državi v neenakopravnem položaju (Ziherl 1945, 45). KPJ je torej poskušala razširiti prepričanje, da so nacionalne buržoazne skupine namerno spodbujale nacionalizme v svojem prizadevanju za eksploatacijo ljudstva.

Ideja rešitve narodnega vprašanja je v drugi svetovni vojni postala ena od temeljnih stebrov komunističnega koncepta, kot se je ta predstavljal navzven pri poskusu pridobivanja podpore ljudskih množic. Slednje so bile potrebne predvsem zaradi krepitev borbenega potenciala, saj se je vodstvo KPJ za razliko od slovenskih konservativnih struj, osrednjega dela Hrvaške kmečke stranke (HSS)

in tudi Draže Mihailovića veliko manj branilo radikalnih potez in vojaških spopadov s svojimi nasprotniki. KPJ se je v tem kontekstu morala vsaj poskušati otresti anacionalne stigme, ki so jo poudarjali predvsem v njej konkurenčnih taborih. Posledično so se motivi precejšnjega dela aktivnih borcev (partizanov) za sodelovanje v vojni v marsičem razlikovali od motivov njihovega vodstva. Primarni interni cilj vrha KPJ je bil namreč prevzem oblasti oz. boljše vizija južnoslovenskega območja, partizanski odredi pa so na popularnosti pridobivali ravno zaradi dejstva, da so predstavljali edino silo, ki se je bila pripravljena spustiti v spopad z na videz bistveno močnejšim nasprotnikom. Skrivanje drugih ideoloških komponent boja za idejo narodne osvoboditve se je pokazalo kot uspešno, partizanski borci pa so bili šele po vstopu v vojaške enote podvrženi intenzivnemu ideološkemu preusmerjanju preko t. i. političnih komisarjev. Tudi razvoj državnih idej je bil ravno zaradi raznorodnosti partizanskih enot izrazito pester. Tako so znotraj partizanskega gibanja v obdobju 1941–1945 obstajale različne variacije državnih konceptov, ki jih je družila želja po spremembi trenutne oblasti. Ti koncepti so se razlikovali tako glede zunanjih meja želene državne tvorbe kot tudi glede meja in avtonomije posameznih enot znotraj nje. Ravno v tem se je kazalo različno razumevanje nacionalnega vprašanja med operativnimi izvrševalci diverzantskih in drugih vojaških akcij na eni ter vrhom KPJ na drugi strani. Alternativne državotvorne misli, ki se niso ves čas vklapljale v okvir KPJ, so bile prisotne predvsem pri slovenskih in hrvaških partizanih, medtem ko je umik komunistov iz Srbije konec leta 1941 nekoliko omrtvičil srbsko partizansko delovanje.

Državne vizije v Osvobodilni fronti

Razvoj gibanja, ki je preraslo v oborožen odpor proti okupacijskim silam, je na Slovenskem imelo specifično pot. Osvobodilna

fronta (OF) se v javnosti prvič omeni 26. aprila 1941 v letaku centralnega komiteja Komunistične partije Slovenije (KPS). Takrat se gibanje še vedno imenuje protiimperialistična fronta slovenskega naroda, OF pa se ustali šele z nemškim napadom na SZ. Gibanje na začetku vojne ni imelo pomembnejših razsežnosti, niti znotraj same KPS ni obstajal konsenz glede odnosa do Nemčije, ki je takrat še bila v paktu s SZ. Med slovenskimi komunisti je bil namreč precejšen delež tistih, ki so po opisih zahodnih obveščevalcev kazali »patološko občudovanje« sovjetov (Vodušek Starič 1992, 112). V skladu s tem je bilo tudi na slovenskih tleh na samem začetku vojne še vedno več kritik na račun zahodnih zaveznikov pod vodstvom Velike Britanije (VB), kar je doživelo vrhunec z omogočanjem azilantskega statusa jugoslovanski vladi in kralju v Britaniji. V skladu s tem določeni indici kažejo na nenaklonjenost Slovencev v KPS do jugoslovanskega državnega okvira, kar se je pozneje poskušalo prikriti z uničevanjem in potvarjanjem dokumentov (Godeša 2006, 18–20).

Slovenski komunisti so se glede na druge veje KPJ znašli v nekoliko bolj občutljivem položaju, saj sta jim obrobna geografska lega in neposreden nadzor okupacijskih sil predvsem v nemški okupacijski coni oteževali stik s centralo. Istočasno pa je ta oteževalna okoliščina omogočila nekoliko bolj avtonomen razvoj slovenskega komunističnega gibanja med samo vojno. V tem procesu je KPS delovala kot združevalno jedro, ki je okoli sebe zbiralo vsa politična in druga družbena gibanja, ki niso bila naklonjena prejšnjemu režimu in so nasprotovala okupaciji. Delo so jim z določenimi nepremišljenimi potezami nekoliko olajšali ravno nekateri člani bivših institucij, saj so se kompromitirali s poskusi kolaboracije z nemškimi, italijanskimi ali z madžarskimi okupacijskimi oblastmi. OF je posledično resnično lahko postala konglomerat raznovrstnih protiokupacijskih sil, ki je vključeval tudi del privržencev pred-

vojnega režima, ki ni iskal zavetja pri silah osi. V njenem izvršnem odboru so namreč sedeli predstavniki vseh ustanovnih skupin, in sicer poleg KPS, tudi katoliške oz. krščansko-socialne skupine, del organizacije Sokol in nekateri drugi kulturni delavci. Koalicija je torej v najožjem smislu predstavljala interesno združenje, vsaki skupini pa je ta omogočala zadovoljitev specifičnih potreb. Glede na podporo prebivalstva in prisotnost v javnem življenju so bile skupine znotraj OF, razen KPS pred vojno, večinoma marginalne, kar je vplivalo na to, da organizacija pravzaprav nikoli ni bila koalicija enakovrednih partnerjev, saj je KPS v njej od samega začetka imela možnost določanja najpomembnejših položajev v njenih organih, predvsem v oboroženih enotah in propagandni ter obveščevalni službi. OF je za druge skupine predstavljala platformo za vstop na politično prizorišče, ki naj bi jim omogočila tako boj zoper trenutno stanje, večini pa tudi zoper vrnitev v obdobje jugoslovanske monarhije. Istočasno je KPS izkoriščala prisotnost skupin različnih barv za prikazovanje slovenskega karakterja gibanja in navidezno manjše poudarjanje internacionalne komunistične komponente. Ravno ta lastnost je nepovratno vplivala tudi na razvoj dela slovenskih komunistov, še bolj pa je to vplivalo na privabljanje slovenskih množic. Predvsem to velja za Primorsko, kjer je bil nacionalni naboj zaradi dolgotrajnejše fašistične represije, ki se je pogosto enačila z italijansko represijo nad Slovenci, najbolj občuten. Da se je pri Slovencih v revolucionarne motive močno vpletel cilj narodne emancipacije in doseganje statusa nacije, kaže primer ljudsko-frontne himne: »Hej Slovenci, mar na veke nam bo gospodaril Rim in Belgrad, carski Dunaj, beli generali? Vstani sin gmajne, vstani kmet slovenski ramo z delavcem ob rami zgradi dom slovenski« (Čepič idr. 1995, 30). Takšno poudarjanje slovenstva je bilo v ospredju skozi celotno obdobje vojne in še dolgo tudi po formalnem zmagoslavju zavezniške koalicije. Istočasno je bila

revolucija vsaj s strani vodilnih predstavnikov nekoliko potisnjena v ozadje. OF je postopoma pridobivala širšo podporo, KPS pa je ob tem šla v prid širša politična stvarnost. SLS namreč ni našla vzvoda za reševanje slovenskih težav niti v okviru kraljeve jugoslovanske vlade v Londonu niti v obliki konkretnih dejanj na slovenskem ozemlju. Sprva je kazalo, da zahodnim zaveznikom ne bo uspelo ustaviti nacističnega pohoda po Evropi, samo Moskva pa naj bi bila dejavnik, ki lahko pod svojo zaščito vzame tudi majhne slovenske narode. OF je tako postala najmočnejša politična sila, ki je na slovenskih tleh odprto nastopala zoper okupacijo in s tem ustvarila predpogoj za skrajno izkoriščanje svojega potenciala mobilizacije slovenskih množic.

V sklopu strategije doseganja primata med zastopniki slovenskih nacionalnih interesov je OF kontinuirano gradila institute in organe vzporedne oblasti. Tako je bil 16. septembra 1941 na tretjem zasedanju vrhovnega plenuma OF ustanovljen Slovenski narodnoosvobodilni odbor (SNOO), ki naj bi »v času osvobodilne borbe edini predstavljal, zastopal, organiziral in vodil slovenski narod v sklopu priprav na narodno revolucijo« (Godeša 2008, 145). Ob tem je plenum določil, da je »vsako organiziranje izven okvira OF v času tujčeve okupacije škodljivo borbi za narodno svobodo« (Osolnik 2007, 417), sankcija za oboroževanje zunaj partizanskih čet pa je bila opredeljena 27. maja 1942, in sicer »bo ustreljen vsakdo, ki bo vršil priprave za formiranje kakršnih koli oboroženih grup izven partizanov oziroma čet, ki so podrejene Glavnemu poveljstvu slovenskih partizanskih čet« (Vodušek Starič 1992, 14). Odlok o zaščiti slovenskega naroda in njegovega gibanja za osvoboditev ter združitvev je opredelil izdajalce slovenskega naroda, in sicer so to bili vsi tisti, ki bi okupatorju pomagali pri sklicevanju na podporo slovenskega naroda. Za takšno dejanje, pa čeprav je bilo storjeno iz malomarnosti, je sledila smrtna kazen (Ferenc 1962, 199). S tem je

OF nase tudi formalno prevzela izključno pravico boja proti okupatorju in prepovedala kakršno koli avtonomno delovanje zunaj okvira gibanja pod komunističnim vodstvom. O državnopravnem položaju slovenskih področij po vojni se je, kot rečeno, sprva manj govorilo. Pri delu Slovencev je še vedno živel ideal »Zedinjene Slovenije«, a jugoslovanski okvir v tem političnem taboru ni bil osovražen kot v nekaterih drugih segmentih slovenske družbe, saj velik del slovenskih partizanov iz primorskih krajev od Trsta do Gorice niti ni bil dobro seznanjen s položajem Slovencev v Kraljevini Jugoslaviji.

Glede na navedeno lahko dejansko kot prvi korak k obuditvi jugoslovanskega državnega koncepta štejemo vzpostavitev ponovnih diplomatskih stikov med SZ in jugoslovansko vlado v Londonu septembra 1941. V iskanju kompromisnih strateških smernic za prihodnost južnoslovanskega področja je predstavništvo vlade monarhične Jugoslavije kot predpogoj postavljalo kontinuiteto vladavine dinastije Karađorđević in jugoslovansko platformo po vojne države. Slednje se je potem preko »nasveta« Moskve vneslo tudi v dokumente KPJ in povezane organizacije. Državnopravne smernice so bile nato opredeljene tudi v OF, in sicer 1. novembra 1941 v okviru temeljnih točk političnega programa, med katerimi je bila tudi eksplicitna navedba jugoslovanskega okvira. S tem je KPS omogočila proces povečevanja legitimnosti osvobodilnega karakterja partizanskega gibanja in zadovoljila skupino Stara pravda, ki je bila zbrana okrog Črtomirja Nagodeta in ni priznavala razkosanja Jugoslavije. Programu sta bili malo pred koncem leta (21. decembra 1941) dodani še dve točki. Prva oz. skupno osma točka se je glasila: »V skladu s slovesnimi izjavami Churchilla, Roosevelta in Stalina bo po svoji narodni osvoboditvi o notranji ureditvi in o svojih zunanjih odnosih odločal slovenski narod sam. OF bo to elementarno pravico slovenskega naroda uveljavljala in branila

z vsemi sredstvi« (Osolnik 2007, 417). S tem sta OF in KPS znotraj nje spremenili, in kot se je izkazalo, tudi dokončno opredelili svojo pozicijo v širših mednarodnih odnosih. Donedavni imperialisti so postali zavezniki, s katerimi se je gradil konkurenčno-sodelovalen odnos.

Privid popuščanja pri ideji sovjetizacije celotne Evrope je bil posledica širših političnih potreb in dogovorov med Moskvo, Londonom in Washingtonom, medtem ko se je ideal »Zedinjene Slovenije« pretil v načelo samoodločbe, ki ga je OF opredelila kot vrhovni pravni institut, nadrejen vsem drugim tudi v okviru vprašanja jugoslovanske državne tvorbe. To se je potrdilo v začetku leta 1942, ko se je v dokumentih OF omenjala samo samoodločba, medtem ko se je jugoslovanski okvir venomer izpuščal, saj je bil za nekatere člane KPS koncept jugoslovanstva še vedno prispodoba za državo Karađorđevićev, v kateri Slovenci niso realizirali želene stopnje politične emancipacije. To so potrjevale kritike dela slovenskih komunistov, ki so zagovornike jugoslovanstva še vedno pogosto označevali za privržence velikosrbskega hegemonizma in unitarizma (Godeša 2008, 146). Še posebej se je to odrazilo v obdobju, ki je sledilo prvim spopadam četnikov in partizanov v Srbiji, čemur je sledil izstop Stare in nove pravde ter Jugoslovanske ženske zveze iz OF (Čepič idr. 1995, 44). Do dokončnega sprejetja jugoslovanskega državnega koncepta s strani slovenskih komunistov je prišlo šele neposredno po prvem zasedanju Antifašističnega sveta narodne osvoboditve Jugoslavije (AVNOJ - *Antifašistično vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije*) v Bihaću 26. novembra 1942. Tam sicer slovenskih predstavnikov ni bilo, saj je zaradi nemške ofenzive obvestilo o tem prišlo prepozno. Tako je moral izvršni odbor OF naknadno imenovati slovenske predstavnike v ta organ, ob čemer je poudaril: »V novo Jugoslavijo bo zato svobodna in združena Slovenija, od Trsta do Špilja, od Kolpe do

Celovca, stopila z vsemi tistimi pravicami, ki ji bodo omogočile, da bo na njenih tleh gospodaril edino slovenski narod sam« (Osolnik 2007, 418). S tem je OF izrazila zahtevo po drugačnem položaju Slovencev, kot so ga imeli v Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, pri čemer lahko opazimo tako načelo samoodločbe kot tudi idejo slovenske države. Pri opredelitvi slednje je predvsem pomembno omenjanje Trsta in Celovca, torej ambicije po priključevanju celotnega slovenskega etničnega prostora, ki naj bi se vključil v Jugoslavijo. Ne nazadnje je to v pismu Titu decembra 1942 potrdil sam delegat politbiroja za slovenska in hrvaška območja Edvard Kardelj, ko je ugotovil, da se bodo Slovenci mednarodno najlažje utrdili prav s pomočjo Jugoslavije (Godeša 2008, 146). S tega vidika je torej bila za Slovence v KPS Jugoslavija le pripomoček za lastno narodno uveljavitev, saj si je takrat višjo stopnjo politične emancipacije od slovenske enote v federalni južnoslovanski državi le malokdo lahko predstavljal. S tega vidika celotna OF niti ni bila bistveno drugačna od nasprotnega slovenskega tabora, ki se je boril proti revoluciji pod vodstvom Partije, a ni našel strateškega pokrovitelja pri kateri izmed zmagovalnih velikih sil (Godeša 2006, 10).

Nacionalno vprašanje v KPH

Nemški napad na SZ je dokončno sprožil aktivno vključevanje v vojno pri hrvaških komunistih, ki so delovali v okviru Komunistične partije Hrvaške (KPH), tudi pri tistem delu, ki je bil pred tem naklonjen iskanju sožitja z novimi oblastmi NDH. Njen centralni komite je namreč 22. junija 1941 z ilegalnega zagrebškega radia poslal poziv proti vključevanju Hrvatov v kontrarevolucionarno armado, ki naj bi skupaj z nemško vojsko korakala na Moskvo. Vrh tedanje komunistične strukture so sestavljali Vlado Popović, Rade Končar in Andrija Hebrang, pri čemer je imel ravno slednji ključno vlogo opredeljevanja političnega programa in taktično-opera-

tivnega delovanja partizanov na Hrvaškem (Kisić-Kolanović 1996, 55). Z renomejem izkušenega komunista, člana KPJ od leta 1919, ki je v obdobju prve Jugoslavije preživel skoraj trinajst let v zaporu, je kmalu prevzel pobudo in 17. novembra 1941 postal sekretar centralnega komiteja KPH (Ivanković-Vonta 1988, 15). Februarja 1942 ga je aretirala policija NDH in ga zadržala v ujetništvu, vse dokler ni septembra istega leta partizanska stran za njega in skupino drugih članov komunističnega gibanja ponudila zamenjavo zapornikov. Hebrang se je sicer takoj vključil v vodenje Centralnega komiteja KPH in zopet prevzel dolžnost partijskega sekretarja, vendar se je ravno ta sedemmesečna odsotnost pod ustaškim nadzorom po vojni pokazala kot pomemben element konspiracije zoper njega.

Ožje vodstvo KPH je imelo za razliko od slovenskih komunistov, ki so v okviru OF nekoliko lažje gradili status borcev za nacionalno svobodo Slovencev in v to vpletali revolucionarno komponento, pri opredeljevanju političnega programa bistveno ožji manevrski prostor. Bistvena razlika se je izkazovala v dejstvu, da je Hrvaška vendarle eksistirala kot poseben subjekt mednarodnega prava v tedanjih okoliščinah, medtem ko je bilo pri Slovencih zaupanje v možnost uresničitve posebne slovenske države precej skromno (Godeša 2006, 12). Ob dejstvu obstoja NDH kot državnega subjekta hrvaškega naroda je bilo namreč nekoliko težje izpostavljanje komunističnega prizadevanja za višjo suverenost Hrvatov, a to še zdaleč ni pomenilo, da nacionalno vprašanje pri hrvaških komunistih ni imelo izredno pomembne vloge. Državotvorna strategija KPH je bila nekoliko bolj kompleksna tudi zaradi strukture ljudi, ki jo je poskušala pritegniti pod svoje okrilje, in sicer predvsem pasivnih članov HSS in srbskega prebivalstva v hrvaških krajih. Za pridobivanje naklonjenosti prvih so se hrvaški komunisti najprej osredotočili na rušenje teze oblasti NDH, da je z vzpostavitvijo nove države hrvaški narod uresničil svoje sanje o narodni neodvisnosti. V sklopu tega

so letaki Narodne fronte in komunistično časopisje od nacističnega napada na SZ poskušali dokazati, da NDH ne izpolnjuje osnovnih elementov narodne neodvisnosti in je ustaška oblast le orodje v rokah nacističnih sil. Ob tem so bili propagandni cilji usmerjeni v diskreditacijo tedanjega vrha HSS in vojaških nasprotnikov, pričemer se je izpostavljala zločinska narava in nehumanost Nemčije ter vseh njenih zaveznic. V tem kontekstu se je tudi ves čas vojne napovedoval njihov skorajšnji propad (Bratanić in Ražnjević 2016, 428-429). Srbsko prebivalstvo se je na drugi strani nagovarjalo s tezo, da ga le partizansko gibanje lahko zaščiti pred državnim terorjem. Seveda, enako kot na slovenskih tleh, tudi na Hrvaškem partijski organi niso zanemarili najpomembnejšega nasprotnika, jugoslovansko vlado in četniško gibanje pod Mihailovičevim vodstvom. Slednje, razen izjem v Dalmaciji, ni imelo pomembnejše podpore med Hrvati, drugače pa je bilo s Srbi na Hrvaškem, ki so v večini še vedno prisegali na srbskega kralja. Hrvatom je KPH v sklopu svoje strategije zagotavljala zaščito pred velikosrbskim hegemonizmom, ki naj bi ga podpirala jugoslovanska vlada v Londonu, obenem pa je srbskemu delu prebivalstva vsaj v začetni fazi tolerirala četniški element, dokler je ta bil v skladu s cilji KPH.

Zdi se, da je KPH najmanj težav imela pri pridobivanju simpatij tistega dela hrvaškega prebivalstva, ki je ostal zunaj NDH, torej pod italijansko oblastjo v Istri, Kvarnerju in v severni Dalmaciji. Istočasno je bil največji izziv prodreti do jedra kmečkih množic, ki se je še vedno nagibalo k HSS. Najmočnejša hrvaška stranka se je odločila za politiko čakanja; ni odobraval oboroženega upora, obenem pa njeni vodje v veliki večini niso sodelovali z novimi oblastmi. Do delitve je sicer prišlo pri opredeljevanju podpore četnikom. Juraj Krnjević je namreč kot vladni minister v maju 1942 preko radia BBC poslal poziv hrvaškemu narodu, naj podpre četnike, za kar je lobiral tudi pri hrvaških izseljencih v ZDA (Jurčević

2005, 42-44), člani HSS na območju Hrvaške pa so temu nasprotovali. KPH je poskus združevanja z vodstvom HSS zaznavala kot prenevaren, saj je predvsem na področjih ožje Hrvaške in Slavonije to še vedno uživalo preveliko podporo, kar je impliciralo nezmožnost nevtralizacije avtonomnega vpliva HSS, tudi če bi jo KPH uspela vključiti v antifašistično koalicijo po vzoru slovenske OF. HSS se je torej izpostavljala kot najverjetnejši nosilec oblasti na Hrvaškem v primeru poraza sil osi, zaradi česar je KPH začela izvajati obsežno propagando zoper njene posameznike, predvsem predsednika Vladka Mačka. Istočasno je intenzivno poskušala privabiti druge vidne člane HSS k sodelovanju s partizani, kar naj bi vneslo razdor v stranko in razdelilo njeno volilno jedro (Boban 1987, 276-306). Primer zasledovanja te strategije je objava (Banac 1990, 92) iz maja leta 1943:

V kolikor ne bi bilo na Hrvaškem Narodnoosvobodilne vojske, v kolikor ne bi bilo na Hrvaškem ZAVNOH-a, v kolikor ne bi bilo na tisoče in tisoče Hrvatov, kateri so navkljub Mačkovim pozivom na »čakanje« vstali z orožjem v roki proti zaslužnjevalcem Hrvaškega naroda, bi danes svobodoljubni svet gledal na Hrvaško kot na sovražno deželo, na hrvaški narod pa kot na zaveznika največjega sovražnika človeške družbe [...] Na eni strani se Pavelićeva »Nezavisna Hrvatska« bojuje proti Zaveznikom. Z druge strani pa formalno v tujini predstavljajo Jugoslavijo velikosrbski hegemonistični elementi, kot so begunci v londonski vladi, Draža Mihailović itd., katerim pomagajo določeni reakcionarni imperialistični krogi v tujini. Tem velikosrbskim protinarodnim in protihrvaškim elementom lebdi pred očmi samo en cilj: nasproti enodušni želji svobodnih enakopravnih narodov želi ta gospoda obnoviti velikosrbsko hegemonijo v Jugoslaviji, podrediti hrvaški, slovenski in druge narode Jugoslavije, ponovno zavihetati bič izkoriščanja in zatiranja nad njimi.

Strategija hrvaških komunistov je doživela prelomni trenutek z zasedanjem AVNOJ-a v Bihaću. V ustanovitvi njegove podružnice (*»Zemaljskog antifašističkog vijeća narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske«* – ZAVNOH) je bilo mogoče razbrati potrjevanje hrvaške suverenosti s strani KPJ. To je bilo celo večkrat nedvomno ponovljeno na junijskem ustanovnem srečanju, ko se je poudarjalo, da bo KPH zasledovala cilje hrvaškega narodnega gibanja, da bo branila tako hrvaško avtonomnost v Jugoslaviji kot suverenost hrvaškega naroda. Sam Hebrang je označil ustanovitev ZAVNOH kot rezultat stoletnega boja Hrvatov za lasten politično-predstavniški organ (ZAVNOH 1964, 171–179). Drugi govorniki so šli celo dlje. Karlo Mrazović je na primer KPH izenačil z narodnimi gibanji, ki sledijo tradiciji hrvaških narodnih gibanj pod vodstvom Matije Gubca in Anteja Starčevića (ZAVNOH 1964, 179–181). Ravno tako se je zagotavljalo, da je to narodno gibanje, ki ga ne sestavljajo samo komunisti, da ne bo radikalnih socialnih in političnih reform in da pravi privrženci HSS ter ideje Stjepana Radića nimajo druge izbire kot združitev moči v okviru ZAVNOH. V tem kontekstu je bil zopet kritiziran Vladko Maček, ki naj bi izdal Radićeve ideale, slednji pa naj bi, če bi bil še živ, zagotovo sledil boji, ki ga je zagovarjala KPH (ZAVNOH 1964, 196–197). V skladu s tem je Božidar Magovac, sicer član HSS, začel tiskati časopis *»Slobodni dom«*, ki je civilno prebivalstvo nagovarjal k pristopu k partizanom (Irvine 1992, 24). Na podoben način se je pristopalo tudi v hrvaško domobransko vojsko, na njene pripadnike je ZAVNOH naslovil naslednji poziv: *»Priključite se brez oklevanja takoj tudi vi k borcem za polno svobodo in neodvisnost Hrvaške, v kateri bo Hrvat sam svoj gospodar in si bo sam v popolni svobodi uredil svoj dom«* (ZAVNOH 1964, 277). To je dalo novo dimenzijo krepitvi hrvaških partizanskih vrst, predvsem s pridobivanjem podpore na levem krilu HSS, kar je označilo tudi začetek lažjega privabljanja hrvaških kmečkih

množic v gibanje pod okriljem jugoslovansko usmerjene centrale, ki se je do tedaj zatikala predvsem pri dokazovanju, da se v novi Jugoslaviji ne bosta ponovila srbski hegemonizem in centralizem.

Tudi centrala KPJ je sprva ZAVNOH v svojem tisku poudarjala bolj kot AVNOJ. Še več, Tito se je zavzemal za manjšo kritiko Mačka, saj je bilo to pomembno v njegovi taktiki pridobivanja britanske podpore (Dedijer 1981, 1150). Kljub temu je vrh KPJ ostal previden in ni želel prehitrega množičnega priključevanja članov HSS, posebej če bi to impliciralo nevarnost ustvarjanja nekakšnega novega HSS znotraj Narodno-osvobodilne vojske (NOV), ki bi s tem dobila drugo ideološko dimenzijo. Sam Josip Broz se je zavedal potenciala, ki ga je imelo hrvaško kmečko gibanje, srbski del KPJ pa je v tem videl nevarnost hrvaške dominacije v NOV in posledično postavljanje hrvaških Srbov v podrejen položaj. Ravno usklajevanje napetih hrvaško-srbskih odnosov je bilo ključnega pomena za uspeh KPH na Hrvaškem. Vodstvo KPH se je s premišljeno taktiko lotilo pridobivanja vse širše podpore hrvaških Srbov. V ta namen so bili v gibanje najprej vključeni srbski intelektualci iz večjih mest in območij, kjer srbsko prebivalstvo na Hrvaškem ni bilo v večini. Slednji so namreč lažje pristajali na politiko skupnega delovanja, medtem ko so bili preostali Srbi, predvsem v Liki in dalmatinskem zaledju, v veliki večini podporniki četniškega gibanja. S ciljem pridobivanja čim širše podpore in vključevanja tudi predelov, večinsko naseljenih s Srbi, je KPH sistematično sprejemala pravne akte, ki so izničevali diskriminacijske ukrepe NDH, enakopravna pa je postala tudi uporaba cirilične pisave. Hrvaški komunisti so torej bili zaradi kompleksnejših razmerij tako glede vojaških enot kot tudi zaradi drugačne narodne sestave, prisiljeni voditi koalicijsko politiko, ki je vključevala vse tiste, ki so nasprotovali hrvaški državi pod okriljem nacistične Nemčije. To se je odrazilo tudi na pestrosti

kadrovske zasedbe izvršnega odbora ZAVNOH na zasedanju v Plaškem oktobra 1943, na katerem pa je vendarle prevladala Hebrangova vizija o Srbih kot manjšinskem in ne konstitutivnem elementu na Hrvaškem znotraj Jugoslavije. Predsedniško mesto je bilo namreč prepuščeno pisatelju Vladimirju Nazorju, medtem ko so podpredsedniške funkcije zasedli Rade Pribičević (nekdanji član Srbske demokratske stranke), Filip Lakuš (eden izmed vodilnih članov HSS) in sam Andrija Hebrang. Ravno Pribičević je bil kot srbski predstavnik v ZAVNOH nekoliko bolj naklonjen sprejetju manjšinskega statusa za hrvaške Srbe, kar je potrdil v svojem zapisu poleti 1944 (Banac 1990, 99–100):

Mi bomo vršili tudi svojo dolžnost do Hrvaške kot vsak dober sin Hrvaške in bomo branili njene pravice federalne države v sklopu skupne Jugoslavije [...] Na Hrvaškem na enega Srba pridejo trije Hrvati. S kakšno pravico lahko tisti en Srb zahteva od treh Hrvatov, da se z njimi skupaj vpreže v velikosrbski voz in da se v imenu tega enega Srba zaničuje tako Srbe kot Hrvate?

Zdi se, da je bil v primeru formiranja ZAVNOH, ki je predstavljal alternativno medvojno hrvaško vlado, najden nekakšen skupni imenovalec. Srbi v hrvaškem partizanskem gibanju so namreč vsaj v določenem medvojnem trenutku pristali na manjšinski položaj znotraj Hrvaške, na drugi strani pa so Hrvati pristali na federalni koncept, po katerem bo Hrvaška le ena federalna enota v jugoslovanski državi z relativno srbsko večino. V nekoliko širši historični perspektivi odnosov med Hrvati in Srbi na večinsko hrvaških področjih to pravzaprav ni bilo nič novega. Hrvaški Srbi, ne upoštevajoč seveda tistega dela z velikosrbskimi nazori, so bili pripravljeni priznati hrvaški državni okvir le pod pogojem, da je slednji popolnoma vključen v specifičen južnoslovanski koncept,

ki ni vključeval Bolgarov in je imel svoje politično središče v Beogradu. V tem okviru so razumljivi tudi posegi KPJ na makedonskih območjih, saj je bilo tam zamenjano komunistično vodstvo na čelu z Metodijem Šatorovom, ko se je le-to preveč približalo Bolgarski komunistični partiji (Deželak Barič 2005, 159).

Glede na dejstvo, da je bil geopolitični okvir prihodnje države določen v podobnih okvirih kot Kraljevina SHS/Jugoslavija po prvi svetovni vojni, ne preseneča, da je tudi urejanje odnosov med različnimi političnimi strujami znotraj ZAVNOH močno spominjalo na koalicijska sodelovanja v stari Jugoslaviji. To je z vidika vrha KPJ predstavljalo tveganje, na kar nakazuje tudi dejstvo, da je predsednik AVNOJ-a Ivan Ribar potožil Titu, da ZAVNOH ne bi smel na lastno pest reševati vprašanja Srbov na Hrvaškem (Pleterski 1988), podobnega mnenja pa je bil tudi Milovan Đilas (1977, 312–317). Vendar se zdi, da je bila centrala v obdobju vojne prisiljena tolerirati takšno delovanje KPH, saj bi vsak poseg v njen vrh stanje na terenu lahko obrnil v še bolj negotovo smer. Hebrangovi strategiji privabljanja hrvaških kmečkih množic v času vojne ni bilo moč nasprotovati, saj se je ZAVNOH pokazal kot zelo učinkovit. Po zasedanju v Plaškem se je namreč sprožil val množične mobilizacije, hrvaški partizani pa so do zasedanja ZAVNOH v Topuskem maja 1944 že predstavljali pet od skupno 11 korpusov NOV. Politika prepuščanja iniciative Hebrangu je izhajala tudi iz njegovega ugleda pri Britancih, za kar je bil zaslužen predvsem sin britanskega predsednika vlade Randolph Churchill, ki ga je opisal kot najpomembnejšo osebnost v Jugoslaviji takoj za Titom (Biber 1981, 133). Centralni komite KPJ glede na navedeno v vojnem času ni mogel direktno vplivati na kontrolo ali celo zamenjavo Hebranga, zato je v strategiji zmanjševanja njegovega vpliva najprej poskušal spremeniti Hebrangovo okolje, samega Hebranga pa se je večkrat samo opomnilo na

politiko Politbiroja. Strategija se je po vsej verjetnosti pripravila na sestanku Tita, Đilasa, Aleksandra Rankovića, Sretena Žujovića in Vladimirja Bakarića (Dedijer 1981, 1155). Ko spomladi 1944 ena od publikacij KPH ni omenila Jugoslavije, pa je Tito (Broz 1977b, 115) Hebrangu pisal osebno:

Popravite takoj tole parolo v vašem časopisu »Žena u borbi«: »Naj živi svobodna in združena Hrvaška v bratski federativni skupnosti s svobodno Srbijo in svobodno Slovenijo.« To je naravnost neverjetno, kako ste lahko to spregledali, da ne pazite na ostale narode ter ste izpustili besedo Jugoslavija. Po našem globokem prepričanju to ni slučaj, temveč je v skladu z vašo linijo, ki ima lahko katastrofalne posledice, v kolikor se takoj ne korigira glede najpomembnejših vprašanj.

Ravno tako je Tito večkrat opomnil Hebranga, naj ne stopa v kontakte z zahodnimi zavezniki sam brez predhodnega posvetovanja s centralo (Dedijer 1981, 1039).

Strategija zmanjševanja Hebrangovega vpliva je vključevala umikanje ljudi, ki bi lahko še dodatno povečali pripravljenost znotraj KPH na koncesije predvojnimi strankam. Božidar Magovac, predstavnik HSS na osvobojenem ozemlju, ki ga je Hebrang videl kot osebo, ki bi lahko izrinila Vladka Mačka v HSS in je skupaj z Lakušem ter Franom Frolom prisostvoval na zasedanju v Plaškem, je bil poleti 1944 zaprt ravno zaradi svojega stališča, da bi antifašistična fronta morala biti koalicija strank (Jelić-Butić 1983, 261; Vodušek Starič 1992, 75). Kljub temu je bilo tudi samo vodstvo KPH vsake toliko časa opozorjeno, naj pri reševanju nacionalnega vprašanja ne odstopa od strategije KPJ. Kardelj je tako v enem izmed svojih pisem v Slovenijo opredelil le, da se »mi (KPJ) ne strinjamo v vseh stvareh z njimi (KPH)« (Dželebdžić 1986a, 13). Zdi se, da je

ravno Kardelj najbolj dvomil o Hebrangu, predvsem glede njegovega odnosa do jugoslovanstva. 30. septembra 1944 je Titu pisal (Banac 1990, 101):

Pri Andriji izbija na vsakem koraku na dan nekakšen nacionalistični uklon. Točno je, v svojih časopisih in propagandi oni (Hrvat) veliko govorijo o Jugoslaviji. V resnici to prekriva eno resnično tendenco nerazpoloženja do Jugoslavije. Jaz ne pravim, da je ta tendenca pri Andriji zavestna, vendar se praktično kaže v celotnem sklopu vsakodnevnih drobnarij. Dvomim, da bi pretiraval, če rečem, da Andrija ne mara Srbov in Slovencev in da smatra Jugoslavijo bolj ali manj kot nujno zlo.

To Kardeljevo opažanje pri vrhu KPH so potrjevala tudi druga pričevanja iz istega obdobja, a na bistveno širši ravni. Britanski brigadir in poročevalec iz KPJ Fitzroy Maclean (Biber 1981, 329) namreč septembra 1944 v svojem opisu stanja na terenu pravi:

Potovanje po osvobojenih krajih osrednje Srbije ponuja obilico dokazov, kako skrajno prijateljsko je razpoloženo civilno prebivalstvo po manjših mestih in podeželskih okrajih partizanskim silam, kar se po mojih izkušnjah nadvse ugodno razlikuje od razpoloženja prebivalstva v mnogih krajih Bosne ali Hrvatske, kjer komajda skrivajo svoje simpatije do ustašev in Nemcev.

KPH je torej morala Hrvate, ki so bili tradicionalno nagnjeni k ideji samostojne hrvaške države, prepričati, da lahko ravno KPH uresniči njihove nacionalne interese, kar pa nikakor ni bilo lahko glede na dejstvo, da so komunisti podpirali idejo širše južnoslovsanske države.

Potrditev teze o drugače mislečem vodstvu partizanov na Hrvaškem je prišla tudi s strani drugih virov pri zahodnih zaveznikih.

Britanski oficir Peter Moore je namreč v svojem poročilu jeseni 1944 navajal, da je imel padec Beograda v partizanske roke pomembne implikacije tudi na druga območja Jugoslavije, saj so komunisti v vseh protifašističnih gibanjih prevzeli popolno kontrolo z izjemo Hrvaške, v KPH pa naj bi interpretirali partijska navodila veliko bolj zaveznikom prijazno (Vodušek Starič 1992, 99). Ravno lastna interpretacija navodil nikakor ni bila po godu vrhu KPJ, ki je vodstvo ZAVNOH večkrat kritiziral, povsem drugačno pa je bilo stališče Partije do dalmatinskih komunistov. Ti naj bi kazali primernejši odnos do Srbov (Dželebdžić 1986a, 83), čeprav so ocene KPH o stanju v Dalmaciji leta 1944 govorile, da je med prebivalstvom večinsko srbskih krajev v dalmatinskem zaledju in Hrvati v drugih delih vladal močan antagonizem, Partija pa naj bi imela malo vpliva na ljudi (Dželebdžić 1986b, 129). Po vsej verjetnosti je večja naklonjenost KPJ dalmatinskemu oblastnemu komiteju (OBKOM) izhajala iz dejstva ubogljivosti slednjega in dejstva, da so iz Dalmacije večkrat namesto nadrejeni KPH poročali neposredno vrhu KPJ. Končno je vendarle tudi iz KPJ prišel ukaz v Dalmacijo, da morajo upoštevati in obveščati ZAVNOH, saj ta sicer ne bo imel takšnega vpliva na Hrvaškem (Irvine 1992, 29–31). Kljub temu je bilo tudi v tem odnosu mogoče zaznati očiten spor med KPJ in KPH.

Implikacije zasedanja v Jajcu

Vrh KPJ s Titom in Kardeljem na čelu si je ves čas prizadeval za programsko homogenizacijo delovanja partizanskih gibanj, pri čemer je pazil, da nacionalne deviacije ne postanejo neobvladljive. Ključnega pomena v procesu centralizacije so bila zasedanja AVNOJ-a, na katerih so se posredovale smernice vsem partizanskim gibanjem. Sprva je sicer Centralni komite KPJ dovoljeval navidežno avtonomnost tudi tistim delom, ki pozneje niso dobili statusa federalne enote. Po zasedanju v Bihaću so namreč najprej začeli

delovati izvršilni politični organi, ki so po zasedanju v Jajcu začeli prevzemati tudi zakonodajno oblast. Poleg slovenske (Slovenska narodno-osvobodilna skupščina; SNOS) in hrvaške (ZAVNOH) različice so bili ustanovljeni podobni organi tudi v Srbiji, BiH, Makedoniji, Črni gori in Boki Kotorski ter tudi v Sandžaku in Vojvodini. To kaže na pragmatičnost vrha KPJ, ki je s popuščanjem nekaterim avtonomnim tendencam poskušal pridobiti naklonjenost prebivalstva tudi v tistih predelih, kjer partizani sicer niso imeli množične podpore. KPJ je torej pogosto s hranjenjem nacionalnih in lokalno-avtonomnih ambicij krepila svoje članstvo, čeprav je bila končna odločitev o številu federalnih enot znotraj prihodnje Jugoslavije po vsej verjetnosti sprejeta že pred zasedanjem v Jajcu.

Dopuščanje avtonomnega razvoja partizanskih gibanj je impliciralo nujnost naknadne homogenizacije NOV. Najprej so bile metode poenotenja bolj mile. Na Slovenskem se je to lahko občutilo pri obisku Arsa Jovanovića, ki je dobil nalogo nadzora slovenske implementacije vzorcev delovanja po navodilih vrha KPJ. Nadaljevalo se je naslednje leto z obiskom Ivana Lole Ribarja, ki je med slovenskimi komunisti bival od januarja do aprila 1943 in je vplival na oblikovanje dolomitske izjave, s pomočjo katere so slovenski komunisti tudi formalno prevzeli vodilno vlogo v OF (Godeša 2006, 84–92). Kljub temu se je še vedno dogajalo, da so izvršilni organi določene odločitve sprejemali samoiniciativno. Primer tega sta bila akta OF in ZAVNOH, ki sta ob kapitulaciji Italije oba razglasila priključitev vseh okupiranih ozemelj k matični Sloveniji oz. Hrvaški. Težava je bila v tem, da sta obe telesi v svojih sklepih izrecno navedli tudi tista področja, ki niso bila okupirana leta 1941, ampak so že prej pripadla Italiji z mednarodnimi sporazumi. To je razjezilo tako centralne organe KPJ kot tudi samo Moskvo, saj so tedaj imeli tudi italijanski komunisti vlogo pomembnega partnerja v strategiji SZ in KPJ. Poleg tega sta tako slovenska kot hrvaška

stran izpostavili svojo pravico do Istre, kar je predstavljalo potencialni spor med KPH in KPS. Končno je moral posredovati sam Kardelj, ki je kritiziral in razveljavil odločitve, ki so določale mejo še pred koncem vojne (Osolnik 2007, 420). Na samostojno odločitev ZAVNOH, da priključi Istro, Hrvaško primorje in Dalmacijo k Hrvaški, je reagiral tudi sam Tito, ki je v dopisu KPH ostro okaral njegov vrh, češ da take sklepe lahko sprejema le AVNOJ, sicer le-ti ne bodo imeli veljave v odnosih z drugimi zavezniki (Broz 1977c, 3). Čeprav je Hebrang osebno odgovoril Titu, da razume navodila in potrdil, da takšne odločitve sodijo v domeno AVNOJ-a, je na naslednjem zasedanju ZAVNOH ta organ vnovič na celem spektru področij pokazal ambicije po tem, da je na območju Hrvaške ravno ZAVNOH vir avtoritete za AVNOJ. Še več, na zasedanju ZAVNOH se je zopet razpravljalo tudi o bodoči federalni ureditvi Jugoslavije (ZAVNOH 1964, 459 in 501), kar je bilo v popolnem nasprotju z razumevanjem državnega delovanja v vrhu KPJ.

Zasedanje AVNOJ-a v Jajcu, 29. in 30. novembra 1943, je tudi formalno opredelilo temeljne geopolitične značilnosti povojne Jugoslavije. AVNOJ se je potrdil kot začasno vrhovno izvršno in zakonodajno telo ter istočasno ustanovil še tri svoje organe, in sicer plenum, predsedstvo in nacionalni komite osvoboditve Jugoslavije (NKOJ), ki je imel funkcijo začasne vlade. Poleg tega je bila odvzeta pravica dotedanji kraljevi vladi, kralju pa se je prepovedala vrnitev v državo. Z notranjepolitičnega vidika so se s temi odločitvami prekršile določbe ustave iz leta 1931 in njene dopolnitve iz leta 1939. Na videz je torej šlo za prekinitev pravnega reda Kraljevine Jugoslavije in določanje novih državnih temeljev. To je bil izkaz večje moči, ki je izhajala tako iz boljšega mednarodnega položaja KPJ kot tudi iz dejstva, da je bilo vse več ozemlja pod njeno kontrolo. V tem kontekstu je bila v Jajcu formalizirana tudi odločitev o federalni ureditvi prihodnje Jugoslavije, ki je bila po prepričanju

KPJ ključ do rešitve notranjih nacionalnih problemov (Engelsfeld 2002, 416). Po pričevanju Janeza Stanovnika (v Zafranović 2012, 12:59–13:47) naj bi ravno v Jajcu še vedno bili prisotni tudi občutki, da bo federacija imela številne konfederalne elemente, saj so se pojavljale pobude, da naj bi AVNOJ vendarle potrdil odločitve ZAVNOH in OF o priključitvi Primorske, Istre, Reke in Dalmacije. A zdi se, da so ta opažanja le rezultat uspešnega manevra vrha KPJ, ki je navzven poskušal prikazati svobodo in politično emancipacijo narodov, vključenih v Jugoslavijo, v resnici pa se oblast nikoli ni imela namena federalizirati, še manj pa konfederalizirati. Federacija po sovjetskem modelu je namreč implicirala le teritorialno opredelitev enot, medtem ko bi oblast ostala povsem centralizirana.

Glede na potek vojne je bilo v Jajcu sicer še vedno nekoliko prezgodaj za objavo končnega števila federalnih enot, kar so posamezni antifašistični člani poskušali izkoristiti in so hiteli s potrjevanjem odločitev AVNOJ, s čimer so poskušali sami sebi dati status subjekta, ki si zasluži federalno enoto. Tako so na primer slovenski komunisti 19. in 20. februarja 1944 v Črnomlju manifestirali izkaz slovenske volje za jugoslovanski koncept, s čimer so se Slovenci »svobodno, po lastni volji, na temelju pravice vsakega naroda do samoodločbe, vključno s pravico do odcepitve, pa tudi združitve z drugimi narodi« združili z drugimi južnoslovanskimi narodi (Osolnik 2007, 420–421). ZAVNOH je na tretjem zasedanju naredil podobno, a je ob tem storil še en velik korak več, ki se je na koncu pokazal kot prevelik zalogaj za njegovo vodstvo. Na zasedanju v maju 1944 je namreč ZAVNOH opredelil Hrvaški sabor kot najvišji zakonodajni in izvršilni organ na Hrvaškem. Ta naj bi torej bil potrditev resnične suverenosti hrvaškega naroda, ki bo preko njega sposoben odločanja o lastni usodi (ZAVNOH 1970, 604). Hrvaško povezovanje z drugimi južnoslovanskimi narodi je bilo s tega vidika opredeljeno kot potreba, saj naj bi kot

majhen narod v povezavi z drugimi majhnimi narodi lažje deloval v mednarodni skupnosti ob velikih silah. Zasedanje v Jajcu torej ni odpravilo razhajanj niti v Partiji, še manj pa znotraj partizanskih gibanj. Še vedno sta se soočala dva temeljna koncepta, ki sta bila le začasno rešena s kompromisom. Na eni strani je bila prisotna vizija predvsem hrvaških in deloma slovenskih organov o federaciji, ki je vključevala decentralizacijo oblasti, na drugi strani pa so centralni organi KPJ zahtevali le nominalno teritorialno federalizacijo s centralizirano oblastjo.

Epilog

Stališča o suverenosti posameznih južnoslovanskih narodov, ki naj bi imeli tudi vsak svoje nacionalne politične organe, neodvisne od Partije, preko katerih bi lahko izkazovali svojo suverenost, so vnašala strah med člane najožjega vrha KPJ, da bi se znotraj samih partijskih institucij lahko razvilo strankarstvo s podobnimi razmerji moči kot pred vojno in bi ogrozilo sam obstoj Partije na oblasti. S ciljem preprečevanja krepitve avtonomističnih ambicij je KPJ intenzivirala proces centralizacije in čiščenja vodstev partizanskih gibanj, kar je najbolj temeljito potekalo ravno na Slovenskem in Hrvaškem. Vezivno tkivo, ki ga je predstavljala narodno heterogena vojska, v tistem trenutku še ni bilo dovolj močno, da bi se lahko presegle razlike v javnem mnenju pri slovenskem, hrvaškem in srbskem prebivalstvu. Poleg tega v marsikateri del jugoslovanskega območja propaganda KPJ še ni prodrla. To je potrdil tudi sam Kardelj spomladi 1944: »Mi smo sklenili organizirati po vseh pokrajinah [...] politično gibanje z organizacijskim aparatom vzporedno z organi oblasti. [...] Mi upamo, da nam bo to precej pomagalo, da pridobimo mase HSS in da rešimo marsikatero vprašanje v Srbiji« (Dželebdžić 1986a, 347). Istočasno je kritiziral izkazovanje nacionalnih čustev v propagandnem diskurzu OF, saj v njihovem

tisku nikjer ni bilo niti omembe Jugoslavije, člani OF pa naj bi se »zapirali v slovenske probleme«. V svojem pismu maja 1944 je še zapisal: »Ko sem videl na kongresu izrazito nacionalistični pečat slov. delegacije, sem se prestrašil. Podvzemite kar najhitreje mere proti temu, pri čemer seveda ni treba iti v drugo skrajnost, v podcenjevanje nacionalnih čustev omladine« (Vodušek Starič 1992, 80–81). Odziv na to kritiko je bil hiter, saj je že naslednji mesec v Slovenskem poročevalcu izšel odmeven članek Borisa Kidriča s pomenljivim naslovom in izborom besed »*Več jugoslovenstva*«, v katerem je kritiziral ozke poglede posameznikov in istočasno zagotavljal obstoj »slovenske ljubezni do Jugoslavije« (Kidrič 1985, 124).

Na Hrvaškem so se zdele težave KPJ še večje, saj je HSS krepil svoj položaj v ZAVNOH. V njegovem imenu sta pristop k jugoslovanski narodno-osvobodilni fronti podpisala Franjo Gaži in Ante Vrkljan, kar pa očitno še ni pomenilo, da HSS pristaja na komunistično državno idejo. August Košutić, ki je predstavljal stranko na osvobojenem ozemlju, je v oktobru 1944 sestavil program stranke za povojno obdobje. V njem je zabeležil, da naj bi HSS kljub pristopu fronti še naprej deloval kot samostojna politična stranka, obenem pa izrazil nestrinjanje s politiko KPJ do Vladka Mačka. Košutićevo stališče se je nagibalo v smer samostojne hrvaške države, ki bi se lahko povezala v skupnost južnoslovanskih držav, zato v programu piše o hrvaški ustavi in se pri tem sklicuje na načela Stjepana Radića, kar je predstavljalo popolnoma drugo državno-pravno paradigmo od koncepta KPJ (Jelić-Butić 1983, 274). Za slednjo je bilo problematično predvsem dejstvo, da je Košutić očitno pridobil simpatije Hebranga, ki je že pred tem prišel v neposreden spor s Titom, saj je ZAVNOH sprejel zakon o obveznem verouku v šolah navkljub izrecni prepovedi s strani Tita. To je bilo direktno spodkopavanje avtoritete KPJ in njenega vodje, zato se je Tito (Irvine 1992, 41) neposredno obrnil na Hebranga:

Neprijetno me je presenetilo, da ste se v ZAVNOH odločili, da na Hrvaškem uvedete obvezen verouk. To je zelo hud prekršek, za katerega ste odgovorni predvsem vi in drugi tovariši. [...] Potrudite se, da umaknete ta ukaz [...]. S takšnimi gnilimi koncesijami ne boste naredili nobene koristi za našo narodnoosvobodilno borbo in naše sinove, temveč vnašate elemente nazadnjaštva.

Poleg tega sta bila tako Milovan Đilas kot Aleksandar Ranković nezadovoljna zaradi stališča predsednika ZAVNOH Vladimirja Nazorja, ki je kljub enakopravnosti cirilice in latinice menil, da je nujno poznavanje in uporaba hrvaškega jezika tudi s strani Srbov na Hrvaškem. Kaplja čez rob je bila ustanovitev zasebne Tiskovne agencije Hrvaške (Dželebdžić 1986b, 425), ko je Tito znova pisal Hebrangu in eksplicitno opredelil, kakšen naj bi bil federalizem v Jugoslaviji: »Takoj ustavite delovanje te vaše t. i. telegrafske agencije TAH. Kaj to sploh pomeni? S polno paro drsite v separatizem. Ali ne vidite, da imajo zvezne države eno uradno telegrafsko agencijo? Vzemite za primer Sovjetsko zvezo« (Irvine 1992, 42).

Septembrski sestanek Košutića in Hebranga se je izkazal kot očitno prenevaren za Centralni komite KPJ. Morebitni sporazum KPH in HSS oz. združitev hrvaških partizanov in hrvaških domobranov bi lahko ustvarila močno vojaško silo, ki bi glede na stališča Mačka in Hebranga lahko postala premočan politični dejavnik. S prevlado HSS bi namreč lahko odigrala tudi protirevolucionarno vlogo ob potencialni podpori zahodnih zaveznikov. Posledično je Tito pisal Kardelju: »Tam počnejo neverjetne neumnosti. Vse to dokazuje, da so separatistične tendence zelo močne, in to, kot je videti, ravno pri naših tovariših. [...] Razišči zadevo, in če se bo Andrija še naprej držal takšnih stališč, ga bomo morali umakniti s položaja sekretarja CK KP Hrvaške« (Dedijer 1981, 1098). Kardelj je sprejel

nalogo in poslal Titu izredno negativno poročilo o delu Hebranga (Irvine 1992, 42-43):

Dvomim, da bi pretiraval, če bi rekel, da Andrija ne mara Srbov in Slovencev, in da Jugoslavijo bolj ali manj šteje kot nujno zlo. [...] Dejstvo je, da na Hrvaškem stvari ne bodo šle dobro, dokler bo Andrija Hebrang sekretar CK KPH, torej dokler je sploh tam. Njegova celotna miselnost in značaj sta takšna, da predstavljata nenehno težnjo po oslabitvi povezanosti Hrvaške z Jugoslavijo.

Ravno tako zapiše, da ima Dalmacija veliko boljši odnos do CK KPJ in da je to pravi razlog, zakaj ima Hebrang negativen odnos do dalmatinskega vodstva. Kardelj je s tem praktično zapečatil Hebrangovo usodo, obenem pa je takoj predlagal njegovo zamenjavo z Vladimirjem Bakarićem. Glede na navedeno ne preseneča, da je bil Hebrang ravno 14. oktobra 1944 odstavljen. Njegov umik se je sicer sprva pojasnil kot napredovanje, saj je Hebrang v Beogradu prevzel funkcijo ministra za industrijo. To je bila po vsej verjetnosti le posledica prevelikega ugleda, ki ga je Hebrang še vedno užival med hrvaškimi komunisti, zato se je uradno obdržal v oblasti vse do afere z Informbirojem, ki je bila izkoriščena za končni obračun. Na drugi strani so se predstavniki HSS umikali bistveno bolj s trdo roko, Košutića je namreč zaprla tajna služba Odsek za zaščito naroda (OZNA), ki je bila ustanovljena v maju 1944 v Drvarju neposredno s Titovo uredbo.

Indikativno je, da je umik Hebranga sledil Titovemu sestanku s Stalinom in je sovpadel z delitvijo interesnih sfer med VB in SZ. V tej luči lahko na to potezo vodstva KPJ in moskovske matice gledamo tudi kot na zavzemanje ključnih pozicij in pridobivanje prednosti v odnosu na VB. Ravno tako niti Hebrang niti Magovac Titu nista bila več potrebna po podpisu Titovega sporazuma s Šu-

bašičem poleti 1944. Čeprav se je torej odstavitev Hebranga pozneje pojasnjevala kot posledica njegove naklonjenosti separatizmu in nacionalizmu, je razloge za začetek procesa njegove politične likvidacije nato pa tudi stvarne smrti vendarle treba iskati predvsem v njegovi odprtosti do HSS in v kontekstu obračuna KPJ s politično stranko, ki je že na volitvah 1938 dokazala, da ima ogromen potencial ne le med Hrvati. Poleg nosilca ideje dejanske hrvaške suverenosti je HSS predstavljala tudi resnega ideološkega tekmeca v prihodnji Jugoslaviji, saj se ji je obetala velika podpora kmečkega prebivalstva, kar je za KPJ predstavljalo preveliko tveganje. Obenem sta odstranitvi Košutića in Hebranga služili kot zgled vsem tistim, ki se niso povsem podrejali navodilom vrha KPJ. Ta teza je bila eksplicitno potrjena v Kardeljevem opominu SNOS, ko je njegovo predsedstvo 3. septembra 1944 sprejelo odlok o ureditvi narodnih sodišč. Najprej je ta organ prejel opozorilo s strani NKOJ, nato pa tudi od samega Kardelja, in sicer, da organi SNOS ne smejo sprejeti nobenega odloka brez privolitve centralnih organov KPJ, drugače bi se tudi med Slovenci lahko našel kakšen Hebrang (Mikuž 1973, 178). Med drugim je Kardelj še zapisal: »Hrvati so npr. prinesli celo vrsto sklepov, ki ne spadajo niti v njihovo kompetenco, a kaj šele, da bi nas obvestili o njih. To je bil eden od razlogov za odstavitev Hebranga« (Vodušek Starič 1992, 100). S tem je posredno opredelil tudi odnos KPJ do narodnega vprašanja in možnosti narodne samoodločbe. Vrh KPJ glede temeljnih državnopravnih vprašanj očitno ni dopuščal avtonomnih poti. Na eni strani je treba vzrok za to delno iskati v negativnih izkušnjah z akcijami, ki so jih posamezniki izvajali na lastno pest, brez posvetovanja z vrhom KPJ, kot je bil to na primer poskus reševanja komunistov iz ujetništva v Kerestincu (Jelić 1986, 122-129), na drugi strani pa gre vendarle ključni razlog iskati v razumevanju narave delovanja komunističnih gibanj s strani vrha KPJ. Če bi namreč nekdo drug pridobil bodisi

večjo legitimnost pri množicah bodisi večjo podporo v moskovski centrali, bi obstoječe vodstvo zelo verjetno končalo enako, kot so pred tem drugi konkurenti za vrh KPJ. Zaključimo lahko, da so si Hebrang in njegova struja v KPH ter tudi posamezniki v OF, ne glede na svojo privrženost povezovanju južnoslovanskih narodov v Jugoslavijo, prizadevali za državo na dejanskih federalnih temeljih, pri čemer bi posamezne federalne enote imele maksimalno avtonomijo. Njihovo ravnanje se zdi z današnjega stališča nekoliko naivno, saj je bilo že tedaj po zgledu SZ mogoče predvideti, da komunistične oblasti ne tolerirajo dejanskega koncepta sestavljene države oz. je bila ta mogoča le na papirju. Vrh KPJ je posledično poskuse avtonomističnih gibanj znotraj lastnega gibanja doživel kot grožnjo obstoju svoje vladavine, zato jo je odpravil z metodo vzornega učenca tedanje moskovske matice, avtonomistična gibanja pa so svoja prizadevanja pogosto zelo drago plačala.

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ERIKA AŠIČ¹

Dojemanje vonja učencev s strani osnovnošolskih učiteljev

Povzetek: V prispevku se osredotočam na dojemanje vonja učencev med osnovnošolskimi učitelji.

V prvem delu s pomočjo pregleda literature ter primerjave med nekaterimi avtorji predstavim pomen vonja na splošno ter pomen vonja z vidika celostne osebnosti. V drugem delu s pomočjo kvalitativne analize predstavljam ugotovitve raziskav med 54 osnovnošolskimi učitelji. Med raziskovanjem me je zanimalo predvsem učiteljevo dojemanje učenčevega vonja, vpliv učenčevega vonja na učiteljevo počutje ter kaj storijo, ko pri učencu zaznajo neprijeten vonj.

Rezultati kažejo, da je za večino vprašanih učiteljev vonj učencev pomemben in ga opazijo; da se ob neprijetnem vonju učencev počutijo neprijetno; da težave z neprijetnim vonjem učencev redko rešujejo globlje (npr. v njihovi družini). Večina vprašanih učiteljev meni, da neprijeten vonj učencev ne vpliva na učni proces ter na odnos med učiteljem in učencem.

Ključne besede: vonj, učitelji, učno-vzgojni proces, odnos, osnovna šola

Perception of students' smell by primary school teachers

Abstract: In this paper, I focus on the perception of students' smell by primary school teachers.

In the first part, I present the importance of smell in general and the importance of smell from the point of view of an integrated personality, based on an overview of the literature and a compar-

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ison between several authors. In the second part, I use qualitative analysis to present the findings of a research among 54 primary school teachers. In the research, I was primarily interested in the teachers' perception of students' smell, the influence of students' smell on the teachers' well-being and the course of action when they notice an unpleasant smell in the student.

The results show that for most of the teachers asked, the students' smell is important and they notice it; that they feel uncomfortable with the unpleasant smell of students; that they rarely try to solve problems with the unpleasant smell of students on a deeper level (e.g. in their family). Most of the teachers asked believe that the unpleasant smell of students does not affect the educational process and the relationship between teacher and student.

Keywords: smell, teachers, educational process, relationship, primary school

Uvod

Čutilo za voh se nahaja v vohalnem delu nosne sluznice (zgornja tretjina nosne sluznice). Neposredno je povezan z možgani, s hipokampusom in amigdalo, ki sta odgovorna za učenje, pomnjenje in čustvovanje, kar je ključen razlog pomena vonja za človeka (Prezelj 2020, 18; Arnau 2001). Ljudje smo različno občutljivi na vonjalne dražljaje, nekatere situacije vonjalni prag povečajo (npr. postenje, nosečnost) ali ga znižajo (npr. prehlad) (Pečjak 1977, 79). Občutljivost na vonj je manjša kot pri živalih ter manjša, kot je občutljivost drugih čutil pri človeku, poleg tega se vonjalni občutki adaptirajo, občutljivost pa se hitro vrne (Arnau 2001, 67; Pečjak 1977, 79).

V zadnjih letih so (bili) prisotni še trije pomembni vzroki, da smo imeli manj vonjalnih dražljajev: (1) maske, ki smo jih nosili, da bi se zaščitili pred boleznijo covid-19, (2) okrnjen vonj po prebolelem Covid-19 ter (3) digitalizacija – ko veliko stvari delamo na

daljavo, s pomočjo različnih digitalnih pripomočkov in aplikacij ter brez osebne stika (služba, šola, stiki s prijatelji in sorodniki, zabava, kultura, nakupovanje, urejanje upravnih zadev itd.), imamo manj priložnosti za vonjanje.

Čutilo za voh je eno od petih čutil (VAKOG – vizualni (vid), avditivni (sluh), kinestetični (gib, otip), olfaktorni (sluh), gustatorni (okus)), s katerimi zaznavamo informacije iz zunanjega sveta. Skupaj z gustatornim ga večkrat priključujemo kinestetičnemu zaznavnemu sistemu (zaznavni sistem VAK – vizualni, avditivni, kinestetični) (Schmidt 2010, 16; Šepec 2013, 257–276; Tomić 2003, 189).

Tomić opisuje model dvanajstih čutov (VAKOG in občutek za čas) kot zunanje in notranje senzorične zmožnosti (Tomić 2003, 23–24). Navadno so olfaktorne in gustatorne senzorične zmožnosti manjše kot preostale tri (Pečjak 1977, 28; Tomić 2003, 24–25; Majid 2021, 111). Pri zunanjih senzoričnih zmožnostih gre za čutno zaznavanje, neposredno opazovanje, čemur v spoznavnem procesu sledi miselna predelava čutnih izkušenj. Za notranje predstave (senzorične zmožnosti) pa gre, ko imamo dovolj zunanjih vtisov, čutnih izkušenj, da lahko brez trenutnega čutnega zaznavanja priključimo v spomin neko čutno izkušnjo (npr. določen vonj, z njim povezan dogodek, osebo) (Tomić 2003, 70–73; O'Connor in Seymour 1996, 52–54). Po Schopenhauerju je čutilo za voh temeljni čut spomina, ki obudi vtise preteklih dogodkov (Schlögel 2021, 26); vonj se torej globoko zasidra v naše možgane (Kocuvan 2017, 28).

V osnovi so vonjave povezane s hedonskimi toni, za človeka so vonji prijetni ali neprijetni in ga usmerjajo h koristnim snovem ali ga odvrčajo od škodljivih (Pečjak 1977, 80). Prijeten in neprijeten vonj se procesirata drugače, drugačna je centralno živčna obdelava in tudi čustven odziv (npr. prevodnost kože, bitje srca). Človek neprijetne vonjave prepozna neodvisno od starosti, medtem ko je prepoznavanje prijetnih vonjav odvisno od starosti. Hitreje se od-

zovemo na neprijetne vonjave, ki v nas pustijo tudi daljši vtis (Konstantinidis idr. 2006, 615–616). Malček se na vonj odziva drugače kot odrasel človek; otrok naj bi se šele okrog osmega leta starosti »poenotil« s kulturo, v kateri živi (kaj je neprijetno/prijetno) (Kocuvan 2017, 30).

Iz literature lahko vidimo, da je neprijeten vonj povezan z revščino, neurejenostjo, umazanijo, boleznijo, vonjem po smrti, taborišču, natrpanostjo ljudi, ujetostjo, izkoriščanjem. Prijetni vonji pa so povezani s čistočo, urejenostjo, denarjem, ugledom, višjim slojem, močjo, svobodo, ugodjem, v nekaterih situacijah tudi z upanjem na preživetje (npr. kruh v taborišču), s spomini na prijetne dogodke ... (npr. Schlögel 2021; Ramšak 2020; Studen 2015; Süskind 2014, Classen idr. 1994). Pogojevan je s predsodki, pomembna je tudi njegova družbena vloga (Miller 2006). Prijeten vonj ali le misel nanj izboljša razpoloženje, neprijeten vonj pa ga poslabša (Kocuvan 2017, 32; Ramšak 2020, 36). Gotovo imamo tudi kakšno svojo izkušnjo.

Vonj ima tudi obrambno funkcijo, saj vonjamo, preden okušamo (Miller 2006, 110 in 366). Vonj je »čut trenutka«; ne moremo ga shraniti; ne vemo, kako je vonjala preteklost in kako bo vonjala prihodnost. Lahko pa vonj poustvarimo, simuliramo (sintetični vonji), tak je lahko celo močnejši od originala (Classen idr. 1994, 204) in dodan tudi v hrano, za spodbujanje apetita (Classen idr. 1994, 181). Vonja ne moremo meriti (zvok npr. izrazimo v decibelih), tudi omejiti ga ne moremo (npr. vonj iz Auschwitz) (Classen idr. 1994, 170–173). Ker se sčasoma privadimo na vonj, svojega (smradu) ne bomo čutili; v mnogih pogledih je tako naš vonj stvaritev drugega (Miller 2006, 366).

Človek je celostna osebnost (Ramovš 2017, 115–120; Frankl 1994). Kar zazna naše telo, vzpostavi povezavo v možganih in tako vpliva na spoznavanje, čustva, vedenje, odnos do sebe, na vzpostavljanje odnosov z drugimi ter na naš odnos do okolja, tudi do preteklosti.

Vonj prodre v naše možgane in povzroča odziv, česar ne moremo preprečiti (Kocuvan 2017, 34). Čeprav smo v zahodni kulturi jezikovno šibki na področju izražanja o vonju (Majid 2021, 112; Ramšak 2020, 31–32; Miller 2006), pa tudi vedenjskih študij o vonju ni ravno veliko (Majid 2021, 111), lahko, če smo pozorni, opazimo velik pomen vonja za naše življenje (Classen idr. 1994; Ramšak 2020). Ustavimo se le pri nekaterih funkcijah vonja, ki bolj vplivajo na odnose med ljudmi (tu ne navajamo vseh funkcij vonja):

- Spremenjen (neprijeten) vonj ali pomanjkanje sposobnosti vonjanja nam sporoča o bolezni človeka (vnetje ustne votline, presnovne motnje, vnetje sinusov, Alzheimerjeva bolezen, Parkinsonova bolezen, Covid-19 ...) (npr. Classen idr. 1994, 60–61 in 184; Majid 2021, 111–112).
- V vonju se odraža hrana, ki jo zaužijemo (česen, mesna hrana, veganska hrana ...) (npr. Classen idr. 1994, 165; Kocuvan 2017, 31).
- Nekateri vonji nas spominjajo na določene ljudi, dogodke, situacije, kraje, življenjska obdobja, občutke (Schlögel 2021; Ramšak 2020, 29–33; Süskind 2014; Studen 2015, 25–28 in 200–206; Classen idr. 1994, 161–179; Kocuvan 2017, 28 in 36–38; de Cupere 2021, 72–73; Jenič in Areh 2021, 106–108; Schmidt 2010, 20).
- V vonju se odražajo življenjska obdobja (novorojenček, otrok, pubertetnik, starostnik) (Classen idr. 1994, 165; Kocuvan 2017, 31).
- Nekatere vonjave spodbujajo določene psihološke pojave, občutke in vplivajo na nekatere fizične zmožnosti (pomirjajo, spodbujajo pozornost, učenje, povečujejo spolno slo, učinkovitost pri delu ... - različne dišave se uporabljajo v tržne namene, pri verskih obredih, na nekaterih delovnih mestih, v šolah, aromaterapijah, zdravljenju ipd.) (Kocuvan 2017, 32–33; Classen idr. 1994, 180–203; Majid 2021, 111; Šepec 2013, 276–277; Ramšak 2020, 29–31; Marković in Vulin 2008, 22; Howes 2021, 30–31; de Cupere 2021, 75–83).

- Zaznavanje s čutilom (vonjanjem) omogoča spoznavanje, to poveča pomnjenje, ki povečuje razumevanje, to pa razsojanje, odločanje, spomin (Komensky 1958, 17 in 106; Šepec 2013, 276–277).
- Malček spoznava svet tudi z vonjem in okusom (vse nosi v usta, vendar če mu nekaj ne diši, tega ne bo dal v usta) (Mennen 1999).
- Vonj vpliva na to, s kom se družimo in kje (če nekdo ali nekaj oddaja nam neprijeten vonj, smo težko tam) (Schmidt 2010, 20; Miller 2006).
- Vonj vpliva na razvoj predsodkov (čefurji, Romi, črnici, revni ... smrdijo; bogati dišijo) (Miller 2006; Ramšak 2020, 29–31 in 35; Stojanović 2017; Süskind 2014; Schlögel 2021; Classen idr. 1994, 161–172; Kocuvan 2017, 24–26 in 30–31; Studen 2015, 25–28).

Neprijetna občutenja, ki so povezana s čustvenim odzivom na nekaj, v nas povzročijo gnus. Občutenje gnusa je človeško, razvije se med 4. in 8. letom, se nato razvija in je kulturno pogojeno. Na občutenje gnusa zelo vpliva vonj – če bi bile stvari, ki so nam gnusne (urin, iztrebki, znoj, gnitje), brez vonja, bi nam bile manj gnusne (Miller 2006).

Prav veliko raziskav s področja odnosov v vzgoji in izobraževanju, ki bi bile povezane z vonjem, nisem zasledila. Lahko pa si pomagamo z raziskavami z drugih področij (Majid 2021; Šepec 2013; Marković in Vulin 2008; Kocuvan 2017; Konstantinidis idr. 2006; Howes 2021; Orel 2021; de Cupere 2021; Miller 2006), ki potrjujejo, da se človeku določen (prijeten ali neprijeten) vonj vtisne v spomin, ustvari temu ustrezne (ne)prijetne občutke in čustva, priključijo tudi fizični odziv ter v človeku ostane dolgotrajno. Tako vpliva na človekovo nadaljnje vedenje – na vse razsežnosti njegove osebnosti.

Vidimo, kako pomemben vpliv na različne vidike človekove osebnosti in življenja ima vonj, ki ga cenimo manj kot druge čute. V minulem času covida-19 smo bili v vedno večji digitalizaciji in

smo bili gotovo manj izpostavljeni različnim vonjem. Morda bi bilo prav, da bi zavestno razvijali ta čut pri otrocih. Otroci čute – tudi vonj – doživljajo še najbolj prvinsko in intenzivno (Mennen 1999, 57); »čim več vonjamo in okušamo, tem bolj smo občutljivi za odtenke« (Mennen 1999, 72). Otroci vadijo vonj že v prenatalnem obdobju, v prvem letu življenja pa imata vonj in okus glavno vlogo, ki se v obdobju otrokovega razvoja skoraj ne zmanjšuje (Mennen 1999, 58). Pri odraslih se nekaj te občutljivosti navadno izgubi (Mennen 1999, 57). Vonj ima zelo pomembno vlogo pri okušanju (Pečjak 1977, 80; Mennen 1999, 69) (pomislimo na obdobje, ko imamo oslavljen vonj zaradi nahoda).

Vonj takoj zaznamo in je povezan neposredno z našimi možgani – z učenjem, pomnjenjem in čustvovanjem. Nekatere vonjave spodbujajo učenje in učinkovitost pri delu, nekatere stvari pa si lahko z vonjanjem bolj zapomnimo – gotovo imata tu veliko prednost naravoslovje in učenje tujih jezikov. S pomočjo vonja marsikatera rastlina, žival, pojav, hrana ostane bolj v spominu kot brez njega. Nekateri avtorji zelo poudarjajo pomen veččutnega učenja, pomen celostne vzgoje (z upoštevanjem vseh čutov), ki upošteva in razvija dostojanstvo človeka ter spodbuja dolgotrajno pomnjenje in uspešno učenje (Tomić 2003; Pallasmaa 2007; Šepec 2013, 277; Schmidt 2010, 17 in 24–25; Jenič in Areh 2021, 104–108). Na to naj bi še posebej pazili učitelji na vseh stopnjah ter razvijali ostrino zunanjih in notranjih čutil (Tomić 2003; Komensky 1958; Marentič Požarnik 2018).

Vonjanje je pomembno v našem osebnem doživljanju, razvoju mišljenja, vpliva na zaznavanje, razpoloženje, učenje, spomin, vedenje, pa tudi na socialne odnose. Vedenje o tem, da se to, kar vonjamo (prijetno ali neprijetno), dolgoročno vtisne v spomin (Jenič in Areh 2021, 106; Classen idr. 1994, 87–88; Miller 2006), je za šolsko okolje pomembno vsaj z dveh vidikov: zaznavnega (uporaba vonjav pri učenju (Šepec 2013; Schmidt 2010; Stojanović 2017; Mennen 1999))

in socialnega (ustvarjanje predsodkov, odpor do neprijetnih vonjav, dajanje prednosti osebam s prijetnim vonjem, ki nas asociira na čisto, lepo, bogato (Ramšak 2020; Prezelj 2020; Schlögel 2021; Süskind 2014)). Tu se bomo bolj posvetili socialnemu.

Odnosi med učitelji in učenci ter med učenci samimi zelo pomembno vplivajo na razredno klimo, s tem pa na kakovost učnega procesa, na uspešnost učenja in poučevanja ter na razvoj osebnosti – tako učenca kot učitelja (Marentič Požarnik 2018, 249–258). Na to, kaj vonjamo, ne moremo vplivati, saj vonj do nas prihaja z dihanjem. V šoli je poleg predsodkov na podlagi drugih značilnosti (Romi, priseljenci) tudi vonj nekoga lahko razlog, da ga sošolci izločijo, se ga izogibajo. Odpor do takega otroka se lahko (nezavedno) zgodi tudi učiteljem. Razlogi za neprijeten vonj otroka so lahko šibke socialne, higienske in/ali zdravstvene razmere, tak otrok dejansko v šolo prihaja s slabim vonjem (ki je povezan s slabo higieno ali zdravjem). V raziskavi nas je zanimalo, kako se z vonjem in morebitnimi ovirami zaradi vonja učencev srečujejo učitelji, kako to doživljajo ter kako to vpliva na njihovo delo.

Namen in cilji

Namen raziskave je bil preveriti, kako vprašani učitelji dojemajo neprijeten vonj učencev; kako ga opredelijo, kako se ob njem počutijo, katere razloge za neprijeten vonj učencev navajajo ter kaj storijo, ko pri učencu zaznajo dalj časa trajajoč neprijeten vonj.

Cilji raziskave so bili:

- 1) pridobiti informacije o tem, kako (nekateri) učitelji opredelijo neprijeten vonj pri učencih;
- 2) pridobiti informacije o tem, kako se (nekateri) učitelji počutijo ob neprijetnem vonju učencev;
- 3) pridobiti informacije o zavedanju in ravnanju (nekaterih) učiteljev v situacijah, ko so soočeni z neprijetnim vonjem učencev;

- 4) raziskati, katere razloge (nekateri) učitelji navajajo za neprijeten vonj učencev;
- 5) raziskati, kako se učitelji odzivajo na dalj časa trajajoč neprijeten vonj učencev.

V raziskavi sem si postavila naslednja raziskovalna vprašanja:

- RV1: Kako učitelji opredelijo neprijeten vonj pri učencih?
- RV2: Kako se učitelji počutijo ob neprijetnem vonju učencev?
- RV3: Katere razloge za neprijeten vonj učencev prepoznajo/opredelijo učitelji?
- RV4: Kaj učitelji (načrtno) storijo, ko pri učencu zaznajo neprijeten vonj?
- RV5: Kaj učitelji storijo, ko pri učencu zaznajo dalj časa trajajoč neprijeten vonj?

Smisel raziskave je (1) okrepiti zavedanje, da je človek celostna osebnost in kot tak deluje tudi na podlagi čutnih zaznav ter (2) okrepiti zavedanje o morebitnem nezavednem ravnanju učiteljev ob neprijetnem vonju učenca, ki bi lahko vplivalo na kakovost učno-vzgojnega procesa.

Metode

Za raziskavo sem pripravila spletni vprašalnik (na spletnem orodju 1ka) z vprašanji odprtega in zaprtega tipa. Vprašanj nisem povzemala po nobenem vzorcu, ampak sem sledila temu, kar me je v raziskavi zanimalo. Vprašanja, katerih vsebina se povezuje z zgoraj zapisanimi raziskovalnimi vprašanji, so bila odprtega tipa (dopuščala so neomejeno dolg odgovor) in sem jih obdelala kvalitativno po postopku kodiranja po Glaserju in Straussu (Mesec 1997, 29-37), ki je smiselno prirejen glede na to, da so bili odgovori kratki in jedrnat:

1. Dobeseden izpis izjav.
2. Podčrtovanje delov izjav, ki bolj natančno izražajo vsebino.

3. Izpis podčrtanih delov.
4. Pripisovanje kod.
5. Ureditev izvlečkov po kodah.
6. Oblikovanje pojmov – pripisovanje pojmov
7. Urejanje pojmov v kategorije ter dodajanje manjkajočih pojmov.
8. Oblikovanje teorije.

Uporabila sem metodo snežne kepe. Osem osnovnošolskih učiteljev različnih šol, s katerimi sem kdaj imela stike zaradi drugih dejavnosti, sem prosila, da izpolnijo vprašalnik ter prošnjo posredujejo tudi sodelavcem. Učitelji so izpolnjevali anketo med 14. in 20. 3. 2022. Ustrezno izpolnjenih je bilo 54 vprašalnikov, do konca jih je bilo izpolnjenih 48. Zagotovljena sta bila anonimnost ter v povabilu opredeljen namen raziskave.

Zaradi načina izbora sodelujočih vzorec raziskave ni reprezentativen, kljub temu pa nam v razmislek daje zanimive informacije.


Rezultati in razprava

Demografski podatki


V raziskavi so sodelovali osnovnošolski učitelji (N=48).² Vprašalnik je izpolnilo 7 moških in 41 žensk. V Grafu 1 je razviden delež sodelujočih po starostnih skupinah, v Grafu 2 pa starost otrok, ki jih vprašani poučujejo.

² Demografska vprašanja so bila ob koncu, zato je tu le 48 odgovorov – kolikor vprašanih je vprašalnik izpolnilo do konca. V začetnih vprašanjih pa je bilo odgovorov 54.

Graf 1: Delež sodelujočih osnovnošolskih učiteljev glede na starost (N=48)



Graf 2: Delež sodelujočih osnovnošolskih učiteljev glede na stopnjo, na kateri poučujejo (N=48)




Če pogledamo še regije: 18 sodelujočih poučuje v Jugovzhodni regiji, 14 v Gorenjski regiji, 9 v Savinjski, 5 v Osrednjeslovenski, po 1 pa poučuje v Podravski in Pomurski regiji.

Rezultati in opis rezultatov

Zaznavanje vonjav

Prva tri vprašanja so bila zaprtega tipa, odgovori pa nam pomagajo razumeti izhodišče. Vprašani so bili (N=54): (1) ali se jim zdi, da dobro zaznavajo vonjave (da/ne/ne vem; Graf 3); (2) kako se jim zdi, da vonj vpliva na počutje človeka (zelo pomembno/pomembno/delno/sploh ne; Graf 4) ter (3) ali se jim zdi, da imajo določeni pojmi, prostori, pojavi poseben vonj (da/ne/ne vem; Graf 5).


Graf 3: Odgovor na vprašanje, kako dobro sami zaznavajo vonjave iz okolja (N=54)




- (1) Iz Grafa 3 vidimo, da velika večina vprašanih (87 %) meni, da ima izostren čut za vonj.
- (2) Iz Grafa 4 je opazno, da vsi vprašani zaznavajo določen vpliv vonja na počutje človeka, od tega velika večina (96 %) meni, da je vonj (zelo) pomemben faktor počutja.
- (3) Iz Grafa 5 razberemo, da velika večina vprašanih (79 %) povezuje določene pojme, prostore, stvari z vonjem. V podvprašanju so imeli možnost navesti, na kaj so ob tem vprašanju pomislili. Navajali so npr.: letni časi, rojstvo, smrt, otroštvo, praznični dnevi in obredje v cerkvi (sveti večer, božič, veli-

ka noč ...), knjižnica, bolnišnica, učilnica, kuhinja, dom, stara podstrešja, garderoba po tekmi, hlev, arhiv, mrliška vežica, sprehod po dežju, peka kruha, morje.

Graf 4: Mnenje vprašanih o vplivu vonja na počutje človeka



Graf 5: Odgovori na vprašanje, ali imajo določene stvari, pojmi poseben vonj (N=54)



RV1: Kako učitelji opredelijo neprijeten vonj pri učencih?

Za prvo raziskovalno vprašanje sta bili pomembni vprašanji št. 6 (Ali zaznate, da imajo učenci različen vonj?) in 7 (Ali kdaj za-

znate, da ima učenec močan vonj, ki je za vas neprijeten? Lahko navedete kateri?).

Večina učiteljev (49) je odgovorila, da zazna različen vonj učencev, 5 jih različnega vonja učencev ne zazna. Vprašanje 6 je bilo zaprtega tipa (da/ne).

Vprašanje 7 je bilo odprtega tipa, učitelji so imeli možnost navesti različne vonje, ki jih zaznajo pri učencih in so zanje neprijetni. Kar 49 učiteljev je navedlo zanje neprijeten vonj, ki ga zaznajo pri učencu. V postopku kvalitativne analize sta se izrisali naslednji kategoriji odgovorov:

- Učitelji kot neprijetne zaznavajo vonjave učencev, ki so sicer *v osnovi prijetne* (dišave, dezodoranti, parfumi), vendar jih ob slabi kakovosti, premočni ali nepravilni (ko telo ali oblačila niso čista) uporabi zaznavajo kot neprijetne.
- *V osnovi neprijetne vonjave*, kot take so tudi zaznane:
 - vonj po kajenju (aktivnem ali pasivnem – ko npr. starši kadijo, ta vonj pa prevzemajo oblačila in zvezki otrok);
 - vonj po slabi higieni (neumito telo, neoprana oblačila, vonj po slabih bivalnih razmerah (vlaga, plesen, dim v hiši), prepotenost (po športni vzgoji) ter vonj po izločkih (urin, blato));
 - vonj, ki izraža težave z zdravjem (npr. gniloba zob);
 - poseben vonj, povezan z razvojnim obdobjem (puberteta – vonj znoja je bolj močan).

Vprašanje je bilo osredotočeno na neprijeten vonj, ki ga učitelji zaznajo pri učencih. Za ilustracijo navajam nekaj odgovorov učiteljev, kateri vonj, ki je zanje neprijeten, zaznajo pri učencih:

»Oblučila z vonjem po praških, mehčalcih ali cigaretne dimu, če starši kadijo v stanovanju. Takrat imajo vonj tudi zvezki.«

»Prepotenost, močni dezodoranti (sploh po kakšni uri športa), plesen oz. vlaga (vonj oblačil pri kakšnih učencih iz socialno šibkejših družin), tudi vonj po izločkih (sem že imela učenca, ki je

imel težave z odvajanjem blata).«

»Ja, predvsem od 7. razreda dalje, ko jih daje puberteta in razganja hormone. Pa ko pridejo po športni uri nazaj v razred čisto prepoteni. Ali pa spomladi, ko jih začne razganjati. Zavohal sem pa tudi že učenca zaradi slabe higiene.«

Iz dokaj majhnega števila odgovorov je že razbrati ujemanje z izsledki raziskav v uvodu omenjenih avtorjev. Učitelji so npr. navajali neprijeten vonj zaradi neprimerne uporabe dezodorantov ter (v kombinaciji) s prepotenostjo pri športni vzgoji (Ramšak 2020, 29–33). Navajali so slabe higienske razmere (Ramšak 2020, 29–33; Schlögel 2021; Majid 2021, 111; Howes 2021, 30–31), omenili so tudi povezave neprijetnih vonjev z boleznijo (Classen idr. 1994, 60–61 in 184; Majid 2021, 111–112). Med odgovori smo razbrali tudi povezanost neprijetnih vonjev z obdobjem odraščanja (Kocuvan 2017, 36–38; Classen idr. 1994, 161–179). Vse to lahko negativno vpliva na socialne odnose med otroki samimi in med učitelji ter otroki, saj je povezano s čustvi (Arnau 2001; Prezelj 2020). Ustvarja lahko predsodke (Ramšak 2020, 29–31 in 35; Studen 2015, 25–28; Kocuvan 2017, 24–26 in 30–31) ali se stopnjuje do gnusa (Miller 2006). Nihče od učiteljev ni navedel vonja, ki jih povzročajo t. i. vetrovi učencev. Te vonjave so v razredih dokaj pogoste; morda so pozabili ali pa jim je bilo nelagodno pisati o tem.

Tako številčnost kot vsebina odgovorov kaže, da je vonj učencev v razredu za učitelje pomemben, da ga učitelji zaznajo in se ga zavedajo.

RV2: Kako se učitelji počutijo ob neprijetnem vonju učencev?

V 10. vprašanju so bili učitelji vprašani po njihovih občutkih, ko pri učencu zaznajo vonj, ki jim je neprijeten. Na vprašanje je odgovorilo 44 vprašanih.

V grobem bi lahko odgovore vprašanih razdelili v dve skupini. Nekateri so zapisali odgovore, povezane z *občutji* ob ne-

prijetnem vonju učencev (to je bila vsebina vprašanja), v drugo skupino pa sem uvrstila odgovore, v katerih so učitelji zapisali bodisi njihove *misli*, *reakcije* bodisi *razlago* stanja. Slednjih tu ne navajam, ker niso bili povezani z vprašanjem. Odgovori so se mi skozi kvalitativno analizo (Mesec 1997) izrisali v naslednje kategorije in kode.

Neprijetne občutke, ki jih učitelj zazna ob neprijetnem vonju učencev, lahko opišemo kot:

- kratkotrajen, rahlo moteč občutek (»to je le rahlo moteč občutek«);
- neprijeten, odbijajoč, nelagoden občutek (»odbijajoč občutek«, »neprijetno mi je«);
- občutek groze (»težko sem v bližini, ker me le-ta navdaja z grozo«);
- gnus (»če je vonj močan, vzbudi gnus«);
- pomilovanje (»smili se mi«, »žal mi je zanj, ker živi v neprimer- nem okolju«);
- jeza (»Jezilo me je, da sem se kot razredničarka morala ukvarjati s tem in s tem soočiti starše. Učenko so zaradi tega v razredu zavračali.«);
- občutek stiske (»stisne me«, »počutim se manj sproščeno, kot bi se sicer«);
- občutek tesnobe, razočaranja.

Odziv učiteljevega telesa na neprijeten vonj učenca:


- neprijeten občutek v nosu;
- občutek telesne slabosti (»Ko je učenec imel vonj po npr. hle- vu ali cigaretah ali potu. Pravzaprav lahko rečem, da se mi je obračal želodec.«);
- oteženo dihanje (»to je tako izrazit vonj, ki se razlega po celi učilnici, da je težko dihati«);
- nezaveden odziv na obrazu (»morda se včasih nezavedno skremžim«).

Iz odgovorov je razvidno, da so ob neprijetnem vonju učenca tudi občutki in počutje učitelja neprijetni, nelagodni, nekateri omenjajo celo gnus in grozo (Ramšak 2020; Miller 2006; Studen 2015). Nekateri so zaznali tudi odziv telesa (slabost, nezavedni fizični odmik, težko dihanje). Vse navedeno nam sporoča o celovitosti človekove osebnosti (Frankl 1994; Ramovš 2017) ter tesne povezanosti čutnega zaznavanja s fizičnim, duševnim in duhovnim odzivom (Šepec 2013; Kocuvan 2017; Orel 2021; Howes 2021; Majid 2021; Jenič in Areh 2021; de Cupere 2021). Zelo malo je bilo odgovorov o nevtralnosti oz. rahlem negativnem počutju, nihče pa ni zapisal, da bi se ob neprijetnem vonju učencev počutil prijetno. Postavlja se mi vprašanje, koliko možnosti je, da učitelj ob neprijetnem vonju učenca/ev nezavedno deluje nevtravno oz. objektivno enako kot do drugih učencev oz. enako kot do tistih s prijetnim vonjem.

Približno polovica učiteljev v svojem odgovoru ni pisala o svojih občutjih, po čemer sem jih spraševala, ampak so opisali svoje misli in vprašanja o zaznanem ob neprijetnem vonju učenca (npr. »v kakšnih razmerah živi, da se ni umil« ...) ter kaj bi lahko oni storili v povezavi s tem; (1) iskali so vzroke za neprijeten vonj, niso pa stopili v stik s sabo, da bi pomislili na svoje občutke ob neprijetnem vonju ter (2) pisali so o možnostih, kaj bi lahko oziroma so morda v preteklosti v zvezi s tem že storili.

Ob tem lahko omenim tudi odgovore učiteljev na vprašanje (12), ali jim je kdaj ob neprijetnem vonju učencev postalo fizično slabo (Graf 6). Nekateri so pripisali, da so ob tem odprli okno, opomnili svetovalno delavko. Zanimiv pa je bil odgovor ene od učiteljic, da ji je postalo fizično slabo ob vonju sodelavke.

Graf 6: Odgovor na vprašanje, ali so učitelji že kdaj čutili fizično slabost ob neprijetnem vonju učenca (N=47)



RV3: Katere razloge za neprijeten vonj učencev prepoznajo/opredelijo učitelji?

V 13. vprašanju me je zanimalo, katere razloge za neprijeten, moteč vonj učencev prepoznajo, opredelijo učitelji. Vprašanje je bilo odprtega tipa, odgovorov nanj je bilo 42. S pomočjo kvalitativne analize sta se izkristalizirali dve glavni kategoriji vzrokov glede na izvor neprijetnih vonjev, znotraj njiju pa še več različnih vzrokov (kode), ki jih prepoznajo učitelji pri učencih.

Vpliv *okolja*:

- slabe bivanjske in higienske razmere in navade (»slabe stanovanjske razmere«);
- šibka skrb in higienske navade staršev (»slaba skrb staršev oz. ga/jo starši niso naučili redne higijene«, »starši so manj skrbni in imajo pogosto tudi sami podobne težave«);
- vonj po kajenju, če starši kadijo doma (»starši kadijo v prostoru, kjer se zadržuje«);
- pretirana uporaba dišav (»močni vonji šamponov, praškov«);

- oblačila izpostavljena prostoru, kjer se pripravlja hrana;
- vrsta oblačila, ki vpliva na znojenje (»sintetična oblačila«);
- z gledovanje po sovrstnikih (»vpliv sovrstnikov«).

Vzrok v osebi, v posamezniku samem:

- razvojno pogojeni vzroki (puberteta) (»hormonska neuravnovešenost, ki je posledica odraščanja«, »najstniki po uri športa v učilnici v poletnih mesecih (odraščanje, puberteta)«);
- premalo umivanja (»pomanjkljiva higiena (npr. tuširanje, umivanje zob) – zaradi lenobe ali nepoučenosti«);
- povezanost z zdravjem (»prekomerna teža«, »Predvsem imajo to podedovano. Otrok ima bolj izrazit vonj znoja, ki ga podeduje. Poznam primer, ko ima hči enak vonj kot mamica.«, »zakisanost telesa zaradi neustrezne prehrane«);
- pretirana ali nepravilna uporaba dišav (»večji otroci se včasih prekomerno dišavijo«, »kombinacija prepotenosti in dezodoranta«);
- neurejena ali nezdrava prehrana (»brez zajtrka«, »zelo začinjena hrana«);
- kajenje.

Iz analize se vidi pestra paleta vzrokov za neprijetne vonjave. Največ težav izvira iz domačega okolja; odvisno, kako starši skrbijo za svojo osebno higieno, za higieno doma ter kako v povezavi s tem vzgajajo otroke, kakšne higienske navade jim privzgojijo. Če je staršem pomembno, da so urejeni in čisti, bodo tako vzgojeni tudi otroci. Če starši doma – v zaprtem prostoru kadijo, otrok in njegova oblačila in učni pripomočki ta vonj prevzamejo nase. Kot naslednji večji vzrok neprijetnih vonjav učencev navajajo puberteto ter povečano znojenje v tem obdobju v kombinaciji s pretirano uporabo dezodorantov. Največkrat učitelji navajajo kombinacijo več razlogov (npr. »deklica je prišla v obdobje pubertete, je močnejše postave in doma nimajo ravno urejenih higienskih navad« ali »neprimerne življenjske razmere, zanemarjanje otrok s strani staršev« ipd.).

Ob dobrih higienskih navadah se tudi neprijeten vonj zaradi pubertete (Classen idr. 1994, 161–179; Kocuvan 2017, 28 in 36–38) in znojenje pri športni vzgoji da preprečiti – z umivanjem, s svežimi oblačili. Če otroka/mladostnika tega starši naučijo (Ramovš 2017, 284). Ni nezamisljivo, kako veliko vlogo imajo dobre higienske razmere doma – saj otrok nehote postane žrtev izogibanja drugih zaradi neprijetnih vonjav (Miller 2006; Ramšak 2020, 29–35; Classen idr. 1994, 180–203; Studen 2015, 25–28), za katere morda niti ni sam kriv. Če že učitelji zaznajo neprijeten vonj učenca in se mu izognejo, se od njega odmaknejo (kot smo ugotovili pri RV2), bodo verjetno tako storili tudi otroci, sovrstniki.

RV4: Kaj učitelji (načrtno) storijo, ko pri učencu zaznajo neprijeten vonj?

V 11. vprašanju me je zanimalo, ali so se vprašani kdaj zavestno odzvali na neprijeten vonj učenca. Od 43 učiteljev se jih 28 ni odzvalo oz. se takega primera ne spomni. Od preostalih (15) so nekateri odprli okno, nekateri so se pogovorili z razredničarko, drugi so na glas opozorili razred, da se določene stvari opravijo v sanitarijah (izpuščanje plinov, parfumiranje). Je pa nekaj zelo zanimivih odgovorov, ki jih tu navajam:

»Torba romskega učenca je močno zaudarjala in oddajala po učilnici zelo neprijeten vonj po dimu, hrani in urinu ..., po vonjavah, v katerih so živeli. Mlajši bratci in sestre so urinirali kar po tleh in verjetno tudi po torbi. Kar nekaj časa nisem ugotovila, kaj tako zaudarja v učilnici. Nekega dne so odšli v telovadnico in povonjala sem vsako torbo posebej in tako ugotovila, od kod prihajajo neprijetne vonjave. Dečku smo torbo zamenjali, ker v učilnici ni bilo za živeti.«

»V uro sem vpletla vsebino v zvezi s higieno oz. problemom, se pogovorila o tem z razredničarko in starši.«

»Deklici sem dala vlažen robček in ji svetovala, naj gre na stranišče in si obriše pazduhe.«

»Ob vonju blata sem otroka poslala potihoma na WC. Nato sem odšla za njim in mu pomagala pri oblačenju. Poklicala sem čistilko, ki je počistila WC do konca. V vrečko sem shranila njegova oblačila.«

»Učenec, ki je pred poukom hodil v hlev, se je za k pouku sicer preoblekel, vendar vedno ni umil las. Na to sem ga diskretno opozorila.«


Ta pričevanja govorijo o tem, da se nekateri učitelji zavedajo posledic, ki jih lahko imajo neprijetne vonjave za položaj otroka/mladostnika v razredu (Miller 2006; Ramšak 2020; Konstantinidis idr. 2006; Pallasmaa 2007). Zavedajo se svoje soodgovornosti do otroka in mu skušajo pomagati, da bi (1) se naučil pravilne higiene in (2) da ne bi bil zaradi neprijetnih vonjav odrinjen tako s strani vrstnikov kot učiteljev. S tem večajo spoštovanje dostojanstva tega otroka – pa tudi drugih prisotnih.

Na vprašanje, ali so učitelji kdaj zaradi premočnega vonja otroka vstopili v stik z njegovimi starši, jih je večina (39 od 44) odgovorila, da ne. Drugi (5) so stopili v stik s starši. Učiteljica navaja, da je starše opozorila na »redno preoblačenje po urah športa«, tri navajajo, da so se s starši pogovorile, »ampak posebnega napredka ni bilo«. Sporočilna pa je pripomba ene od vprašanih: »Je pa bil primer, ko niso imeli pogojev, pa jih je mati naučila dobrih higienskih navad.« Iz tega lahko razberemo, da so pomemben vir (ne)prijetnega vonja osebne higienske navade, ki jih odrasli prenašajo na otroke.

RV5: Kaj učitelji storijo, ko pri učencu zaznajo dalj časa trajajoč neprijeten vonj?

48 učiteljev je odgovorilo na vprašanje, kaj storijo, ko pri učencu zaznajo dalj časa trajajoč neprijeten vonj (Graf 7).

Graf 7: Izkušnja učiteljev, da je imel učenec dalj časa neprijeten vonj (N=48)



Kvalitativno sem obdelala odgovore tistih (13), ki so se na to odzvali in tudi zapisali, kaj so storili v takih primerih. Pokazala sta se dva načina reševanja teh težav (navajam kategorije in kode).

Reševanje *neposredno z otroki, v razredu*:

- Pogovor, neposredno z otrokom, ki ima težave (»z učencem sem se pogovoril o teh stvareh in mu predlagal rešitve«) oz. za pogovor s celim razredom (»o higieni smo govorili na razredni uri«);
- urejanje prostora tako, da je za vse lažje (»zračila učilnico, malo stran stopila«, »mehurček okrog njega«).

Reševanje težav *s pomočjo drugih pomembnih odraslih*:

- reševanje težave znotraj šolskega prostora (»opozorila romsko koordinatorico«, »povedala sem razredničarki«, »romski učenci so se v šoli začeli tuširati in preoblačiti v spremstvu svetovalne delavke«, »učenka se je tuširala v šoli, učitelji smo ji prinašali sveža oblačila svojih otrok«);

- pogovor s starši – pri tem je posebej zanimiva izkušnja, ki jo je vredno poudariti: »Učenka je precej časa imela izrazit vonj iz nosu, pogovorila sem se s starši. Bili so hvaležni, ker so odkrili zdravstveni vzrok in ga pozdravili.«

Odgovori pri tem vprašanju nam sporočajo, kako pomembna je vloga učitelja in kako veliko lahko naredi za otroke, ki jih poučuje (Marentič Požarnik 2018; Stojanovič 2017). Če je do njih pozoren, če je na delovnem mestu s srcem in čutom za odgovornost, če zna svoja opažanja in skrbi izraziti na pravi način, lahko otrokom pomaga ne samo v socialnem ali duševnem smislu, temveč tudi pri telesnem zdravju (Majid 2021; Classen idr. 1994).

Zaključek

Pričujoča raziskava nam kaže, kako vonj pomembno vpliva na odnose tudi v učno-vzgojnem procesu.

Človek je celostno bitje, njegove razsežnosti (telesna, duševna, duhovna, socialna) so povezane in soodvisne. Ko zavonjamo nekaj prijetnega, pomirjujočega, vzbudi v nas prijetno počutje, tudi na telesni ravni. Ko zavonjamo nekaj neprijetnega, odbijajočega, se skremžimo, odmaknemo, v nas se sprožijo neprijetni občutki in temu primerni (tudi telesni) odzivi.

Vonjanje pomembno vpliva na naše doživljanje, mišljenje, zaznavanje, razpoloženje, učenje, spomin, vedenje in tudi na socialne odnose. Vedenje o tem, da se to, kar vonjamo (prijetno ali neprijetno), dolgoročno vtisne v spomin, je za šolsko okolje pomembno z zaznavnega vidika (uporaba vonjav pri učenju) in socialnega (predsodki, odpor do neprijetnih vonjav, prednost osebam s prijetnim vonjem).

Raziskava je pokazala, da je za večino vprašanih učiteljev vonj učencev pomemben in ga zaznavajo. V večini poznajo tudi vzroke za neprijeten in moteč vonj otrok in mladih. Manj pa je takšnih učiteljev, ki skušajo do otroka oz. mladostnika pristopiti odgovorno,

zavedajoč se vpliva njegovega neprijetnega vonja na njegovo samospoštovanje ter socialni položaj. To ni lahko, gre za zelo osebne in občutljive stvari. Toda pomembne so za prihodnost tako odnosa med učiteljem in učencem, med učenci samimi kot za prihodnost otroka, ki ima s tem težave. Po vsej verjetnosti bo otrok z neprijetnim vonjem v družbi odrinjen, deležen žaljivk in zmerjanja. Razvijejo se predsodki, odpor do otroka, lahko tudi s strani učitelja. Pozoren, odgovoren, srčen in iznajdljiv učitelj lahko to velikokrat prepreči. S tem se poveča otrokovo samospoštovanje, zmanjša se njegova izločenost, morda se izboljša celo njegovo telesno zdravje, kot smo videli v raziskavi. Ugoden vpliv pa ima tudi na učno-vzgojni proces, saj je težko verjeti, da bi učitelj do učenca, ki v njem vzbuja odpor, neprijetne občutke, celo gnus ali grozo, kot so navedli učitelji v tej raziskavi, pristopil z enako naklonjenostjo kot do nekoga drugega, ki zaradi različnih vzrokov okrog sebe širi prijeten vonj.

Učitelj nosi veliko odgovornost za otroke in mlade. Na njem je, da ustvarja varno, spodbudno in odprto okolje. Da otroka spoštuje v vsem njegovem dostojanstvu ter mu pomaga pri razvoju v vsej njegovi celostnosti. Tudi s pomočjo zavedanja svojih čutnih zaznav ter zavedanja, da tudi drugi nas zaznavajo z vsemi čuti ter da to vpliva tudi na ustvarjanje odnosov. S pozornostjo, spoštljivo komunikacijo, kdaj celo s pogovorom z družino ali svetovalno službo ali neposredno pomočjo pri vzpostavljanju higiene učitelj lahko otroka iz ‚ozadja‘, zasramovanja s strani drugih otrok popelje v skupnost otrok in mu tako pomaga k boljši samopodobi, k boljšim socialnim stikom in gotovo tudi boljšemu učnemu uspehu.

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